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Abstract
This thesis concerns two different aspects of categorization, the first is an 
investigation with a novel paradigm, which relates to relative vs. absolute 
(supervised) categorization, and the second, an investigation of the simplicity 
model (Pothos & Chater, 2002). The first investigation was motivated from the 
relative judgment model (Stewart et al., 2005). According to this model, 
classification judgments in absolute identification tasks are influenced by the 
relative context in which they are presented. We examine the generality of this 
conclusion in categorization. In the present study, we tested 320 participants in 5 
experiments, in which participants had to classify new items into predefined 
artificial categories. In three experiments, we observed a (predominantly) relative 
mode of classification, and in 2 experiments we observed an absolute mode of 
classification. These results suggest three factors which promote a relative mode 
of classification; when there are fewer items per group, more training groups, and 
the presence of a time delay. Overall, we propose that less information about the 
distributional properties of a category and/or weaker memory traces for the 
category exemplars (induced, e.g., by smaller item numbers per category, or a 
time delay respectively) can encourage relative judgment. For the simplicity 
model, we conducted three experiments, a free sort task, a learning task and a 
memory task. In the free sort task, we asked 169 participants to spontaneously 
categorize nine sets of items. A category structure was assumed to be more 
intuitive if a large number of participants consistently produced the same 
classification. Our results provide a rich empirical framework for examining the 
simplicity model of unsupervised categorization (Pothos & Chater, 2002).
if
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The term ‘cognitive science’, was coined in 1967 by Ulric Neisser, who used this to 
mean all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, 
stored, recovered, and used. Neisser (1967) refers to people as being dynamic 
information-processing systems whereby a description of their mental operations can 
be given in computational terms. The origins of ideas in cognitive psychology, such
♦Vias computational theory of mind, can be traced back to Descartes (17 century) and 
continued with Alan Turing (1940s-1950s). This basic foundation of cognitive 
psychology allowed the development of more thorough attempts to understand how 
we process and organise information in terms of information processing, and has led 
to the development of complex the categorization theories, that we have today.
Today in cognitive psychology we have very complex mathematical 
descriptions about how information is organised in terms of spontaneous (e.g., the 
simplicity model, Pothos & Chater, 2002) and supervised categorization (e.g., the 
generalized context model, Nosofsky; 1984, 1986, 1991). These models provide us 
with a rich range of predictions about how information can be organised when we 
have no past knowledge about it (spontaneous) and also, how information is organised 
when there is an external agent guiding classification (supervised). We also have 
evidence as to how relative properties can affect classification decisions, that is 
properties which do not depend on the physical appearance of a stimulus that the most 
spontaneous and supervised modes depend on. This is through the work carried out 
on shared properties in analogical mapping (Gentner, 1983, 2003; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995) and also the relative judgment model (RJM; Stewart et al, 2005).
From this literature, we have produced five experiments that explore a relative vs. 
absolute shift in categorization and three further experiments that demonstrate that 
people organise information in spontaneous and supervised categorization in terms 
explained by simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002).
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In Chapter 2 ,1 explain the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002) in 
unsupervised categorization and compare it with other models (such as SUSTAIN; 
Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) in the hope to further clarify its uniqueness in 
categorization. In Chapter 3 ,1 explain supervised categorization (including models 
such as the generalized context model, Nosofsky; 1984, 1986, 1991), how this 
contrasts with spontaneous categorization, and how this relates to the studies I will 
present on relative vs. absolute judgment. In Chapter 4 ,1 explain analogical mapping 
(Gentner, 1983, 2003; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) and provide a literature review of 
relative judgment in categorization (Stewart et al, 2005). I also explain how it is 
relevant to our relative vs. absolute judgment experiments. In Chapter 5 ,1 explain the 
five relative vs. absolute judgment experiments that I have carried out and reach a 
conclusion of what promotes a relative judgment as compared to an absolute 
judgment. In Chapter 6 ,1 explain the spontaneous categorization experiments and 
give my conclusion as to how this relates to the simplicity principle. In Chapter 7 ,1 
explain the results from the supervised categorization studies that relate to the 
simplicity model. In Chapter 8 ,1 give my general conclusions on the three simplicity 
model (unsupervised, learning and memory) experiments and the five relative vs. 
absolute judgment experiments, and how my findings advance our knowledge of 
categorization in general.
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Chapter 2
The simplicity model in unsupervised categorization
2.1 An Introduction
Unsupervised classification deals with the problem of understanding how 
people organise information into categories without any prior knowledge of the items, 
or how they should be categorized. For example, if someone were presented with 
novel items, such as seeing a novel computer game or material viewed under a 
microscope, then the information presented might be interpreted in terms of different 
groups. Crucially, unsupervised categorization deals with how we group items that 
we have not seen before or have any idea what the items relate to.
The main technique for exploring how people organise information in an 
unconstrained way is through free sort tasks. In these tasks, the participant is given a 
collection of items and is asked, simply, to categorize these in a way that seems most 
intuitive. There is no feedback instructions and therefore in this case categorization is 
completely intuitive. This is different to supervised categorization tasks, where 
constraints on categorization are included. These constraints can include feedback 
relating to a desired structure, general knowledge, and category labels (for a detailed 
specification on such constraints, see exemplar theory, Chapter 3, on supervised 
categorization). The objective in supervised categorization (e.g., Brooks, 1987; 
Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schafer, 1978), is to identify the ways in which people 
categorize new items into existing groups which have been already specified by the 
experimenter. In such a case, the experimenter attaches a label to the group, such as 
‘this is a group of Chomps and this is a group of Blibs’, and specifies exactly which 
items belong to the groups. So, the main difference between these types of 
categorization is that one uses constraints and the other does not.
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Despite this difference, unsupervised and supervised categorization are not 
completely different. One shared feature of supervised and unsupervised 
classification is that they both make their predictions of classification (mostly) on the 
basis on physical similarity. More specifically, in supervised classification, the 
classification decisions are typically made on the basis that the new item is most 
similar to the items within an existing group (see Nosofsky; 1984, 1986, 1991). For 
example, if one category consists of triangles and another consists of squares, and 
then a new item is introduced which appears more like a triangle than a square, then 
participants are more likely to categorize the new item into the category which consist 
of triangles, than the category that consist of squares. Likewise, in unsupervised 
categorization, where, for example, free sort classification tasks are used, the 
participant has to sort items into groups using the similarity of the individual items, 
such as the length and width of the items. So, the key feature that both of these types 
of categorization share, is that they both make their predictions on the basis of 
physical similarity.
Unsupervised categorization can be conducted under different experimental 
conditions (e.g., Zippel, 1969; Imai & Garner, 1965) where, rather than predicting 
spontaneous categorization, the objective is to understand what factors influence 
categorization performance (e.g., different instructions or stimuli). An example of 
this is given when investigating whether the structure of the stimuli is made up of 
integral or separable dimensions and how the number of dimensions used in a task 
affects classification performance (see for example Handel & Preusser, 1970; Smith 
& Baron, 1981; Wills & McLaren, 1998). One example of how performance is 
affected by different conditions, relates to comparing the simultaneous presentation of 
stimuli vs. a sequential presentation. In simultaneous presentation, the spontaneous 
classifications between participants are similar, but in sequential presentations, the 
spontaneous classifications are dependent on the particular sequence of stimulus 
presentation (Handel & Preusser, 1969). In another example, when the stimuli were 
composed of separable dimensions, classification was based on a single dimension, 
but in contrast to this, when integral dimensions were used, classification was based 
on overall similarity (Handel & Imai, 1972). In a more recent case, Regehr and 
Brooks (1995; see also Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampton, 1987) suggested that a 
single dimension was most frequently used in classification when the constraint of
16
asking participants to classify items into two groups was imposed, rather than having 
no constraints, such as in typical free sort tasks. However, in Pothos and Close 
(2008), it is argued that uni-dimensional sorting is not a general constraint, rather it is 
an artefact of the particular task employed by Ragehr and Brooks (1995). In another 
example, which uses a more unconstrained method, Compton and Logan (1999) used 
an arrangement of dots, and examined if the proximity between elements acted as a 
factor in determining classification results.
The previous research considered above has typically tried to identify 
manipulations that influence spontaneous categorization performance rather than to 
actually predict the classification groupings (the Compton and Logan studies are an 
exception to this). The simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002), Rational model 
(Anderson, 1991) and SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004) are three 
examples of unsupervised categorization models that make predictions on how the 
classification groupings are made.
As both the research traditions of supervised and unsupervised categorization 
have complementary explanatory objectives, it is useful to identify similarities and 
differences between them.
2.2 Exemplar Approach in Supervised Categorization vs. Unsupervised 
Categorization
Supervised and unsupervised categorization have some similar and some very 
different aspects. See Chapter 3 for an in depth description of models of supervised 
categorization. In exemplar models (Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1986), the classification of new items is made based on computing the 
similarity of this with each training exemplar stored in memory. In an example of 
how the exemplar model works, if test items are more similar to items in categories 
‘A’ compared to items in categories ‘B’ or ‘C’ then classification of the test items into 
category ‘A’ will be made.
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Supervised vs. Unsupervised categorization:
There are definitional accounts of categorization (e.g., Bruner, Goodman, & 
Austin, 1956; Katz, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963, Pothos & Hahn, 2000) which suggest 
that categories are characterized by necessary and sufficient features. In exemplar 
theories (e.g., Brooks, 1987; Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schafer, 1978; 1989, 1988a, 
1988b, 1985) a set of known instances represent the concept, where the assignment of 
a new instance to a category is made on the basis of similarity to each member. There 
is also Prototype theory (e.g. Homa & Vosburgh, 1976; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 
1981; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972) where categorization is made on the same 
basis as exemplar theory except that in this case the central tendency of the group (the 
prototype) is used rather than each individual exemplar. Also according to general 
recognition theory (Ashby & Perrin, 1988), intrinsic noise properties of perception 
and representation explain categorization effects.
The obvious difference between unsupervised and supervised categorization 
models is that in supervised categorization, there is a pre-specified group for how to 
categorize the training items, so that in this case the learner must infer the underlying 
category structure. In the case of an unsupervised task, the learner has no category 
structure to infer and therefore has to make a classification based on what is most 
natural and intuitive.
In experimental terms, participants are presented with artificial labels for the 
training stimuli by the experimenter in supervised categorization. The group labels 
are learned by the participant before a classification of a new item is made. In the real 
world, the application of supervised categorization seems relevant in many cases. For 
instance a case of supervised categorization is when a child is told that a particular 
item is called an apple, while other items are called oranges. In order for the child to 
classify correctly new instances o f apples and oranges the child must infer from the 
category structure enough about the concepts “apples” and “oranges”. This is 
different to unsupervised categorization where in this situation we would 
spontaneously categorize objects without being told the category labels, and which 
items belong to which category.
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It could be claimed that concepts are based upon supervised categorization 
mechanisms exclusively such as involving the use of linguistic labels. The typical 
assumption in unsupervised categorization is that boundaries between groups are 
determined only after seeing enough exemplars of items from each within group. 
However, children and adults generalize from a small number of examples when 
learning new words (e.g., Feldman, 1997; Tenenbaum & Xu, 2000). From this, the 
assumption can be made that there are prior constraints on which categories are 
plausible, and these constraints may be determined by unsupervised categorization 
learning. There are also strong commonalities between schemes of categorization 
between different cultures (e.g., Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997). 
Therefore, unsupervised categorization may help in the understanding of how 
supervised learning occurs.
A crucial difference in the two approaches is that in unsupervised 
categorization we deal with the problem of what makes a category naturally coherent. 
Category coherence deals with the question of what makes a category of birds or cups 
a coherent category but disallows non-sensible categories such as dolphins bom on 
Tuesday.
2.3 The simplicity principle
In 1986, Pomerantz and Kubovy formulated the simplicity principle to 
describe how the perceptual system sought the simplest rather than the most likely 
(see Helmholtz, 1962 for the likelihood principle) perceptual organisations which 
were consistent with the sensory input given. There was much controversy as to 
whether the perceptual system was governed by the likelihood or simplicity principle 
(e.g., Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986). However, Chater (1996) provided a mathematical 
account, which linked the simplicity and likelihood principles in perceptual 
organisation using the mathematical theory of Kolmogorov complexity (e.g., 
Kolmogorov, 1965). This account provided evidence that the two theories were not in 
competition with one another, but instead were identical (at least when accounting for 
perceptual organisation).
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With the controversy partly alleviated, the simplicity principle has been 
applied to explain how the cognitive system imposes patterns on the world. As the 
world is highly patterned, the cognitive system has presumably evolved to 
successfully find these patterns. The simplicity principle achieves two criteria: (1) It 
is normatively justified; (2) It appears descriptively correct. Normative justification 
refers to the requirement of the principle to be consistent with theoretical arguments. 
In this case evidence for this is presented in the formulation of ‘Occam’s razor’ 
(William of Ockham, 1285-1349) and also in early positive epistemology (e.g., Mach, 
1883/ 1960) and remains a standard principle in modem philosophy of science (e.g. 
Sober, 1975). In addition, over the past thirty years the theory of simplicity 
‘Kolmogorov complexity’ has been developed and applied in mathematics (Chaitin, 
1966, Kolmogorov, 1965, Solo mono ff, 1964), in statistics (Rissanen, 1987, 1989; 
Wallace & Freeman, 1987), and computer science (Quinlan & Rivest, 1989; Wallace 
& Boulton, 1968). This evidence gives the rigorous normative justification for the 
simplicity principle, which suggests that the simplest account for some data leads to 
the best theory for the data. Regarding (2), evidence for being descriptively correct 
refers to whether the theory explains specific evidence accurately. The simplicity 
principle in this case appears descriptively correct as demonstrated in the examples in: 
Mach (1959/1886), Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1962/1935) and in information 
processing research in perception (Buffart, Leeuwenberg & Restle, 1981; Gamer, 
1962, 1974; Hochberg and McAllister, 1953; Leeuwenberg, 1969, 1971;
Leeuwenberg & Boselie, 1988) and in the simplicity model, Pothos and Chater 
(2002).
For a more thorough example of how the simplicity principle is descriptively 
correct we can take the example from Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1962/1935). More 
specifically, we can consider the Gestalt law of good continuation which states how 
the cognitive system completes visual patterns when part of the visual pattern is 
occluded. In figure 1 (a) the vertical bar is perceived as occluding the upper left and 
right horizontal lines, therefore the two upper left and right horizontal lines are 
perceived by people as a single line as in figure 1 (b), although it could have any form 
as in Figure 1 (c). The simplicity principle, predicts a preference for the straight line. 
This is because it is more simple as there would be a shorter codelength to describe a 
continuation of the same pattern, as compared to altering a pattern.
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When referring to the codelength of information, and the simplest codelength 
to describe perceived information patterns, we are referring to the measurement of 
information as introduced by Shannon (1948). One bit of information is the smallest 
piece of quantifiable information, and is a single binary decision. In categorization 
(e.g., Pothos & Chater, 2002), codelength of categories are computed using the 
simplicity principle (this will be explained in more depth in this chapter).
The simplicity principle is consistent with the Gestalt law of good 
continuation. In the case of the lower left and right horizontal lines of Figure 1 (a), 
this is perceived as two separate lines. This is consistent with both the simplicity 
principle and the Gestalt law of good continuation. In the case of the simplicity 
principle, the deviation of the two lower horizontal lines allows the minimal 
description to account for a possible disappearing of the hidden line. Therefore, the 
advantage of the simplicity principle is that it can postulate that the hidden line 
disappears. This means that the hidden line is not perceived, but can continue. When 
a nai've observer is presented with Figure 1 (d) this is perceived as a cross, occluded 
by a circle, and illustrated in Figure 1 (e). The Gestalt law o f good continuation fails 
to account for this and leads to an interpretation of Figure 1 (f). Simplicity principle 
accounts for the illustration of Figure 1 (e) as this form is simpler (it requires less 
codelength to describe, as the deviation requires a greater codelength of description) 
than the more complex (greater codelength description) of the irregular Figure 1 (f).
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Figure 1: Simplicity in filling in occluded objects.
In addition to the evidence given regarding the preference for simpler perceptual 
organisations, a simple mathematical illustration in favour of simplicity can be given 
which supports its justification. The justification of this is given using Bayes’s 
theorem, which states:
P{H \ D)ozP(D\H)P(H) (1)
The theorem states that the probability of a hypothesis given the data is proportional 
to the product of the probability of the data given the hypothesis and the prior 
probability of the hypothesis without the data. The H  that maximizes (1) is the same 
as the //th a t minimizes (2).
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-  l°g2 P(D  | H) -  log 2 P(H) (2)
Formula (2) uses Shannon’s information theory for the specification of the optimal 
code for describing quantities such as the data, hypotheses, etc., where the optimal 
code minimizes the average codelength. Event x with probability P(x) has the
codelength-log 2 P{x) . Formula (2) therefore gives the codelength for D in terms of 
H  plus the code length for //w ith o u t/) . From formulas (1) and (2) it can be seen that 
the most probable hypothesis is also the formula which is the simplest (i.e., is encoded 
with the shortest codelength). Given that both of these approaches equate to one 
another the general simplicity principle statement that ‘when all things are equal then 
the simplest explanation is likely to be true can be seen as reasonable.
2.4 Measuring Simplicity
The simplicity principle predicts that the simplest possible explanation to fit 
the data is often the best (Chater, 1996). When using such an approach, this could 
lead to the prediction that a distal scene should be uniform, however the organisation 
must be consistent with the sensory input and this is usually non-uniform. It is 
important to note that the simplicity principle predicts that the cognitive system 
should capture the regularities in the available information to maximise descriptive 
power. One question is whether the consistency with the input (capturing the 
regularities of the information) can be traded against the simplicity of the 
interpretation. Again, perceptual organisation must capture the regularities in the 
sensory input, so the compression in the information must be compatible with the 
regularities in the data. If we were to ignore this point, then the simplest of 
explanations would be to state “anything can happen” or “group all items together as a 
single group” which would be completely useless as a cognitive strategy for capturing 
the patterns in the world. Harman (1965) suggested that the simplicity o f a theory 
must be traded against explanatory power. However, these two factors must be stated 
in more specific and formalized terms in order for them to be useful as a model for
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category learning. The way to proceed according to Chater (1996) is to view 
perceptual organisation as a way o f encoding information, so that the perceptual 
organisation which provides the simplest of encoding, is chosen. This prevents overly 
simple organisations that do not account for the regularities of the information to 
become present. This is because these encodings do not help the encoding, or the 
explanation of the information. Maximising explanatory power but also maximizing 
the simplicity in encoding are both crucially desirable in accordance with the 
simplicity principle (the optimal state is maximum explanatory power and minimum 
description). If the perceptual organisation fails to capture the regularities then it 
cannot provide a brief description of the data accurately, and is therefore useless. A 
useful example, which demonstrates this problem, is given in the Richard-Berry 
paradox (see Li & Vitanyi, 1997), which suggests there is a paradoxical problem 
when generating the following statement:
“the smallest natural number that cannot be uniquely specified in less than twenty 
words of English” (1)
The problem here is that out of the infinite number of numbers, the smallest number N 
that cannot be specified in less than twenty words can be specified with the 
description above (1), which contains only 16 words, and hence the paradox is clear. 
Kolmogorov complexity avoids this problem by specifying that the description given 
must construct the object. Therefore, the Kolmogorov complexity of object K(x) is 
the length of the shortest description that generates x rather than an overly general 
description that does not actually generate the object directly.
The measurement of simplicity has been studied extensively in philosophy, for 
example by Sober (1975), who suggested that no quantitative measure of simplicity 
has ever been universally accepted. It has also been discussed in psychology, by 
Attneave (1959), who suggested that the perceptual system prefers short descriptions, 
and been referred to as an important goal by Atick and Redlich, (1990. It is best 
discussed in the context of mathematics and computer science, such as in Kolmogorov
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Complexity theory, which shows that identifying simplicity with brevity provides a 
rigorous theory of simplicity (see Kolmogorov, 1965).
Brevity of encoding can become operational using two approaches. Shannon’s 
(1948) information theory (Attneave, 1959; Gamer, 1962) and coding theory (Simon, 
1972) structural information theory is one elaboration of this (Buffart, Leeuwenberg 
& Restle, 1981). We now consider the quantification of brevity.
Information theory and brevity:
Brevity is quantified in terms of the number of bits required to distinguish the 
stimulus from an information source, which has a mutually exclusive range of 
alternatives.
The formula for this is given as:
In this equation, each alternative in an information source A has the probability 
of occurrence P(At) . I(A,) represents the amount of information associated with the 
choice of a particular alternative, A , and is called the surprisal (surprisal can be 
viewed as a measure of brevity in codelength) of A/ .
H(A)  is the entropy, and is the average surprisal of source A.  It is the surprisal of 
each alternative, weighted by its probability of occurrence.
(1)
(2)
j
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Information theory allows surprisal to be viewed as a measure of brevity. When 
choosing a sequence of alternatives according to the probabilities of the information 
source, these can be encoded in a binary sequence. The encoding gives each At an
individual code word in the form of a sequence of binary digits (e.g. 001101). 
Sequences of alternatives can be concatenated into a single binary code. In 
accordance to the idea of brevity, the binary string that describes the alternatives is 
minimized as much as possible. The product of the sequence length and the average 
length of the code words within the sequence gives the length of the sequence code. 
One important implication here is that the average code of words should be 
minimized. If the binary string of length /, gives the codelength for alternative Ai , 
then the specification for the average code word length for source A is given by:
(3)
There are however some limitations of information theory in some contexts, for 
example when applied to individual perceptual stimuli. An example from 
Leeuwenberg and Boselie (1988) involves a stimulus consisting of three letters 
‘aaabbbbbgg’. If we assume that there is an equal chance ( X ) of choosing one of 
these letters (a, b or g) then the information associated with this specification for 
example ‘a’ is log 2 (1 /X ) = log2 (3) bits of information. To specify the entire 10 
letter sequence is 10 log 2 (3) bits because in this case the probabilities of each item 
being chosen are the same for each letter. In a different situation, where for example 
‘b’ is chosen with probability Vi and a and ‘g’ with probabilities % then ‘b’s can be 
specified with log2 (1 / x/2) = log2 (2) = 1 bit whilst the ‘a’s and ‘g’s can be specified 
with {\l / )  = log 2 (4) = 2 bits which total 15 bits of information for the entire 
sequence. Having more variation in the set, such as including the entire alphabet 
would lead, to more information required to specify it. Information theory measures 
the information in the stimulus relative to the probabilities of the other stimuli. This
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is useful in experimental settings where the range of possibilities is limited (e.g. 
Gamer, 1962). However, in natural perception, the range of possibilities to define the 
stimuli can be greater, and therefore this scheme does not provide a useful measure of 
brevity in encoding stimuli (Gamer 1962). Another problem with information theory 
is that it only states the number of bits required to specify the stimuli and not the best 
(most meaningful) code. It is both the nature and length of the code that is useful in 
understanding perceptual organisation (Gamer, 1974). A meaningful encoding tells 
us something about the actual features of the stimuli whilst a meaningless encoding 
randomly ascribes the code without consideration of the features.
Coding theory and brevity:
Because of the problems with information theory, i.e., the fact that sometimes a 
meaningless code is ascribed to the sequences, a different approach has been sought to 
measure brevity, which allows featural detail to be encoded in the stimuli. The 
encoding of the organisations within the stimuli (i.e., the featural detail) is what 
Simon (1972) calls pattern languages. The shortest description of the expressed 
pattern language is the preferred organisation. It is constrained by the number of 
symbols in the description (e.g., Simon, 1972) and the number of parameters (e.g., 
Leeuwenberg, 1969). An example of bad code would be aaabbbbbgg which requires 
10 parameters, whilst an example of good code would be 3(a)5(b)2(g) which requires 
just 6 parameters and hence economy is achieved. The problems with short 
description length is that (a) a new description language needs to be created for each 
perceptual stimulus, and (b) the prediction of the theory depend on the description 
language chosen, however Simon (1972) noted that description languages are highly 
correlated in their description lengths. Kolmogorov complexity generalizes coding 
theory and addresses these issues.
From the simplicity principle that suggests that simple explanations that fit the 
data are often the best, a formulation of a much more specific simplicity model 
(Pothos & Chater, 2002) was proposed about how people spontaneously categorize 
stimuli in their environment.
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2.5 The Simplicity Model of Unsupervised Categorization
Unsupervised categorization and category coherence
The simplicity model is designed to capture category coherence (see Figure 2 for an 
illustration of category coherence, i.e., greater intuitiveness) in a stimulus set (it is 
useful in free sort tasks of unsupervised categorization), and it assumes that there are 
no constraints on how the stimuli should be classified. Several theories have been 
suggested which explain what constitutes category coherence. One theory is that 
some categories are grouped together through a common function they share (such as 
corkscrews having the function of opening bottles) rather than appearance such as 
size, colour etc. (Barsalou, 1985). In contrast to this, other explanations suggest that 
categories contain items that are judged to be similar to each other (Rosch, 1975; 
Wittgenstein, 1957; see also Goodman, 1972, and Quine, 1977), the simplicity model 
(Pothos & Chater, 2002) is one example of a model that uses similarity in 
classification.
Murphy and Medin (1985; see also Gentner & Brem, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; 
Medin & Wattenmaker, 1997) proposed the dominant theory of category coherence, 
according to which a concept is an element of people’s naive theories about the world. 
This means that category coherence is not based on any specific piece of information, 
but rather on meaning in our general life. For example, regarding the concept of 
water, coherence is not based on its chemical structure, but rather on its meaning in 
our general life. For example, general knowledge could include information that tap 
water comes from reservoirs; it is wet and can soak our clothes etc. Gelman and 
Wellman (1991), provide support for this idea by demonstrating that young children 
generalize on the basis of theoretical knowledge rather than physical similarity. An 
example of this is in the case of categorizing a worm, a person and, a toy monkey; the 
worm and the person were deemed more similar because both share biological 
properties.
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The work carried out by Murphy and Medin (1985; also Medin & 
Wattenmaker, 1997) provides compelling arguments for why a model of conceptual 
coherence cannot be based on similarity alone. The Simplicity model (Pothos & 
Chater, 2002) uses similarity information in its account of unsupervised 
categorization, but in principle could be extended to include background general 
information relating to particular classifications. The formalization of general 
knowledge has been shown to be very difficult (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Heit, 1997; 
Heit & Bot, 1999; McDermott, 1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1991, 1998; Pickering & 
Chater, 1995). In the case of the present experimental work, stimuli that are novel 
and abstract are used as this avoids the problem of formalising general knowledge.
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Figure 2: A simple arrangement of points in a Euclidean space. Classifications A 
should be more intuitive (indicating greater category coherence) for naive observers 
than classification B, since it involves more cohesive clusters.
Another aspect of categorization is that of Basic level categories which 
identifies information according to a hierarchy where classification of new items must 
fit the definition of a category at its ‘basic level’.
Basic level categories and unsupervised categorization:
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Basic level categories deal with the explanation of a ‘basic’ level for categorization, 
which is a general (basic) category label in a hierarchy of categories which can be 
more specific higher up the hierarchy (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). One hierarchy could 
include; ‘Scottish highland terrier, a terrier, a dog, an animal, a living thing’ etc. The 
default (or basic) level of categorization, for example, for a dog called ‘Fido’, would 
be that it is a dog rather than an animal or living thing. There is a wide body of 
evidence supporting this argument. One example of this is where basic level 
categories lead to more rapid picture naming, in comparison to the superordinate or 
subordinate categories (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyles-Braem, 1976).
There is also evidence that suggests basic level categorization is used in naming and 
other category related behaviour in children (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982; Horton & 
Markman, 1980).
The relation between unsupervised categorization and basic level 
categorization can be seen if one assumes that the basic level of categorization is the 
category level that is most coherent, and explaining category coherence is the ultimate 
goal of unsupervised categorization tasks. Basic level categories have been modelled 
computationally (e.g., Corter & Gluck, 1992; Gluck & Corter, 1985; Gosselin & 
Schyns, 1997). However, basic level and unsupervised categorization do have 
different predictive scopes. In basic level categorization the predictive objective is to 
identify the basic level category from a hierarchy of three or four category levels. 
There is no attempt to predict the exact way in which items are partitioned within the 
basic level. In unsupervised categorization the aim is to identify the preferred 
classification (the classification which has the minimal descriptive length, if one 
adopts the simplicity model, see later) amongst all possible classifications for a 
particular data set. Another important difference is that basic level categorization is 
based on featural representations (e.g., a dog has several known features such as a tail, 
a snout, paws, etc) of objects but in unsupervised classification the items are novel 
and therefore cannot be typically expressed in terms of features. In unsupervised 
categorization, features such as short vs. long or differences in shades of colour can be 
used but this does not include the complex background information that is found in 
basic level o f categorization. Because of this, it is difficult or impossible to identify 
features. The advantage of the simplicity model is that it can be used to compute
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preferred classifications on the basis of features or independent of them whereas 
models for the basic level categorization are restricted to feature based categorization.
From perception to unsupervised categorization:
When confronted with an unfamiliar scene, the information can often be organised 
into different kinds of groups. This can be viewed as a process of perceptual 
organisation, whereby sometimes we identify groups in the sensory input. It is also a 
process of unsupervised categorization. In order to form a mathematical model of 
unsupervised categorization theoretical insights from perceptual organisation can be 
considered, as we have done above. The two processes, ‘perceptual organisation’ and 
‘unsupervised categorization’, can be considered related in the sense that the 
perceived structure of a set of objects can lead to the (unsupervised) categorization o f 
these items into groups.
The application of the simplicity principle to unsupervised categorization is 
made on the assumption that perception is based upon physical similarities 
(Pomerantz, 1981). Therefore, groupings made in unsupervised categorization should 
maximize within group similarity and minimize between group similarities. Using 
this assumption, we can view categorization as imposing default constraints on the 
similarity relations between a set of to-be-categorised stimuli.
The simplicity model o f unsupervised classification:
The first step in considering how the simplicity principle can be applied to grouping 
items into categories is to specify the data and hypotheses (a hypothesis corresponds 
to a possible grouping of the items). An assumption is made that the information 
about the similarity structure of the items corresponds to the data. The codelength 
required to specify the similarity structure (from standard information theory) from 
the objects in terms of a particular grouping is the sum of the:
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codelength to specify similarity in terms of the grouping + the codelength to specify 
the groupings. (1)
There is a unique codelength for each possible grouping. According to the 
simplicity principle (e.g., see Rissanen, 1978) there is a preference for the grouping 
with the shortest (most compressed) codelength. The specification of the simplicity 
model is made in such a way that the similarity structure with the most reduction in 
codelength is chosen.
The form o f the data:
In categorization research, there have been many kinds of representation assumptions. 
It is assumed that items can be embedded in a multi-dimensional space in spatial 
models of representation (e.g., Nosofsky, 1985; Shepard, 1980, 1987), and that 
similarities are negatively monotonically related to distances in such a space. An 
adherence to metric axioms is implied by such spatial models of representation but in 
some situations similarity information violates the metric axioms (e.g., Bowdle & 
Gentner, 1997; Tversky, 1977, see Nosofsky, 1991). A representation of objects in 
terms of features is an alternative to this. In this case, similarity is a function of the 
degree to which features are shared between items, as the items correspond to bundles 
of features (Tversky, 1977). The problem with features is that in unsupervised 
classification the use of novel objects with no prior knowledge is common and is 
often the case that we may not be able to express such objects in terms of features.
It is the perception of the similarity of objects that is important in the 
simplicity model. Similarity information can be best described in terms of internal 
spaces, abstract similarity relations or features depending on circumstances. The 
formulation of the simplicity model is designed in a way to be compatible with 
different types of representation assumptions. In this way, the difficult and largely 
irrelevant problem of psychological representation (see Goldstone, 1993; Goodman,
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1972; Hampton, 1999; Quine, 1977) is avoided. Such computational principles, 
which are independent of a representational assumption, have been usefully employed 
in other areas of cognitive science (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Marr, 1982; van der Helm & 
Leeuwenberg, 1996, 1999).
The form of information the simplicity model assumes is illustrated in the 
following: Consider four objects A, B, C and D. A specification of similarity 
information would be needed to be specified, such that, for example, the similarity of 
‘A, B’ is greater or less than similarity ‘C, D \ The formulation of the model is made 
in a way that similarities are never equal, and obey minimality, such that ‘A, A’ = 0, 
and symmetry, so that ‘A, B’ = similarity ‘B, A’, but they can violate transitivity.
Any combination of the metric axioms can be assumed in the simplicity model and if 
metric axioms can be assumed for similarity relations then these can be specified with 
less information. Similarity is used in the implementation of the model whether 
symmetry and minimality is assumed or violated but there is no reason to suggest that 
minimality should be violated (Tversky, 1977, discusses some of the considerations 
that underlie some of the metric axioms). The version of the simplicity model 
employed in this work was implemented without the assumption of transitivity. The 
assumption of transitivity does not affect the computation of the codelength in the 
simplicity model. Transitivity is always obeyed unless the similarity information is 
collected with a task in which trials have the form: ‘is similarity between A, B less or 
greater than similarity C, D?’ Assuming transitivity (and all of the other metric 
axioms as well) is equivalent to assuming extra constraints, such as ‘A, B’ > ‘C, D’ 
when given ‘A, B’ > ‘B, C’ and ‘B, C’ > ‘C, D \ The number of groups and elements 
in each group determine the number of extra constraints due to transitivity. The extra 
constraints due to transitivity will be the same where the classifications compared 
have similar groups, and numbers of elements in each group, so that the assumption of 
transitivity does not influence the optimal classification.
From information theory it can be assumed that when deciding between two 
pairs A, B, and C, D, it is a binary choice to compute whether similarity (A, B) is 
smaller or greater than (C, D), and this is associated with one bit of information to 
compute. Where we have r items we require s(s -1 ) / 2 bits to specify the data
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directly where there are s = r(r - 1) / 2  similarities between pairs of r items and 
s = r(r - 1) / 2  comparisons between the similarities for pairs of items.
Fig. 1 shows items represented in a Euclidean space, where distance 
corresponds to dissimilarity. Here, there are (5 x 4)/2 = 10 distances between these 
points, which can be expressed as 45 inequalities ((10><9)/2 = 45) such as:
d(a,c) < d(b,c);d(a,c) < d(a,b);d(a,c) < d(d,e);d(a,c) < d(b,d); 
d(a,c) < d(b,e);d(a,c) < d(c,d);d(a,c) < d(a,d);d(a,c) < d(c,e); 
d(a,c) < d(a,e)...
The regularity in the specifications of the inequalities (the redundancy), means that 
there may be a shorter description which captures the structure of the data. The 
simplicity model is one attempt to model the regularities in this structure, creating the 
largest saving in codelength.
Clustering by simplicity step 1: Coding group:
When computing the codelength required for specifying how r items are 
allocated into a set of n categories the allocation of all items into all possible 
classifications needs to be considered. This is given by
TT-n(~l)v((n ~ v)r /(« —v)!v!) (this is Stirling’s number, e.g., Graham, Knuth, &
Patashnik, 1994; Feller, 1970). Using standard information theory we can assume 
that log 2 (D) gives us the codelength required to identify one out of D possibilities 
(with the assumption that each one is equally probable). Therefore, log 2
^ =0 ( - l ) v( (« -v ) r / ( « - v)!v!) gives a codelength, which specifies the allocation of r
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items into groups. This, however, represents only a minor contribution to the overall 
computation.
In general, certain category structures are more likely to be chosen than others. 
For example, a category structure that consist of clusters equal to the number of items 
divided by two, is more likely than for example a classification where each item is in 
its own cluster or if all the items are clustered into a single group. The computations 
made in the simplicity model are based on the probability o f different category 
structures which are consistent with the simplicity approach. Pothos and Chater 
(2 0 0 2 ) suggest that in future work the model could identify constraints regarding the 
likelihood of different category structures, and this could be in the form of a non- 
uniform, prior probability distribution over category structures. They also suggest 
that general knowledge effects could be introduced here, as some groupings using 
general knowledge would be more plausible and therefore more likely. Such a case 
could include groupings based on biological vs. non-bio logical kinds, and thus could 
reduce the code length. Where there is no general knowledge, i.e., in a case of novel 
items, the codelength for the classifications can be computed as above (see also 
Pomerantz, 1981).
Clustering by similarity step 2: specifying the data in terms o f groups:
When encoding similarity data, the definition of a cluster (or category) is that 
it is a collection of objects where the within cluster similarities are greater (which 
should be as great as possible) than the between cluster similarities (which should be 
as low as possible; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Default constraints on the similarities 
between items are therefore introduced by a particular grouping. If the constraints are 
strong (i.e., many comparisons between distances are explained by them), and 
generally correct (i.e., there are no corrections to the constraints) then the first term in 
(1) is reduced.
The description of similarity inequalities that are not specified by the 
grouping is needed, such as between two within cluster similarities or between two 
between cluster similarities. If there are /o f  these, then the code length will be t bits.
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If there are u constraints, where e are incorrect, the encoding of e must be between 0 
and u , so the encoding of u requires a binary code of length log2 (u + 1) bits. 
Identifying the constraints e out of u constraints is done with standard combinatorics:
„ Ce = (u\!e\{u -  e)\) ways to choose e items from set u . The total code for correcting
erroneous constraints, E, is log 2 (w + 1) + log2 (u Ce).
In order to specify the errors when there are few or very many errors, a short 
codelength is needed. In the case of the errors, having half the number of constraints 
requires the greatest codelength. Pothos and Chater (2002) suggest that the number of 
errors should be less than half the number of constraints, and where this is not the case 
then no clustering should be defined, as in this case the clustering would be of 
dissimilar items. This additional assumption is mild, as any reasonable algorithm for 
finding clusters should use similarity.
The simplicity model, a summary:
Pairwise similarity inequalities between pairs of objects are the representation 
of the similarity structure in the simplicity model. The number of inequalities needed 
to be specified is reduced with use of categories. The disadvantage of using 
categories is that they require a codelength to describe the particular set of categories 
used and correct for any errors in the constraints. Using categories usually shortens 
the description of the similarity structure of the items, and the greater the 
simplification the more intuitive the category structure is predicted to appear. The 
simplicity model is evaluated in the experiments assessing naive observers’ 
unsupervised categorization performance.
2. 6 Other Unsupervised Models vs. the Simplicity Model
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Some of the early research into unsupervised learning helps illustrate the 
distinctiveness of the simplicity model. One of these early studies of unsupervised 
learning comes from Fried and Holyoak (1984), where categories are described in 
terms of density functions. They suggest that participants can infer the actual density 
function from a sample of exemplars presented to them. An assumption is needed that 
category distributions have a particular form (an illustration of Fried and Holyoak’s 
theory is made with normally distributed category distributions). They also suggested 
that an external specification must be made of the number of categories sought. The 
difference between this and the simplicity model is that here we have a situation 
where learners know a priori that the category exemplars have properties whose range 
conforms to a certain distribution; another difference is that this model requires 
advanced knowledge of the number of categories. This corresponds to a situation 
where, for example, a bird expert has to identify bird categories in a new domain. The 
simplicity model, by contrast, does not make any assumption about the parametric 
properties of the categories or the number of categories sought.
Auto Class
Cheeseman and Stutz (1995) provided a model for unsupervised categorization 
called AutoClass, which comes from the machine learning literature. The model 
consists of two components, the first of which is a probability distribution which 
specifies how items belong to different categories with different probabilities, as 
opposed to being assigned to any particular category. There is also a probability 
density function. This is for the distribution of the attributes of the objects that belong 
to the category, which constitutes the second component. Attributes can be 
distributed in several ways in AutoClass, as it can model many types of attribute 
distribution within categories and category distributions, and is not restricted to one 
type of probability distribution, which is unlike Fried and Holyoak’s model.
However, the range of probability density functions AutoClass can employ determines 
the modelling scope in the AutoClass version used. This is different from the 
simplicity model, as here a particular distribution for categories or category attributes 
is not assumed, therefore it is more similar to Fried and Holyoak’s (1984) model.
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There are several related Bayesian approaches to unsupervised learning. Some 
of these do not use a specification on the number of categories sought. Ghahramani 
and Beal (2000) used a factor analysis procedure within the Bayesian framework to 
determine the number of factors required to model the data automatically (when 
considering the number of instances associated with each factor as belonging to the 
same cluster then factor analysis is similar to the process of clustering). Components 
are rejected from the model under particular circumstances in order for this to be 
achieved. In contrast to the non-parametric method used in the simplicity model, 
Ghahramani and Beal’s (2000) computations use a Gaussian function to model the 
distribution of information.
CODE
The CODE model by van Oeffelen and Vos (1982, 1983) later modified by 
Compton and Logan (1993, 1999), is another model in which the classification of 
objects is guided by parametric features. It deals with the perceptual grouping of dot 
patterns but presumably could be used for the classification of more complex 
elements. In this model, a value of strength is associated with each element in a 
pattern that originates from the element. Group allocation is made on the basis of 
when the pattern of strengths from the different elements at a location, when added, 
are above a certain threshold. As with AutoClass, the determined classifications are 
predicted on the basis of the strength spread. It has a parameter which is a fixed 
threshold, so a single classification was predicted for a set of objects in the original 
formulation of CODE. The model was later adapted so that it could produce from a 
set of objects nested classifications (Compton & Logan, 1993, 1999).
Ahn and Medin (1992) produced a two-state model of category construction 
for free sort classification. The model’s primary use was to evaluate the relative 
compellingness of a hypothesis where overall family resemblance drove the 
spontaneous groupings rather than sorting via a single dimension (this issue has been 
considered extensively in the free sort classification literature). The prediction made
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by this model, was that there would be as many groups as there are featural values 
along a dimension (but there was no attempt to predict the most salient dimension).
Kohonen neural network
Schyns (1991) proposed an unsupervised model of classification. This model 
used a two module neural network to investigate the spontaneous discovery of 
categories, and the association of these categories with labels. The Kohonen neural 
network was used to reduce the high dimensionality input vectors to lower 
dimensionality (two dimensions) output vectors. This was used to find how 
categories were spontaneously discovered. The segregation of the output space into 
distinct regions that can be identified with categories can be made by the Kohonen 
neural network. The similarity structure of the input distances determines the 
segregation into distinct regions and therefore is a spontaneous classification, rather 
than being determined by an external constraint. One limitation of such a model as 
compared to the simplicity model is that a specification of the number of categories is 
needed, in advance, in order to classify the information.
The rational model
The rational model is the only unsupervised categorization model which is not 
explicitly based on similarity (although in practice its predictions appear to converge 
with those of similarity-based models; Pothos, 2007). The rational model is an 
incremental, Bayesian model of categorization (cf. Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001), 
which classifies a novel instance in the category which is most likely given the feature 
structure of the instance (Anderson, 1991). For example, I would classify a novel 
instance in the category o f ‘cats’, because its particular features (‘meows’ , ‘has fur’, 
‘has four legs’, ‘can purr’) are particularly likely given membership to this category. 
This approach is analogous to the various category utility proposals in categorization, 
according to which categories are useful to the extent that they can be used to predict
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the features of their members (and vice versa; e.g., Corter & Gluck, 1992; Gosselin & 
Schyns, 2001; Jones, 1983; Medin, 1983; Murphy, 1982).
We briefly describe the version of the continuous version of the model 
described by Anderson (1991). The probability of classification of a novel instance 
into category k depends on the product P(/c)P(F |fc), whereby P(k) = 1^ ™*+cn •
this equation, is the number of stimuli assigned to category k so far, n is the total 
number of classified stimuli, and c is the coupling parameter. The probability that a
1 Cnew object comes from a new category is given by P(0) =  ^ _ c^ +cn» Therefore, lower
values of the coupling parameter will lead to the creation of more new categories and, 
so, the coupling parameters determines the number of categories which will be 
produced in classifying a set of stimuli. Also, P (F |k ) =  Y\ifi(x\k), where i indexes 
the different dimensions of variation of the stimuli and x indicates the different values 
dimension i can take. Note that in this (the original) version of the rational model, 
feature values are assumed to be independent. Each ft(x \k )  term corresponds to the 
probability of displaying value x  on dimension i in category k, and is given by
ai 11  + t)»  which is the t distribution with at degrees of freedom; fa =  A°f0+n- 1 '\J *i *o+n
a 0a o + ( .n - l ) s2+ j 3^ ^ 0- y )2 
and a f = ------------------2----------- . In these equations, =  A0 + n, fa = a0 +  n, n is
C10+71
the number of observations in category k, y  is their mean along dimension i, and s2 is 
their variance. Finally, a0 = 1 =  A0, p 0 can be set as the halfway point of the range of 
all instances, and cr0 as the square of a quarter of the range.
The primary function of the rational model is to predict the optimal 
classification for a set of stimuli. This optimal classification will depend on the order 
of presentation of the stimuli.
COBWEB
There are also differences between the simplicity model and Fisher’s 
COBWEB system (Fisher, 1987, 1996; Fisher & Langley, 1990; Gennari, Langley, & 
Fisher, 1989; Gennari, 1991). Corter & Gluck’s (1992) category utility is used as a 
measure to examine what is special about basic level categories. With the use of
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category utility, COBWEB can predict how items should be divided amongst clusters 
and how many clusters there should be. It is difficult to compare COBWEB with the 
simplicity model as COBWEB is used for understanding basic level categorization 
and the relation between this and the aspect of spontaneous categorization that the 
simplicity model addresses is not clear; this requires further work.
Statistics and data mining approaches have also been extensively used in the 
study of unsupervised categorization (e.g. Arabie, Hubert, & de Soete, 1996; Fisher, 
Pazzani, & Langley, 1991; Everitt, 1993; Hartigan, 1975; Krzanowski & Marriott, 
1995). Hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis is one important line of research 
here (e.g., Jardine & Sibson, 1971), where all items are assumed to be individual 
clusters in the first step of analysis. In the next step an all-inclusive category is 
created by combining items into a single cluster two at a time. Regardless of the 
algorithm used this procedure results in n - 1 groups for n items. In another approach 
of clustering, K-means clustering, items are grouped into K categories, which involve 
optimizing an explicit criterion (where K is determined by the investigator; Banfield 
& Basil, 1977; Duda & Hart, 1973; MacQueen, 1967). The criterion (the objective 
function) can be viewed as a measure of category cohesiveness. When given a set of 
items, the criterion selected determines the discrete (non-hierarchical) set of groups.
A statistical clustering model called CLUSTER/2 (Michalski and Stepp, 1983) 
uses simplicity of verbal description of the categories created as one of the 
determinants of classification goodness (see also Ahn & Medin, 1992; Medin, 
Wattenmakker, & Michalski, 1987b). When dealing with several different kinds of 
datasets then statistical clustering may have an advantage with this flexibility, but this 
is less so in cognitive modelling where the number of free parameters relative to the 
degrees of freedom in the data needs to be watched.
SUSTAIN
SUSTAIN is an adaptive model of category acquisition, aiming to capture 
both supervised and unsupervised categorization in the same framework (see also 
Gureckis & Love, 2003). The internal representations in the model take the form of 
clusters, which capture psychologically meaningful sub-groupings of items. For
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example, when learning about categories of birds, a single cluster in the model might 
represent highly similar species such as robins and blue-jays separate from highly 
dissimilar examples such as ostriches. SUSTAIN is initially directed towards 
classifications involving as few clusters as possible, and only adds complexity as 
needed to explain the structure of a category. Two key aspects of SUSTAIN’s 
account are the role of similarity and surprise in directing category discovery. First, 
SUSTAIN favors clusters organized around perceptually or psychologically similar 
items. Second, new clusters are created in memory when the existing ones do a poor 
job of accommodating a new instance. Thus, SUSTAIN adjusts its category 
representations in a trial-by-trial fashion to accommodate the similarity structure of 
the items it has experienced.
When a to-be-categorized item is first presented to the model, it activates each 
existing cluster in memory, in a way based on the similarity of the item to each 
cluster. In addition, learned attention weights in the model can bias this activation in 
favor of dimensions which are more predictive for categorization. Clusters that are 
more activated are more likely to be selected as the “winner” for the item. If there are 
many highly activated clusters for a particular item, then confidence in the winning 
cluster is reduced— i.e., there is cluster competition (regulated by a parameter). In the 
unsupervised learning situations considered here, if the current input item fails to 
activate any existing cluster above some threshold level, then a new cluster is created 
for the item. This is the key mechanism o f ‘surprise’ in SUSTAIN: new clusters are 
created in response to surprisingly novel stimuli that do not fit with existing 
knowledge structures. The threshold parameter (t) controls what level of activation is 
considered ‘surprising’ enough, so that this parameter determines the number of 
clusters the model creates (analogous to the coupling parameter in the rational model; 
Anderson, 1991).
Given that SUSTAIN is a trial-by-trial learning model, in modeling free 
sorting task where multiple items are simultaneously presented, SUSTAIN’s fits are 
derived by running the model thousands of times on different stimulus orderings in 
order to create a distribution of plausible classifications: more psychologically 
intuitive classifications are considered to be the ones more frequently generated.
The unsupervised GCM
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The unsupervised GCM (Pothos & Bailey, 2009) is a straightforward 
modification in the application of the standard GCM (Nosofsky, 1991). The objective 
of the standard GCM is to predict the classification probabilities of new stimuli, 
relative to two or more pre-trained categories. For example, suppose that participants 
have been taught in a training phase to associate some stimuli in category A and some 
other stimuli in category B. Then, the GCM-predicted probability of a category A
n
response given a new stimulus X is: P(A\X) = - — ---- ? whereby riXA =
p a V x a + p b V x b
ZjeA exp j - c  [(E°=i wk\yXk -  y jk lr ) 1/rf  }•The P terms are category biases, r]XA is
the sum of similarities between X and all the A exemplars, c is a sensitivity parameter, 
r is a Minkowski distance metric parameter, q determines the shape of the similarity 
function, Wk are dimensional attention weights, and y ’s are item coordinates (it is 
assumed that stimuli are represented in a putative psychological space). The input to 
the GCM consists of the coordinates of a set of training stimuli, information about the 
assignment of the stimuli to categories, and the coordinates of a set of test stimuli. 
Behavioral data are typically fit by adjusting GCM parameters until the classification 
probability GCM predicts for a test stimuli X is as close as possible to the empirically 
observed one. An error term for the GCM can be computed as £(0* — Pi)2, whereby 
Oj are the observed probabilities and P, are the probabilities predicted from the model.
In an unsupervised context, instead of classifying test stimuli relative to a set 
of training items, we consider the relative coherence of alternative partitions of a set 
of stimuli, where coherence means that the classification of each stimulus is 
predictable given the classification of the other items. Suppose we are interested in 
evaluating a classification for a set of stimuli, (1 23} (4 5 6 7 8  9} (the numbers 41 ’,
42’ etc. are stimulus ids). We can consider each item in turn as a test item whose 
classification is to be predicted, and all the other items as training items whose 
classification is given. GCM parameters are adjusted until the predicted classification 
probabilities for individual 4tesf items are as close as possible to 1 0 0 % for the 
classification of interest. For example, the Ot for classifying stimulus 41 ’ into category 
{2 3} would be 100%, the Oj for classifying stimulus 42’ into category {13} would be 
100%, etc. In other words, stimuli are assigned to categories in accordance with the 
category structure being evaluated and GCM fits are computed on this basis. Pothos 
and Bailey (2009) suggested that the lower the sum of all the corresponding error
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terms, the more coherent and intuitive a classification is predicted to be, according to 
the GCM.
In examining a classification, the parameters of the unsupervised GCM are 
automatically set in a way that the groups in the classification are as separated as 
possible. For example, for two-dimensional stimuli, if clusters are specified along 
dimension 1 , but there is no classification structure along dimension 2 , optimizing the 
unsupervised GCM will typically produce a high attentional weight for dimension 1 
and a low weight for dimension 2. In other words, parameter search in the 
unsupervised GCM is guided by the particular classification structure examined, not 
by the need to produce specific empirical results.
The unsupervised GCM assumes that all stimuli are presented concurrently. 
Moreover, at present it can only produce predictions of relative intuitiveness for 
particular partitions of a set of stimuli; it cannot (yet) be employed to identify the best 
possible classification for a set of stimuli from scratch.
DIVA
The divergent autoencoder, DIVA (Kurtz, 2007) is an account of human 
category learning based on the autoencoder connectionist architecture (Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004). The DIVA model consists of a three-layer, feedforward neural 
network with a bottleneck hidden layer that is trained auto-associatively using 
backpropagation. The model operates by recoding the input at the hidden layer and 
then decoding (reconstructing the original input) in terms of a channel for each 
category (separate sets of weights connect the hidden layer to sets of output nodes that 
represent the feature reconstruction for each category). In supervised learning tasks, 
DIVA produces a construal of the input in terms of each possible category and the 
relative degree of reconstructive success determines the classification response. The 
model learns by applying the auto- associative error to adjust the weights only along 
the channel corresponding to the pre-determined correct category. Psychologically, 
the model assumes that an example belongs to a category to the extent that it can be 
reconstructed by the category. A category is basically a flexible representation of the 
statistical properties of the exemplars. For example, one category can correspond to 
all items that have value 1 on feature FI, or all items for which FI and F2 are
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perfectly correlated, or all items such that feature FI has value 1 unless features F2 
and F3 each have value 0.
In unsupervised learning tasks, the model has no information about which 
stimuli belong to which category or about the number of categories, so DIVA begins 
as a standard autoencoder with a single channel. DIVA performs unsupervised 
learning by evaluating stimuli one at a time. To simulate a spontaneous classification 
task with all stimuli concurrently available, DIVA is trained on blocks of all stimuli 
presented one at a time in a random order. DIVA evaluates each stimulus by 
determining the reconstructive success of all existing category channels (on the initial 
trial, there is only one category channel and no evaluation process). A spawning 
threshold is used to determine whether any of the existing categories provide a 
satisfactory account of the stimulus (i.e., sufficiently low sum-squared error). This 
threshold is analogous to the coupling parameter in the rational model or the 
rparameter of SUSTAIN and it effectively determines the number of categories or 
clusters. If none of the existing categories meet the threshold, then the network 
architecture is altered: a new category channel is created and seeded by conducting 
one training trial with the current stimulus. After the evaluation of a stimulus, one 
self-supervised (input = target) training trial is conducted in which the error signal is 
applied only to the category channel with the best reconstruction of the current 
stimulus. Based on this learning procedure, a clustering solution arises in the form of 
category channels that specialize in reconstructing sets of stimuli with similar 
properties. See Table 1 for a summary of the key differences and similarities of some 
of these models.
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Table. 1. An examination of how the unsupervised models differ from each other. 
_______________W ithin cat, s im .1 B etw een  cat, s im .1 Trial-by-trial Formal
principle
G eo m e tr ic  Yes Yes No N/A
DIVA N/A N/A Yes N/A
Rational N/A N/A Yes
Bayes
Simplicity Yes Yes No
Simplicity
SUSTAIN Yes No Yes
Simplicity
Un. GCM Yes No No N/A
Notes: Within cat. sim. and Between cat. sim. refer to whether the models favor 
classification which maximize within category similarity and/or between category 
similarity.
2.7 Summary
This chapter has outlined the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002) and its 
theoretical foundation, which is of the simplicity principle (Pomerantz & Kubovy, 
1986; such as demonstrated in the simplicity model). It has outlined the similarities 
and differences of unsupervised and supervised categorization, and compared the 
simplicity model to other unsupervised models. In the next chapter, I explain another 
type of categorization, supervised categorization, and how this relates to absolute 
representation (or judgment).
47
Chapter 3
Supervised Categorization and Absolute Judgment
3.1 An Introduction
In categorization, there are several theories which attempt to explain how 
people make classifications, such as unsupervised (see Chapter 2) and supervised 
categorization (which this chapter explains). These theories hold their own unique 
perspective of how categories are formed. For example, some focus on rule 
formation (Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994); decision boundaries (Maddox & 
Ashby, 1993); prototype abstraction (Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972; Smith & 
Minda, 1988); and exemplar storage (Medin & Schaffer). The focus of the present 
investigation is to explore relative vs. ‘absolute judgment’ (or absolute-like 
representation). Absolute classification is a classification based on the actual physical 
properties of the items used. So, a judgment based upon absolute properties would be 
influenced by how physically similar an item is to another item. This is similar to the 
way that exemplar and prototype theories suggest that classification is made. This 
chapter explores the exemplar and prototype models for an illustration of what is 
meant by absolute representation (the terms representation and judgment are used 
interchangeably).
3.2 Exemplar Models
Exemplar models (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) assume that 
in categorization, a new item is categorized based on its similarity with existing
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exemplars (items) in memory. An alternative to this is the distributional approach 
(Ashby & Townsend, 1986) which suggests that classification of a new exemplar is 
based on the relative likelihood of belonging to each distribution. These two accounts 
make qualitatively different predictions. Consider the case of two categories, one of 
which has high variability and another which has low variability. Exemplar theory 
will predict that a critical exemplar which is exactly half way between the two 
categories will be categorized as belonging to the category with low variability. The 
distributional model predicts that the critical exemplar should be classified into the 
high-variability category.
Despite the difference in qualitative prediction for categorization, the 
exemplar model has been successful in accounting for results which have been used in 
support of other models such as prototype abstraction or rule induction. An example 
of this, is where prototypes are classified better than exemplars (Homa, 1984). 
However the exemplar theorists have shown that prototype enhancement effects are 
predicted well by pure exemplar models (e.g., Busemeyer, Dewey, & Medin, 1984; 
Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988, 1991; Shin & Nosofky, 
1992).
3.3 Prototype vs. Exemplar Theories of Categorisation
A major controversial issue in the categorization literature, has been whether 
categorization for new stimuli into existing categories occurs on the basis of 
comparing the similarity of the individual exemplars, within a group, with the new 
item (exemplar theory; e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1989; Shin & 
Nosofsky, 1992), or by comparing the similarity of the average summary 
representation, of the category with the new item (prototype theory; e.g., Reed, 1972; 
for general discussions see Nosofsky, 1990; Komatsu, 1992; Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 
1995). According to exemplar theory (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Hintzman, 1986; Medin, 
1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1989, 1988a, 1988b, 1990,1991) a person 
will classify a new item as a member of a category if the new item is more similar to 
the items in this category as opposed to another. So, in this case, the previous
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exemplars within the pre-specified groups shapes the way the classification of the new 
items is made, because, the category structure is given by the experimenter. This is 
different to spontaneous categorization, which is explored in Chapter 2. Spontaneous 
categorization is completely unconstrained, and has no existing categories which 
suggest how the items should be classified (see Chapter 2 on unsupervised 
categorization).
In contrast to this, prototype theory suggests that when learning a category, the 
person abstracts a central tendency across all encountered instances of the category 
(e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; Homa et al., 1981; Homa 
& Vosburgh, 1976; Reed, 1972). In some cases, certain restricted types of prototype 
and exemplar models are equivalent (independent cue models; Nosofsky, 1990;
Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995). The controversy relates to which theory best 
describes conceptual structure (for reviews see Murphy & Medin, 1985; Komatsu, 
1992; Hahn & Chater, 1997).
In the investigation for ‘relative vs. absolute categorization’ (see Chapter 5), I 
will ask the question: under what circumstances should we expect a relative as 
opposed to an absolute representation in categorization? Before this can be answered, 
however, clear definition of the terms absolute-like and relative-like representations 
must be given. This is the goal of the present chapter, which relates to Chapter 4 on 
relative judgment. In order to explain absolute representation, some of the models on 
supervised categorization are described in more detail. The goal here is to give a 
deeper understanding into exemplar theory, and absolute judgment (representation).
3.4 The Generalized Context Model o f Supervised Categorization
The Generalised Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1991) has been 
used successfully to model exemplar (absolute) representation in categorization. This 
model generalizes the original version of the context model proposed by Medin and 
Shafer (1978), and integrates this with classic theories and ideas in the area of choice 
and similarity (Gamer, 1974; Shepard, 1958). The model uses multidimensional
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scaling (MDS) in modelling similarity. Exemplars are represented in 
multidimensional space, and similarity is a decreasing function of their distance in 
space.
The GCM assumes that the categorization of a new exemplar is determined by 
the similarity between that new exemplar and those stored in memory. The GCM 
sums the similarity of a new item with the items in each category and predicts that the 
new item will be classified in the category for which this summed similarity is 
greatest. For example, a new instance will be classified as belonging to category A 
rather than category B, if it is more similar to the A exemplars than the B exemplars. 
More specifically, exemplars are represented in a multidimensional space; each 
exemplar is stored together with its category label. In a simple, one-dimensional case, 
the distance between two stimuli S, and Sj is given as:
r f 9 = l  X' ~ Xj\  ( 1 )
Where x, is the absolute magnitude of St , and x . is the absolute magnitude o f S j .
For an m-dimensional space, the weighted Minkowski power formula is used, so that 
the distance between stimuli S , and Sj is given as:
- - Mr
d , =
m
X im ~~ X j m | (2)
In Equation (2), xim denotes the value of exemplar i on psychological dimension m .
The r value defines the distance metric of the psychological space. For example, the 
city block metric is defined with r= 1, and the Euclidean distance metric is defined 
with r = 2 (Gamer, 1974; Shepard, 1964). Shown in Equation (2) are also the 
attention weight parameters wm (Carroll & Wish, 1974), which model the degree to 
which a participant attends to a particular dimension. The similarity between stimuli 
Sj and Sj is a function of their distance. Similarity is typically a monotonically
decreasing function, of distance as in the equation below:
—cdfj
1,  =e , (3)
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In Equation (3) 77,.. is the similarity between Sf and S j ; where q = 1 leads to an
exponential function and q = 2 leads to a Gaussian function. The sensitivity 
parameter, c, determines how quickly the similarity between stimuli St and Sj  is
reduced with distance.
The probability of classifying stimulus S, in category A, is proportional to the 
similarity between St and all the A exemplars, as in Equation (4); in that equation, the 
f3 a parameters are category biases, which indicate whether there might be a prior bias 
to identify new items as being members of a particular category.
Finally, the actual probability of making a category A response given stimulus 
Sf, when there are two alternative categories (A and B), is given by Equation (5).
3.5 Other supervised categorization models
COVIS (Ashby et al, 1998).
Ashby et al. (1998) asked participants to learn to classify stimuli into two 
bivariate normally distributed categories. Ashby et al.’s COVIS (competition 
between a verbal and implicit system) model suggests that there are two mental 
systems that compete with each other in the categorization response. It suggests, that 
first, there is an implicit (nonverbal) system that learns the optimal decision boundary 
for separating a psychological space into regions corresponding to categories. In 
categorization, items above the decision boundary would fall into category A, and the 
items below this criterion would fall into category B. There is also an explicit system 
that learns verbal rules. The criteria set by the verbal rule are then used in
=A< 2X > (4)
(5)
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categorization, so that a new item above the criterion (e.g., 1 0  cm) would be 
categorized into category A, and an item below this criterion would be categorized 
into category B. Ashby et al. (1998) suggested that the fact that categorization results 
fitted the decision boundaries (criteria) as predicted by their model was evidence in 
support for their model.
ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992).
A model that is closely related to the GCM is ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992; 
Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992), which incorporates the principles o f the 
GCM within a connectionist framework. The advantage of ALCOVE is that it has an 
explicit mechanism that can learn the attention weights on a trial by trial basis. The 
mechanism is error driven, and therefore can learn the weights that optimizes 
performance, rather than the experimenter having to set the weights manually for each 
stimuli set presented, in the GCM.
RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri & McKinley, 1994).
Results from another study which suggest a limitation of exemplar models, 
was made by Nosofsky, Palmeri and McKinley (1994). They advocated the 
alternative rule-plus-exception (RULEX) model of classification. From this model, 
they suggested that categorization is made by forming simple logical rules along 
single dimensions and then storing occasional exceptions to these rules. For example, 
if category A consists of features 1112, 1212, 1211, 1121, 2111 (1 could mean, ‘it has 
a feature x’, and 2 could mean, ‘it does not have feature x’) and category B consists of 
1 1 2 2 , 2 1 1 2 , 2 2 2 1 , 2 2 2 2  then the logical value 1 can be predicted as a determining 
factor for what should belong in category A and logical value 2 can be predicted for 
category B. So, according to the model, the individual might store value 1 on 
dimension 1, as a test of what belongs to category A, and value 2 on dimension 1, as a 
test of what belongs to category B. The exceptions stored would be 2111 for category
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A and 1122 for category B. The learning process in RULEX is stochastic, and a key 
property is that different observers can from different rules from the same 
information. The vast array of different rules are the result of a probabilistic learning 
process described by few free parameters.
One of the advantages of the RULEX model over the GCM is that it 
successfully predicted a distribution-of-generalization data which the GCM failed to 
predict (Nosofsky, Palmeri & McKinley, 1994). However, Nosofsky and Johansen 
(2000) demonstrated that a modified version of the GCM was successful at 
accounting for this data by allowing for an individual-subject parameter variability. 
Also, to gain further support for the exemplar based account of the distribution-of- 
generalization data, the ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) model was applied. In the GCM 
version, altering particular patterns of attention weights across the five subgroups was 
required, but in ALCOVE, this requirement was fulfilled by the model’s attention- 
weight learning mechanism.
ATRIUM(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998)
ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) is a multiple-system categorization 
model that incorporates both rule and exemplar representations. Specifically, there is 
a rule module that learns to establish single-dimension decision boundaries, an 
exemplar module, that learns the association between exemplars and categories, and a 
module that links the two together, called the competitive gating mechanism. In 
general, the model uses the rule module in categorization, unless there is an exception 
to the rule in which case it prefers the exemplar module.
Erickson and Kruschke (1998) demonstrated that when using stimuli that vary 
along two dimensions, the ATRIUM model accounted for the categorization 
performance more accurately than the GCM. Nosofsky and Johansen (2000) suggest 
that this was because the stimuli involved numerical data which allowed for the 
precise perception of the magnitude of the items. When replicated without the 
numerical data there was little difference in the GCM and ATRIUM model 
predictions.
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3.6 Exemplar theory; the GCM and how this relates to absolute judgment
In the present investigation a ‘relative (or relational; see chapter 4 on relative 
judgment for a full account) mode of categorization (or representation)’, is a 
categorization process in which items are represented in terms of some relational 
property (e.g., ‘small vs. large’). A relational classification is therefore based on a 
relational property which is independent of the particular physical properties of 
individual exemplars, but rather depends on the relations between sets of exemplars 
(in different categories). The implied converse mode of categorization, ‘absolute 
categorization’, involves item representations which veridically correspond to the 
actual physical properties of the items (e.g., ‘approximately 6  cm vs. approximately 
20 cm’). It is this latter kind of categorization which the GCM has been designed to 
capture.
To demonstrate the specific difference in the absolute and relative 
representations, an account is given using the GCM which models the classifications 
o f absolute and relative properties (is is not designed of relative representation but we 
include it here for illustrative purposes) in this example. So, in this example, the 
GCM is applied on the basis of two representational schemes for the training and test 
items: one in which the items are represented in an absolute way (in terms of their 
actual physical magnitudes; e.g., 1 2 mm, 15mm etc.) and another in which the items 
are represented in a relative way (e.g., in terms of a simple coding whereby ‘smaller’ 
items are represented with the value 1 and ‘larger’ items are represented with the 
value ‘5’). For this example, all the other details of GCM fits were standard.
So, consider the following example. In the absolute version of the GCM fit, 
there are four items in a category called Chomps which have the heights: 32, 35, 36, 
40 mm, and four items in a category called Blibs with heights: 62, 64, 6 6 , 70 mm, and 
four test items, with heights: 81, 85, 121, 124 mm. It can be seen that two of the test 
items have ‘relatively’ smaller magnitudes and the other two relatively larger 
magnitudes. It therefore can be asked, ‘How do participants classify the test items in
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this experiment?’ If  they represented the training and test items in an absolute way, 
then it would be expected that most of the test items would be classified in the 
category of Blibs, since the Blibs training items were most similar to the test items. 
Using the GCM to predict the classifications made, a sum of squares value of 2.372 is 
produced when assigning all o f the test items into the category of Blibs (note that 
smaller sums of squares indicates better classifications by the GCM).
Alternatively, in the relative version of the GCM fit, the relative value 1 could 
be used to represent all the (small) Chomps in training and the value 5 all the (large) 
Blib items in training. Likewise, the values 1 and 5 are used to represent the pair of 
smaller and larger test items respectively. Crucially, with this representational 
scheme, the items are only represented in terms of small and large, there is no more 
specific information about their physical (absolute) properties. As before, attempting 
to predict the empirical classification probabilities using the GCM and a relative 
representation for the training and test items, a sum of squares value of 0.181 was 
found for the relative classification. In other words, the GCM could predict 
classification probabilities better when the training and test items were represented in 
a relative way, as compared to when they were represented in an absolute way.
In the case of using a prototype model to represent absolute judgment, the 
same predictions would be made. For example, in the case of an absolute 
representation, the physical size of the prototypes for the ‘Chomp’ category and ‘Blib’ 
category would be used in the classification process. So, in the case of a pre-specified 
category labelled ‘Chomps’ which consist of heights 32, 35, 36, 40 mm, and a 
category labelled ‘Blibs’ consisting of heights 62, 64, 6 6 , 70 mm, the prototype for 
the Chomp group would be 36 mm and the prototype for the Blib group would be 6 6  
mm. In the same way as described in the GCM exemplar situation, this physical size 
would be used in the categorization process. So, in the case of new test items being 
presented corresponding to heights 81, 85, 121, 124 mm, then according to prototype 
theory, just as was the case for the GCM exemplar theory, the new items would be 
classified with the category to which they are physically most similar. Crucially, the 
only difference between prototype theory and the GCM exemplar, is that in the GCM 
each of the individual items within a group are compared for similarity with the test 
items, whereas in the prototype model, it is only the abstracted prototype that is 
compared with the test items.
This simple example demonstrates a possible use of the GCM to account for 
relative properties, however, the model has been designed and adapted for the use of 
predicting categories in absolute modes of supervised categorisation, where physical 
sizes of magnitudes are used.
3.7 Summary
The focus of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, a detailed description of 
absolute representation was given, which was illustrated with several supervised 
models such as the GCM. A simple example of absolute and relative representation 
and an example was given which used the GCM account. This evidence will be used 
to motivate the experimental investigations into relative vs. absolute representation in 
Chapter 5 and unsupervised vs. supervised categorization in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Relative Judgment in Categorization
4.1 An Introduction
In Chapter 3, a description was given of absolute representation (or 
judgments) and an example was given using the generalized context model (GCM; 
Nosofsky; 1984, 1986, 1991). This chapter expands the literature review o f absolute 
vs. relative representation by examining some of the literature in categorization on the 
subject of relative representation. Crucially, a description of the relative judgment 
model (RJM; Stewart et al., 2005) in categorization and analogical mapping (Gentner, 
1983, 2003; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) is given, which motivates the definition of 
relative representation that we will use.
4.2 Absolute identification tasks
Miller (1956) reported that the cognitive system had difficulty in processing 
information once the short-term capacity limit in memory was reached. He found that 
this limitation occurred when using many different types of information, such as 
loudness of tones to the magnitude of lengths and areas. Absolute identification tasks 
are commonly used in classification experiments when testing memory limitations. 
These tasks consist of presenting several items of varying size, but can be used many 
other situations, such as when using sound, or brightness. In all of these situations, 
the participant must identify from memory, the smallest item to the largest. For 
example, a participant is given several stimuli of varying sizes and is asked to identify
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them from memory first the smallest, then the second smallest etc., until all the stimuli 
are accounted for. One of the problems that can result from this task is that errors in 
judgment can occur once the limit in short term memory is reached. To be more 
specific, if there are too many items (i.e., if the sequence of information exceeds the 
capacity limits of short-term memory), the memory trace of the exemplars can be lost, 
which reduces identification accuracy in this task. To compensate for this loss, 
representation of the items in memory can shift from absolute (based on the actual 
physical size) to a relative representation (where the representation of the items is 
relative to one another. Such relative representations (e.g., see Stewart et al., 2005), 
utilized the relative properties of ‘bigger than’ or ‘smaller than’ the neighbouring 
items, which is a process similar to analogical mapping. Briefly, there are three main 
observations from in these tasks: a limit in information transmission; bow effects in 
the accuracy of identifying the stimuli; and sequential effects. Each of these will be 
explained in turn.
Limitations in Information Transmission
The amount of information that can be transmitted through short-term memory 
can be measured with absolute identification tasks (McGill, 1954). Information 
transmission has an input, the presented stimuli, and an output, the classification 
response made. Input information travels through the short-term memory channel and 
arrives as the classification response output. Perfect transmission of the input to the 
response, would equal perfect classifications where there would be no errors.
However, Miller (1956) demonstrated that the memory channel is limited to just a few 
bits (2.5 bits) of information and therefore, perfect transmission, once this limit is 
reached is not possible. However, as Miller (1956) points out, the memory channel is 
limited to just a few bits, and thus the information cannot travel perfectly from input 
to output if this channel capacity is exceeded. The 2.5 bit limit corresponds to about 
six equally likely alternatives. The limit leads to a loss of information and thus leads 
to a reduction in classification accuracy. Stewart et al. (2005) have demonstrated that 
such a limitation of memory leads to an alternative form of representation which is 
based on relative properties of the items. These relative properties are based on
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comparisons between the present item with preceding items, in terms of how different 
they are to each other. For example, the present item could be represented as ‘much 
bigger’ than the previous item. Information transmission can increase with the 
increase in range (e.g., the difference in size between items from smallest to largest). 
However, this also reaches a limit once the items are easy to discriminate (Alluisi & 
Sidorsky, 1958; Braida & Durlach, 1972; Eriksen & Hake, 1955a; Pollack, 1952).
Bow or Edge Effects
One of the phenomena observed in absolute identification tasks is the bow 
effect. This is where the classification accuracy is greater at the extremes of the item 
set and poorer at the midrange, and hence a bow effect is observed when plotting 
accuracy on a graph (e.g., Kent & Lamberts, 2005; Lacourture & Marley, 2004; 
Murdock, 1960; Siegel, 1972). When the range of the item set increases, the 
classification accuracy only slightly improves (e.g., Braida & Durlach, 1972;
Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973; Hartman, 1954; Pollack, 1952). This effect is not only 
observed with visual stimuli such as items, it is also found with other stimuli such as 
when tones of sound are used (Brown et al., 2002). The bow effect increases when 
the number of stimuli presented increases (Alluisi & Sidorsky, 1958; Durlach & 
Braida, 1969; Lacouture & Marley, 1995; Pollack, 1953; Siegel, 1972). Siegal (1972) 
found that this effect was not due to any response bias, such as the end items being 
more frequently used as compared to the midrange items.
Sequential Effects
Another observed phenomenon in absolute identification tasks is sequential 
effects. This is where the previous item has some influence over the perception and 
thus classification of the present item. For example, if the preceding item was much 
smaller than the current item, then the perception of the current item could be that it is 
smaller than it actually is. There are several theories that try to explain the sequential
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effect. One of these theories is the assimilation theory. In this theory, the current 
item is perceptually assimilated in memory by the previous item so that it is more 
similar to it than it actually is (Gamer, 1953; Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Hu, 1997; 
Rouder et al., 2004). Ward and Lockhead (1970) demonstrated that a response bias 
led to the current item being biased away from the previous item. Evidence for the 
assimilation of the items has not been confined to absolute identification tasks, as this 
has also been shown with magnitude estimation tasks (e.g., Jesteadt, Luce, & Green, 
1977), in matching tasks (Stevens 1975) and in relative intensity judgment tasks 
(Lockhead & King, 1983). Assimilation effects have been modelled by several 
researchers such as by Stewart et al. (2005) in the relative judgment model (RJM).
4.3 Models that account for the effects observed in absolute identification 
tasks
Assimilation Models
Assimilation and contrast effects (i.e., where the current item is contrasted 
away from a neighbouring item) can be accounted for by assimilation models 
(Holland & Lockhead, 1968). For this, it is assumed that the cognitive system 
generates a classification response by converging the judged distance between the 
current and previous stimulus. Assimilation occurs when, for example, a smaller 
item precedes a larger item and this results in the larger item being assimilated so that 
it is perceived as more similar to the previous item. Thus, the present item has been 
assimilated so that it is perceptually smaller than it actually is, which leads to the 
errors in classification judgments.
Lockhead and King (1983) and Lockhead (1984), provided an assimilation 
model, which made two assumptions: (1) that it is the successive stimuli, which are 
assimilated in memory, and (2) relative comparisons are made between each new item 
and those stored in memory from the sequence presented. The model has accounted 
for contrast and assimilation, because it assumes that such relative comparisons are
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made. However, it did not account for the information transmission limit and bow 
effects. Such a limitation motivated the development of other models (e.g., Stewart et 
al., 2005).
Modified Thurstonian Models
Thurstonian models give an account for the bow effect. The simple 
Thurstonian decision model has been modified many times (e.g., by Durlach &
Braida, 1969). This model assumes that the items in memory are represented in a 
noisy way, so that the exact magnitudes are not stored in memory, but instead some 
unspecific representation. It is these noisy values that are used in the classification 
process and this leads to the errors found in the bow effect.
The model accounts for the limit in information transmission as it assumes that 
the noisy values are stored instead of the exact values because of the information 
transmission loss from input to output. So, instead of storing the exact values of the 
items, the cognitive system only stores the noisy values. This accounts for why the 
errors in classification increase when more stimuli are presented. For example, when 
more items are included but the range is held constant, then the items are closer 
together in terms of size. As the memory representation of these are noisy, then there 
is a greater likelihood that these will be confused with each other which would lead to 
greater errors in classification. The bow effect is accounted for by the fact that as 
there are less neighbouring items at the extremes of the presented sets, then there is 
less chance of confusing these items with the neighbouring items. Less confusion 
would lead to greater identification accuracy.
Restricted Capacity Models
Lacouture and Marley, (e.g., 2004; Marley & Cook, 1984, 1986) accounted for 
the limit in information transmission and bow effects in absolute identification tasks. 
They suggested that the cognitive system had a limited capacity to process 
information and it is this that led to the errors in the classification such as the bow
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effect. The exemplars in this model are represented on a noisy Thurstonian scale.
This model did well to account for the information transmission and bow effect but 
could not account for the sequence effects.
In more recent work, Lacouture and Marley (1995, 2005) developed a neural 
network mapping model, which includes a network of one single input unit, one single 
hidden unit and an output unit for each response. The storage of the exemplars in 
memory, were assumed to be noisy values. Response classifications in this model 
were made through the mapping onto the hidden unit activation, and it is assumed that 
for each output unit, activation is accumulated through the course of the trial. Once 
the accumulation reaches a threshold, the response is activated. However, the model 
still does not account for the sequence effects. Lacouture and Marley (2004) 
suggested that the model could be modified so that it would account for sequence 
effects, such as by suggesting that the normalizing of hidden activation units could be 
made so that previous items could be used instead of anchor values.
Laming’s (1984,1997) Relative Judgment Model
The relative judgment model (Laming, 1984), accounts for the limit in 
information transmission. This model gives a starting point for our definition of 
‘relative representation’. More specifically, the model assumes that the classifications 
made are done in such a way that, item differences are represented relative to each 
other. For example, the current item is represented relative to its difference with the 
preceding item.
It is clear, that this model uses relative representations rather than those based 
solely upon absolute physical properties. For example, rather than classifying the 
items based upon their physical (absolute) properties, such as ‘item one comes after 
item three because item one is 6mm and item three is 4mm’, the classification is made 
on the bases of item one is (relatively) ‘bigger than’ item three. So, the representation 
is based on relative properties. Specifically, it is the relative difference information 
that is used here rather than just the relative property. This is different to the relative 
representation of Stewart et al. (2005) RJM, where it is the relative property ‘bigger or
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smaller than’ that is used and not the relative difference information which is based 
upon the absolute properties. This model was good to account for the limit in 
information transmission but failed to account for the bow and sequence effects. 
Laming did suggest that the model could be adapted to account for prior expectations 
of the distribution and thus account for these additional phenomena.
Absolute Judgment, Exemplar Models
A thorough explanation of exemplar models is given in Chapter 3. Briefly, 
there are models based on similarity of absolute physical sizes. An example of how a 
classification would result here for three items; item one, 10mm; item two, 12mm and 
item three, 14mm, would be, that item one would be classified with item two, rather 
than item three, because it is physically more similar to this, as compared to item 
three. There are several models which use absolute physical similarity in 
classification. According to the exemplar theory (e.g., Medin & Schafer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1986), each item is stored in memory with its associated label. So, for 
example, when presented with a chair and also the category label, chair (i.e., the 
participant is told that this item belongs to a category called chairs), then the item with 
its label ‘chair’, is stored in memory. When classifying a novel item, the probability 
of a classification is increased when the stored items and the novel items are 
physically more similar. So, if a chair is presented and there are two available groups, 
‘chairs’ and ‘stools’, then there is a greater likelihood that the new item will be 
classified into the category ‘chairs’. This is because its physical properties such as 
length, and width are more similar to the exemplars in the chair category, as compared 
to those in the stool group.
In terms of the absolute identification task, Brown et al. (2002) applied the 
data for absolute identification tasks to the exemplar model (Generalized Context 
Model, Nosofsky, 1986). The exemplar model accounted for bow effects, as the end 
items have fewer items to get confused with, but it does not explain the gradual 
bowing. This however, can be accounted for if the weights in the model are changed 
and bias in favour of responses for stimuli that have more extreme magnitudes.
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The major problem with the exemplar models is that they fail to account for 
sequential effects. They try to account for such effects by placing more weight to 
neighbouring items (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmer, 1997, Elliot & Anderson, 1995), so that 
these become more available to memory. However, this fails to predict the sequence 
effect in classification of the items (Stewart, Brown, & Charter, 2002).
4.4 Stewarts Relative Judgement Model (RJM, 2005)
Stewart et al. (2005) were motivated to develop the RJM by the assumption that that 
the classification process in absolute identification tasks is based upon relative and not 
absolute judgment.
Relative vs. absolute judgment
The RJM assumes that when making classifications there is no mechanism 
which stores even noisy perceptual absolute magnitude. Instead, the model is based 
on the idea that classification in absolute identification tasks are made on the basis of 
simple relative comparisons of the current item with its preceding neighbours.
Stewart et al.’s (2005) RJM, uses a similar mapping model as used by Lacouture and 
Marley (1995, 2004), and assumes that there is noise in the process of mapping 
several stimuli to the correct output response. This noise, they suggest, is the 
limitation which leads to errors in absolute identification tasks. This is different to 
other accounts such as the simple Thurstonian account, in that it does not require 
noisy representations of the perceptual exemplars. By assuming that the limit in 
capacity is due to mapping rather than perceptual noise, Stewart et al. (2005) 
suggested that there was no requirement for any further explanation to account for the 
lack of improvement in performance when stimulus range is increased, which makes 
the RJM approach more parsimonious than competing theories. One of the problems 
that face most models, according to Stewart et al. (2005), is that they base their 
assumptions on the physical magnitudes held in long-term memory, which makes it
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difficult to account for sequence effects. For example, in Thurstonian models, the 
position of criteria in long-term memory is used. In the connectionist model, 
Lacouture and Marley (1991, 1995, 2004), suggest that information about the most 
extreme stimuli is used from long-term memory. Also, in the exemplar models, the 
physical magnitudes of each stimulus is kept in long-term memory, and classifications 
are based upon similarity of these exemplars. Although these models can be modified 
to account for the sequence effects, the RJM explains all three observed effects in 
absolute identifications tasks without any need for modification.
RJM and absolute identification tasks
In Stewart et al.’s (2005) relative judgment model (RJM) for absolute 
identification tasks, the model accounts for all three effects (bow effect, sequential 
effects, and limited capacity), which all the other models fail to do. The main 
assumption the RJM makes, which is directly relevant to the present investigation, is 
that the classification judgments are made on the basis of relative comparisons and not 
absolute magnitudes to one another. This leads to the focus of the present 
investigation. The question asked is whether there might be analogous situations in 
categorization experiments.
4.5 Relative Judgment in Analogical Mapping
Analogical mapping
Analogical mapping is a process of comparison to identify shared relations 
between two knowledge systems, such as two objects. The generated comparisons are 
thought to play a role in relational reasoning (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995); when learning and using rules (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998; Lovett & Anderson, 2005); in the appreciation of perceptual
similarities (Medin, GoldStone, & Gentner, 1993); and in the production of language, 
science, mathematics and art. In analogical mapping when making a comparison 
between several objects such as elephant, truck, mouse and ball, then shared 
properties are identified such as elephant and truck are both ‘big’ and mouse and ball 
are both ‘small’. The shared property receives a double activation and is therefore 
more active in the classification procedure as compared with single activated unshared 
properties. The shared properties can drive classification decisions: for example, 
because elephant and truck are both big they should be classified together, and the 
same happens for mouse and ball.
The development of relational thought
There is evidence to suggest that the ability to reason using relational thought 
occurs through development (e.g., Gentner & Ratterman, 1991; Halford, 2005). 
Initially, children make inferences based on whole object similarity and then later 
acquire the ability to develop relational thought (e.g., Gentner, 2003; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991). For example, consider the following situation: when given two 
pictures, one of which is a dog chasing a cat and another is a boy chasing a girl with 
the cat in the background. Three year old children use featural similarity to match the 
cat in both pictures while five year old children use relational similarity, e.g., in both 
cases chasing is taking place (Richland et al., 2006). This developmental trend is 
known as the relational shift (Genter & Rattermann, 1991).
Connectionist models based on distribution representations (e.g., Colunga & 
Smith, 2005) provide a good account of whole object similarity in younger children’s 
reasoning, but do not account for more complex later relational thought (see Holyoak 
& Hummel, 2000; St. John, 1992). There are accounts of older children’s and adults’ 
reasoning ability (e.g., Anderson & Libiere, 1998; Falkenhainer et al., 1989), but these 
do not provide accounts of where the structured representations on which they rely 
originate from. There are accounts for both the featural (displayed in young children) 
and the relational (displayed in older children) representations, but there is no account 
for how the relational thought develops. This lack of an account for learning
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structured representations from unstructured examples is often cited as the most 
significant limitation of structured accounts of cognition (e.g., Munakata & O’Reilly, 
2003; O’Reilly & Busby, 2002; O’Reilly, Busby, & Soto, 2003). Doumas et al. 
(2008) offer an account for how structured relational thought is produced from 
relationally unstructured information (i.e., no direct instructions that allow for 
relational thought).
Analogical mapping modelling: DORA
Doumas et al. (2008) formed an analogical model for discovering relations 
(the Discovery Of Relations by Analogy; DORA). They suggested that there are three 
crucial factors in the development of complex learned relations. These were: firstly to 
identify invariants in the features presented; secondly, to isolate such property 
relations; and thirdly, to bind such property relations to new examples. Identifying 
featural invariants has been found in children as young as 6 months, who can identify 
features such as ‘more’ and ‘less’ in properties such as size, Clerafield and Mix 
(1999) and Feigenson, Carey, and Spelke (2002). Doumas et al. (2008) suggested that 
in the next stage, the property needs to be isolated (such as ‘taller’), from the rest of 
the environment, so it has its own independent meaning. In the final stage, is the 
ability to bind these property relations (e.g., ‘taller’), to new items and concepts in 
novel situations (see Doumas & Hummel, 2005). This takes the process from simple 
detection of relational properties, such as ‘taller’, into one which can structure new 
arguments, from the same relational properties, but with novel items or concepts 
(Doumas & Hummel, 2005; Halford et al., 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).
The main goal in the development of DORA was to demonstrate how an 
unstructured relational example can lead to structured relational representations. It 
forms four basic operations: (1) the retrieval o f propositions from long-term memory 
(LTM); (2) analogical mapping of the propositions, from working-memory (WM), to 
the novel situation; (3) predication and refinement; and (4) self-supervised learning 
(SSL). Analogical mapping, inference, and schema induction, all use these four basic 
operations (see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). For the purposes of the present
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investigation, the main interest in this literature is the binding of the relational 
concepts such as ‘smaller than’, which is relevant for the present experiments.
4.6 Relative Judgment in our experimentation
From the Stewart et al. (2005) study, relative judgment accounts of absolute 
identification tasks, and of relations between ‘current’ and ‘preceding’ items, we can 
lay out our basic argument for the current investigation. The argument presented, is 
that there are situations in which relative judgments dominate over absolute 
judgments and representations, as identified in absolute identification tasks. Both 
relative and absolute representations are supported in the literature (e.g., the 
Generalized Context Model; GCM; Nosofsky; 1984, 1986, 1991, for absolute 
identification, and, Stewart et a l, 2005, Gentner, 1983, 2003; Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995, for relative judgment). The present investigation investigates, specifically, the 
circumstances which will promote a relative vs. an absolute representation. An 
argument for this is given in the chapter describing the experiments (Chapter 5) for 
relative judgment, but here, a simple description of the term relative representation (or 
judgment), is given.
A general description from analogical mapping is used, and Stewart et al.’s 
RJM offers a useful starting point for such a definition, on the basis of properties such 
as ‘smaller’, ‘bigger’ than etc. For the studies in this investigation, a ‘relative (or 
relational) mode of categorization’, is a categorization process in which items are 
represented in terms of some relational property (e.g., ‘small vs. large’). A relational 
classification is therefore based on a relational property, which is independent of the 
particular physical properties of individual exemplars, but rather depends on the 
relations between sets of exemplars (in different categories). The implied converse 
mode of categorization, ‘absolute categorization’, involves item representations which 
veridically correspond to the actual physical properties of the items (e.g., 
‘approximately 6 cm vs. approximately 20 cm’).
So, to conclude, a relative representation is a classification based upon the 
relative differences of the items (e.g., bigger than, and smaller then), whilst absolute
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representation is based upon a classification when using the actual physical properties 
(e.g., item 1 is 10cm tall). In Chapter 5 these definitions are used in the current 
investigation of absolute and relative representational shifts of classification.
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Chapter 5
Experimental results; relative vs. absolute representation 
in categorization
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we wish to demonstrate a set of experiments which explore 
relative vs. absolute shifting in supervised categorization. This work is motivated by 
Stewart et al’s (2005) relative judgment model (RJM), which explores relational 
representation in absolute identification tasks. For this investigation we produced 5 
Experiments which explore the shifting between relative and absolute judgment in 
supervised categorization.
5.2 Relative vs. absolute representation in supervised categorization
The problem of how naive observers represent information is clearly a 
fundamental one in psychology. On one extreme, there is a strong intuition that 
psychological representations have to be veridical descriptions of the physical/ 
perceptual properties of the stimuli in our environment. The bulk of the modelling 
work in categorization involves such representations. For example, both exemplar 
theory (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1991) and prototype theory 
(Homa & Vosburgh, 1976; Posner & Keel, 1968; Reed, 1972) typically formulate 
predictions in terms of items represented in a way, which directly corresponds to their 
actual physical properties (cf. Shepard, 1987). However, clearly, the representational 
capacity of human cognition is a lot more flexible than that.
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There has been an abundance of evidence for the generation of abstract 
features/ the representation of information in terms of relative or relational features.
An influential tradition of relevant evidence comes from research on analogical 
reasoning. Analogical mapping is a process of comparison to identify shared relations 
between two knowledge systems, such as two objects. The generated comparisons are 
thought to play a role in relational reasoning (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995); when learning and using rules (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998; Lovett & Anderson, 2005); in the appreciation of perceptual 
similarities (Medin, GoldStone, & Gentner, 1993); and in the production of language, 
science, mathematics and art. In analogical mapping when making a comparison 
between several objects such as elephant, truck, mouse and ball, then shared 
properties are identified such as elephant and truck are both ‘big’ and mouse and ball 
are both ‘small’. The shared property receives a double activation and is therefore 
more active in the classification procedure as compared with single activated unshared 
properties. The shared properties can drive classification decisions: for example, 
because elephant and truck are both big they should be classified together, and the 
same happens for mouse and ball.
As suggested in Chapter 4 ,1 will use the term ‘relative-like (or relational) 
mode of categorization’, a categorization process in which items are represented in 
terms of some relational, abstract property (e.g., ‘small vs. large’). A relational 
classification is therefore based on a relational property, which is independent of the 
particular physical properties of individual exemplars, but rather depends on the 
relations between sets of exemplars (in different categories). The implied converse 
mode of categorization, ‘absolute-like categorization’, involves item representations 
which veridically correspond to the actual physical properties o f the items (e.g., 
‘approximately 6 cm vs. approximately 20 cm’).
A categorization researcher can ask whether there might be circumstances, 
which spontaneously lead to a preference for a more absolute-like, or relative-like 
mode of categorization. In this respect, prior research is slightly uninformative. Most 
studies either assume one form of representation or demonstrate that a particular form 
of representation is plausible (e.g., in analogical reasoning, the objective is commonly 
to demonstrate situations in which analogies can be employed to solve reasoning
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problems). It is rarely the case, however, that alternative possible representations for 
the same stimuli have been directly contrasted within the same paradigm.
The above discussion immediately leads to an important methodological 
problem: how can a researcher determine whether a particular categorization reflects 
absolute-like or relative-like representations? In a typical manipulation in this work, 
participants see items varying along a single dimension in a training phase. The 
training items are organized into two categories, a category o f ‘small’ items and a 
category of Targe’ items. In test, suppose that there are only two test items, one of 
which is smaller than the other, but also such that they are both larger than the items 
in the Targe’ training category (see Figure 3). It seems straightforward to assume that 
a relative-like categorization would mean that the Category A exemplars are 
represented as ‘smaller’ than the Category B ones, so that the shorter of the two test 
stimuli will be classified as a Category A instance while the larger as a Category B 
one. By contrast, with an absolute-like categorization, both test instances should be 
classified as Category B instances, since their physical properties are more similar to 
those of the Category B members.
Two important qualifications underwrite the robustness of this paradigm. First, 
an assumed relative-like representation is not the same as a fuzzy absolute-like 
representation. If the representation of the test instances is absolute-like, but inexact in 
some sense, then they should still be classified in Category B, as long as the 
difference between Category A and Category B exemplars is large enough (see Figure 
3). This can be arranged in a straightforward way, for example in an experiment 
where we have exemplars in training Category A approximately 30 mm, exemplars in 
training Category B as 60mm, whilst test exemplar sizes are 80mm and 120mm. In 
this case, an absolute-like representation would yield a classification, where both test 
items would be classified into Category B. Second, one can assume that the default 
response bias of participants would be to select some test instances as members of one 
training category and other instances as members of the other. Such a response bias 
clearly favours a relative-like mode of categorization in our experiments. Crucially, 
the conclusions we are seeking to derive in this work are not whether a particular 
manipulation leads to absolute-like or relative-like categorizations, but rather whether 
it leads to more absolute-like or relative-like categorization, in relation to a baseline 
manipulation.
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Training items
C ategory  A C ategory  B
Figure 3. A schematic diagram of a typical manipulation in the present work. Each 
line corresponds to a stimulus. Stimuli vary along a single dimension, which is overall 
length.
5.3 Defining relative and absolute representation
The issue of absolute-like vs. relative-like categorizations has recently 
received some attention in the study of absolute identification tasks. In such tasks, a 
participant is presented with several stimuli of varying magnitudes along a particular 
dimension of physical variation, such as height. They are then asked to remember 
these stimuli and to place them in order from smallest to largest from memory. Using 
this task, Miller (1956) observed that people found it difficult to identify a particular 
item from a set of items that vary along a single dimensional continuum (such as 
length, brightness of colour or pitch of tone). Stewart et al. (2005; see also Lamings, 
1984, 1997) could account for various phenomena in such tasks by assuming that the 
judgment for each stimulus was made relative to the previous stimuli. Also, in the 
work of Stewart et al. (2002; Stewart & Brown, 2004), who have demonstrated that
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difference information between items in sequence is used to generate the classification 
response, which is similar to the relative comparison that we refer to.
In our terminology, such representations would be examples of relative-like 
representations, in the simple sense that the representation of the stimulus does not 
depend on its absolute physical properties. Stewart et al. suggested that, for example, 
limits in memory capacity might have prevented the absolute representation of all 
relevant exemplars.
The work on absolute identification tasks suggests that all representations are 
relative. In categorization, it seems implausible that there are not circumstances in 
which the representations we employ are not absolute (e.g., see Goldstone, 1994).
So, the question becomes, under what circumstances might we expect that an 
absolute classification mode will be preferred? It is reasonable to suggest (e.g., in 
terms of a minimalist Bayesian intuition) that the absolute properties of a category 
(e.g., information about particular exemplars, as would be required by exemplar 
theory, or information about a prototype, as this would be required by prototype 
theory) would be inferred with more confidence if more category exemplars were 
studied in the training phase. In other words, suppose that the correct hypothesis 
about the absolute value of the prototypes of the two presented categories is such that 
the first prototype is PI and the second prototype is P2.
Let’s label the training exemplars of the categories as D l, D2, D3 etc. We 
suggest that P(P1, P2|D1, D2, D3) would be lower compared to P(P1, P2|D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5, D6...). In other words, it would be possible to evaluate with more confidence 
a hypothesis about the absolute properties of the category prototypes, if more training 
exemplars are processed. Likewise, if there were four categories there would be four 
values to infer regarding the physical values of the prototypes, PI, P2, P3, P4. A 
straightforward extension of this reasoning suggests that P (PI, P2|D1, D2, D3) would 
in general be lower than P (PI, P2, P3, P4|D1, D2, D3). In other words, we would 
need more information to support or reject a more complex hypothesis (about the 
physical properties of category prototypes). This argument does not assume that 
participants represent categories with exemplars or prototypes. Rather, our claim is 
that a representation of a category based on (absolute) physical values of the training
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exemplars is more likely to be possible (and hence, we predict, preferred by the 
cognitive system) if there are more training exemplars per category.
The above approach leads to straightforward predictions: More training 
exemplars per category would lead to more absolute-like classification. More 
categories would lead to more confusion between the particular physical properties of 
each category, therefore to less absolute-like classification. Finally, other 
manipulations which undermine participants’ confidence in the absolute physical 
properties of the training items, would also lead to less absolute-like classification (we 
employed one such manipulation, a time delay).
These predictions depend on a particular, incidental mode of category 
learning (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004). In our tasks, the training items were shown to 
participants in bundles corresponding to their intended categorizations. Thus, 
participants could readily perceive the training items in terms of their intended 
categories. In addition, participants were exposed to the training exemplars of each 
category relatively briefly; they did not have an incentive (and were not encouraged) 
to memorize the exemplars or study them thoroughly. Indeed, as they had the training 
exemplars available in test there would be no reason for them to do so.
Such a mode of category learning strongly contrasts with the more common 
supervised categorization methods. In such cases, participants are exposed over a 
large number of trials to the same training exemplars repeatedly, until they can 
perfectly reproduce their classifications. Moreover, the category structures typically 
learned in this way are complex: extensive training is required before learning can be 
achieved (by contrast, in our experiments participants were shown very simple 
category structures). What would be the relevant expectations under such 
circumstances? Clearly, the fewer the exemplars, the easier participants would find 
learning the required classifications, and (therefore) the more salient would 
participants find the taught exemplar-classification label associations. Overall, the 
fewer the exemplars in a supervised categorization paradigm, the more pronounced 
we would expect exemplar-effects to be. Indeed, this is exactly what has been found 
in previous work (Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004; cf. Blair & Homa, 2003).
So, with the incidental category learning paradigm approach we propose 
there is a prediction that fewer exemplars (typically) lead to less absolute-like
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classification, however, with a standard supervised categorization paradigm fewer 
exemplars lead to more absolute-like classification (more pronounced exemplar 
effects). To reiterate, the key difference between the two approaches is that in the 
latter case, participants have no choice but to represent the training exemplars in an 
absolute way. They receive typically dozens of training trials (e.g., in Rouder’s study 
experiment 2, there were 96 trials in a block and 10 blocks in a session with each 
participant going through two sessions of training) in which they have to learn to 
associate particular exemplars with particular labels. In our case, by contrast, the 
training exemplars never really have to be learned (they are present throughout the 
experiment and the category structure is very simple). Additionally, the test 
exemplars could be classified by interpreting the training exemplars in two radically 
different ways.
In closing, our general hypothesis is that, when it is difficult to derive accurate 
training category representations (prototypes or exemplars) based on the physical 
properties of the studied objects, the cognitive system is more likely to employ 
relative-like (relational) representations. From this general hypothesis, as stated three 
more specific ones can follow: 1) We expect more relative-like categorization when 
there are fewer items per group; 2) We expect more relative-like categorization when 
there are more groups; 3) We expect more relative-like categorization when we use a 
time delay between the initial presentation of training stimuli and test items. For 
hypothesis 3 we are suggesting that the time delay will deteriorate the memory o f the 
specific exemplar representation and therefore reduce the available information 
regarding the distributional properties, leading to a greater likelihood of relative-like 
representation.
5.4 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 provides a baseline examination of the basic experimental design.
There were two training categories, a category of Chomps and the category of Blibs. 
There were four test items, (heights are indicated in Table 2 shows a comparison of all 
heights in all experiments). If participants adopted an absolute-like mode of
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categorization, then all four test items should be classified in the category of Blibs 
(that is, all the ‘large’ items would be classified in the same category). By contrast, if 
participants adopted a relative-like mode of classification, the two smaller test items 
should be classified with the training category of smaller items (Chomps) and the two 
larger test items should be classified with the category of larger training items (Blibs). 
Note that, as said, with a single experiment, it is impossible to gain insight into the 
circumstances under which absolute-like or relative-like representations are more 
likely to occur. For example, results in this experiment will be partly driven by a 
propensity to represent the stimuli in a relative-like or absolute-like way, but also by 
possible task demands, such as a bias to assign some of the test stimuli to all the 
available training categories. Experiment 1 is the baseline manipulation: We are 
interested in whether our additional manipulations lead to a shift in favour of relative- 
like or absolute-like representations. By comparing the results of subsequent 
experiments with those of Experiment 1, we effectively factor out such possible task 
demands.
Method
Participants
A total of 63 Swansea University students took part in the experiment for a small 
payment. Participants were tested individually and were all experimentally naive.
Materials
12 items were created using Corel Draw (Figure 4). Each item was presented on a 
card and consisted of a picture of a flower grounded on a solid base. The picture of 
the flower was comprised of a yellow bud with eight petals, and a blue stem. Eight 
items, grouped into two categories, comprised the training stimuli. The group of 
Chomps consisted of four flowers, which were of the following heights: 32, 35, 36, 
40mm. The group of Blibs consisted of four flowers with greater heights: 62, 64, 66, 
70mm. There were four test items of flowers with heights; 81, 85, 121, 124 mm (see 
Table 2). The items in the category of Chomps and the items in the category of Blibs
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were such that height differences between any successive items were computed 
assuming a Weber fraction of 8%. The three authors independently verified that each 
stimulus could readily be discriminated from all others. Note, also that the width of 
the flowers would increase in size as with the overall height. We only report height 
values, since these provide the easiest way to label the stimuli.
Figure 4. Two examples of the stimuli which were presented to participants. The top 
image is an example of an item belonging to the Chomps category (in Experiment 1) 
and the bottom image is an example of the Blibs category.
Procedure:
Participants were first presented with (written) instructions to the effect that they were 
about to see some items, which belonged to two imaginary categories (called Chomps 
and Blibs), and that the experimenter would tell participants which items went to 
which categories. At that point, participants were shown the two groups of stimuli 
presented on cards Chomps and Blibs (each o f the items were presented on a single 
card). Both training groups, Blibs and Chomps, were presented together in all of our 
experiments (two single piles of items, Blibs and Chomps; presentation of categories 
was counterbalanced across participants). Participants were asked to look though 
every item in the two groups in their own time (this was typically less than three
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minutes). Subsequently, and while the training items were still available to 
participants, participants were presented with new (written) instructions, indicating 
that new items will be shown, and that each participant had to decide for each new 
item whether it was a Chomp or a Blib. The instructions stated, “There are no right or 
wrong answers! You have to classify each item as a Chomp or a Blib.” After the 
presentation of the instructions, participants were presented with the four test items; 
test items were also presented simultaneously. Note that in all the experiments the 
training items were present when participants were asked to categorize the test items. 
The presentation order of items was randomized for each participant.
Results and discussion:
We define absolute-like categorization to correspond to a response pattern whereby all 
test items were considered Blibs and relative-like categorization whereby the two 
smaller test items were considered Chomps and the two larger test items Blibs. 
Directly analogous definitions for absolute-like and relative-like categorization were 
employed in the other experiments as well. Absolute- (or relative-) like 
categorizations will partly be influenced by whether the training stimuli are 
represented in an absolute or relative way. Equally, the relative proportion of 
absolute-like or relative-like categorization will depend on other factors, such as, for 
example, whether there is a respond bias to classify some test stimuli into all the 
available training categories. Therefore, we cannot say from the results of a single 
experiment whether (e.g.) absolute-like categorization constitutes evidence for 
absolute-like categorization and representation. This becomes possible by comparing 
the results of two (or more) experiments, so that we can examine whether a particular 
manipulation increases the tendency for (e.g.) absolute-like categorization is 
increased. Notwithstanding the above issues, the characterization of participant 
responses as absolute-like and relative-like seems like a good starting point in 
considering our data.
The responses of some participants were such that they did not conform to this 
characterization. Such participants were eliminated from the analyses here and 
elsewhere, since their results do not bear on the hypotheses we are interested in. Of 
course, if our experimental design works as intended, we would expect that relatively 
few participants would produce such in-between responses. In this experiment, only
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one participant was eliminated because he/she categorised the stimuli in a way, which 
did not clearly fit our definitions of absolute-like and relative-like representation.
Forty eight participants adopted a relative-like categorization mode and 14 an 
absolute-like one.
Here and elsewhere we adopted %2 two-tailed tests to examine any preference 
for relative vs. absolute-like classification of the test items, against either what would 
be expected by chance, or in relation to results from other experiments. A test 
against chance simply examines whether the proportion of absolute-like 
categorizations is equal to that of relative-like categorizations or not. We assume that 
a straightforward 50-50 observed-chance split is most appropriate for the chi-square 
analysis, as we were interested in testing against the null hypothesis that an absolute­
like classification is equally likely to a relative-like classification. However, it is not 
the observed vs. chance analysis which is particularly interesting, as the frequency of 
relative vs. absolute classifications in any one experiment could be determined by 
demand characteristics. Rather, it is the comparison of classification performance 
across experiments, which supports our conclusions regarding the manipulations 
which promote relative vs. absolute classification.
In Experiment 1 there was a highly significant tendency for participants to 
prefer relative classification, against chance: (1) = 10.08,/? < .0005. Overall,
Experiment 1 demonstrates the baseline condition and the analytical approach. It is 
clear that several participants (14 out of 62) did not feel obliged to assign some test 
instances to all the training categories. However, it is probably exactly this bias which 
led to the preference for relative-like classifications in Experiment 1. Accordingly, in 
itself, the conclusion from Experiment 1 is not interesting. In subsequent experiments, 
by altering the key characteristics of Experiment 1 and observing participants’ 
performance, we will present a series of results, which support our hypothesis of when 
relative-like vs. absolute-like categorization is more likely to occur.
5.5 Experiment 2
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In Experiment 1 we showed that relative-like categorization can be observed when 
each of the training categories had four test items per training group (Chomps and 
Blibs). In Experiment 2 we doubled the number of items per training group. We 
suggest that this may encourage absolute-like classification. It is possible that when 
more evidence is available regarding the distributional properties of the training items, 
concrete (absolute) information about the category exemplars (or prototypes) would 
be more available and so it would be such information which drives the classification 
of new exemplars. Conversely, relative-like classification may be encouraged by 
indistinct memory traces of the training exemplars. Again, having more exemplars 
per category is likely to strengthen the corresponding memory traces and hence 
promote absolute-like classification. As said, note that in all our manipulations the 
training items were present when the test items were categorized. However, we can 
minimally assume that in classifying a test item a participant has to rely on some 
psychological representation of the training categories.
Method and Procedure:
Fifty nine Swansea University students took part in the experiment for a small 
payment. Participants were tested individually and were all experimentally naive 
(here and elsewhere, no participant took part in more than one of the present 
experiments). Materials consisted of the same two groups o f flower images (Blibs 
and Chomps), but with eight instead of four items in each group. The heights of the 
members of the Chomps category were 35, 36, 40,42, 44, 46, 47, 49 mm and the 
heights of the members for the Blibs category were 62, 64, 66, 70, 74, 75, 76, 77 mm 
(see Table 2 for a comparison of all heights in all experiments). The test items and 
procedure remained the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion:
In this experiment, we observed 25 participants providing relative-like classification 
of the test items and 32 absolute-like classifications (two participants were eliminated 
because their responses could not be characterized as absolute-like or relative-like). 
Examining participants’ pattern of responding against chance, as before, did not 
identify a preference for relative-like or absolute-like classification ( / 2 (1) = .33, p  = 
.573). Crucially, when comparing the results of Experiment 2 with the results of
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Experiment 1, there was a highly significant interaction: x 2 (1) = 14.1, p  < .0005. This 
result indicates that in Experiment 2 participants were a lot more likely to adopt an 
absolute-like mode of categorization, compared to Experiment 1. Such a conclusion 
supports the hypothesis outlined in motivating Experiment 2.
In sum, increasing the number of exemplars per category increased the 
preference for representing the stimuli in an absolute-like way. As predicted by 
assuming that more concrete information about the training items enhances absolute- 
like categorization.
It is important to mention a possible range effect, which is the differences in 
size between the items, effecting the possible classifications (see e.g. Alluisi & 
Sidorsky, 1958; Braida & Durlach, 1972; Eriksen & Hake, 1955; Pollack, 1952). The 
range of training stimuli does change between experiments and I should have clarified 
in the chapter when this occurs. For example, in Experiment 1, the difference in 
height between the largest stimulus (the biggest Chomp) and the smallest one (the 
smallest Blib) is 22mm; there were four exemplars per group in Experiment 1. By 
contrast, in Experiment 2, in which there were eight exemplars per group, the 
corresponding difference is only 13 mm. Therefore, there is a decrease in range 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Now, the key question is whether such 
differences in range can (partly?) account for our results. This is extremely unlikely 
for the following reason: First, please note that previous research shows that it is 
increases in the range which make the stimuli more discriminable and would 
therefore, presumably, encourage absolute representation. However, our results are 
inconsistent with such an expectation. In Experiment 2 we observed more absolute 
representation compared to Experiment 1, however, the range of stimuli in 
Experiment 2 was smaller than in Experiment 1. A similar situation occurs in 
comparing Experiments 3 and 4. Again, when comparing Experiment 3 with 
Experiment 4, the range size difference for Chomp and Blib is 2 mm, Blib and Zlog,
6, and Zlog and Glab, 8; compared with, for Experiment 4, where the differences are 
5, 6 and 6 respectively. As can be seen, an increase in range, can only encourage an 
absolute representation, therefore we can discount range effects as a possible reason 
for our experimental effect, when there is no such increase in range.
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It is also important to mention, that in Experiment 1 the largest Blib was 
70mm and the smallest test item 81mm, which is an 11 mm distance between the 
items. In Experiment 2 the largest Blib was 77mm and the smallest test item 81mm, 
which is only a 4 mm distance between the two items. In order to justify that the 
items being more similar, did not lead to the absolute judgment in experiment 2 we 
need to note two things. First, in all cases all three authors verified independent that 
all stimuli were discriminable from each other. Also note that participants saw the 
stimuli concurrently so that even relatively small differences between stimuli could be 
readily detected. Second, in Experiment 1 the largest Blib was 70mm and the smallest 
test item 81mm, but in Experiment 2 (as the Reviewer notes) the largest Blib was 
77mm and the smallest test item 81mm. However, more importantly, in Experiment 
4 we include two test items which are identical to two items in the training groups, 
one in the Zlog group and the other in the Glab (48 and 62 mm). In this Experiment 
there were significantly more relative vs. absolute classifications as compared with 
chance levels. This indicates that even when the some of the training items are not 
disciminable with the test items, we still can find relative judgments.
In Experiment 3 we provide a manipulation, which is intended to weaken the 
concreteness of information for the training items and so (if our reasoning is correct) 
promote relative-like categorization.
5.6 Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we doubled the number of training groups, from two to four (the four 
training categories were called Chomps, Blibs, Zlogs, and Glabs). The Chomps had 
heights 30, 29, 36, 30 mm, the Blibs 38, 39, 40, 41mm, the Zlogs; 47, 48, 49, 50mm 
and the Glabs 58, 61, 62, 63mm (see Table 2). It can therefore be seen that the heights 
of the members of the four categories conformed to the simple ordering, smallest, 
small, large, and largest. The heights of the four test items were 48, 62, 113,183mm. 
Accordingly, one test item was the same size as one Zlog and another test item was 
the same size as one Glab; the other two test items were larger than all the training 
items. The fact that two test items were identical to two training items might plausibly
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enhance absolute-like classification. However, if our suggestion that the concreteness 
of information for the training exemplars enhances absolute-like classification is 
correct, then the converse prediction is made: with more categories, one would expect 
that participants would be more confused about the exact physical attributes of the 
members of each category, so that relative-like classification would be favoured. Note 
that Lacouture et al (1998) demonstrated that increasing the number of possible 
responses reduces the frequency of correct responses. The manipulation in this 
experiment relies on a similar assumption, namely that with more categories, 
increased confusability between stimulus-category label associations would lead to 
more relative-like categorization. However, in Lacouture et al.’s work there was a 
single normative response. That is, all responses were either correct or wrong and 
participants had to represent the stimuli in an absolute way for correct responses to be 
possible. By contrast, in our experiments participants were not constrained to 
represent the stimuli in a specific way. They could present them in a presumably more 
absolute or a relative way. Our manipulation in Experiment 3 exactly follows the 
logic of Lacouture et al. By providing more response categories, we assumed that 
participants would find it more difficult to adopt absolute representations. For 
example, this difficulty might relate to higher confusability between stimulus- 
category label associations. Note that we were not interested in the difficulty with 
which multiple categories can be learned and, so, during the test phase, participants 
could observe all the training stimuli correctly arranged into their respective 
categories. All these points are not made in the ms.
Method:
A total of 79 Swansea University students took part in the experiment for a small 
payment. Materials consisted of the same flower images but with four instead of two 
groups (labelled Chomps, Blibs, Zlogs and Glabs) and with four items for each group. 
The heights of all the stimuli are given above. The procedure for this experiment was 
the same as for Experiment 1, except that participants were required to categorise 
each of the four test items into any of the four groups (whereas in Experiment 1 there 
were only two groups). The instructions stated that any possible classification of each 
test items was possible.
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Procedure:
The procedure was the same as in other experiments, but for the fact that participants 
were presented with four training groups. Additionally, in this experiment participants 
were told more clearly that any possible classification was possible. Specifically, 
instructions prior to the test phase were augmented with the following text: “Any 
possible classification is allowed. The test items could be classified between all four 
possible categories, between three of the possible categories, between two of the 
possible categories or just one of the categories.”
Results and discussion:
In this case, relative-like categorization corresponded to grouping the smallest test 
item with the training group with the smallest members (Chomps), the second 
smallest test item with the training group with the second smallest members (Blibs) 
etc. An absolute-like classification corresponded to assigning test item 48 in the 
category of Zlogs (since there was a Zlog of the same size) assigning test item 62 to 
the category of Glabs (since, likewise, there was a Glab of the same size) and, finally, 
assigning the two remaining test items (113 and 183) to the category with the largest 
members (the category of Glabs). Fifty nine participants adopted a relative-like 
categorization mode and 9 an absolute-like categorization mode. Responses from 11 
participants were removed from the data as these did not fit the definitions of relative­
like or absolute-like categorization, and so do not bear on the hypothesis tested.
We used a j 2 test to investigate whether relative-like or absolute-like 
categorization was preferred (against chance) in classifying the test items into the 
categories of Chomps, Blibs, Zlogs and Glabs. There was a very strong tendency to 
form relative-like categorizations in this experiment: x 2 (1) = 21.26,/? < .0005. We 
next examined whether in Experiment 3 there were more relative-like categorizations 
compared to Experiment 1. There was an interaction in this direction, but it did not 
prove to be significant; x 2 (1) = 1.95,/? = .163.
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5.7 Experiment 4
In Experiment 3 we doubled the number of training groups and so observed a 
preference for relative-like classification. This preference should be reduced, by 
doubling the number of members o f each group, if our hypothesis regarding relative - 
like vs. absolute-like classification is correct.
Method and procedure:
A total of 60 Swansea University students took part in the experiment. Materials 
consisted of the same flower images with four groups (labelled Chomps, Blibs, Zlogs 
and Glabs) but with eight instead of four items for each group. These were the same 
training groups as in Experiment 3 (Chomps, Blibs, Zlogs, and Glabs), but each 
category in this case had eight members instead of four. The eight Chomps were 
flowers with heights 27, 28, 28, 31, 30, 29, 24, 21 mm, the eight Blibs had heights 38, 
39, 40, 41, 39, 40, 41, 36 mm, the Zlogs had heights 47, 48, 49, 50, 49, 50, 51, 52mm, 
and the Glabs had heights 58, 61, 62, 63, 61, 60, 62, 63mm. The four test items were 
the same as in Experiment 3 and had heights 48, 62, 113, 183mm (see Table 2). The 
procedure for this experiment was the same as for Experiment 3. There was some 
repetition of the exemplar sizes, to prevent as much as possible a reduction in the 
range between groups. There is no reason to assume that such a repetition would not 
affect the classifications made. Some exemplars were repeated, to prevent, as much 
as possible differences in stimulus range regarding the members of different groups. 
However, our results strongly indicate that range effects (and repetitions) do not affect 
the conclusions we wish to draw regarding shifts towards absolute or relative 
representation between experiments.
Results and discussion:
In this experiment, we observed 36 participants as categorizing according to relative­
like categorization and 14 according to absolute-like categorization. The responses of 
1 0  participants were removed, as these did not fit the definitions of absolute-like or
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relative-like categorization. With 2 x 2  training groups and two test items, there are 
22x22x22x22 = 256 possible classifications (since each item can be assigned to either 
group), but with 4 x 4 x 4 x 4 training groups, and four test items there are four billion 
possible classifications. Such a massive increase would undoubtedly lead to a greater 
number of classifications which we cannot characterize as absolute-like or relative­
like and, hence, which do not bear on our research questions. Also, these rejected 
classifications did not appear to confirm to a consistent pattern of responding. We 
first examined whether there was any evidence for a preference of absolute-like vs. 
relative-like categorization against chance. A x 2 test showed that participants 
preferred a relative-like mode of classification: (1) = 5.086, p = .024. The crucial
comparison regarding our hypothesis corresponds to whether there were a greater 
proportion of absolute-like categorizations in Experiment 4, compared to Experiment 
3. This was indeed the case: there were significantly more absolute-like 
categorizations in Experiment 4 compared to Experiment 3, as predicted: x 1 (1) = 4.0, 
p  = .045. This result is consistent with the findings in Experiment 2, in which we also 
observed a shift towards absolute-like categorization when increasing the number of 
items per group. We also compared Experiment 4 with Experiment 2 to examine 
whether increasing the number of groups would have led to an increase in the number 
of relational categorizations (note that the number of items in each group was the 
same in Experiment 4 and Experiment 2). For this comparison, we found x 2 (1) = 
8.61,p = .003 which further shows that having more groups does increase the number 
of relational categorizations.
Experiments 1 to 4 examined our hypothesis in terms of manipulating the 
number of training categories and the size of each category. In all cases, our results 
were consistent with a general hypothesis regarding preference for absolute-like vs. 
relative-like classification, according to which when it is possible to derive more 
concrete information about a category, then absolute-like classification should be 
favoured. In Experiment 5 we attempt an alternative test of this hypothesis.
5.8 Experiment 5
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Experiment 5 is based on Experiment 2 (two training categories, with eight items per 
group). The difference between the two experiments is that instead of asking 
participants to classify the test items immediately after presentation of the training 
items, we asked them to return one week later and then make their classifications 
decisions. According to our hypothesis, the time delay should deteriorate the memory 
traces for the training items, and thus increase the proportion of relative-like 
categorizations. In other words, if participants are unable to remember the exact 
physical characteristics of the stimuli, they might be more likely to attempt to classify 
the test stimuli on the basis of relational features, such as ‘small vs. large’.
Method and Procedure:
A total of 59 Swansea University students took part in the experiment for a small 
payment. The materials were identical to those in Experiment 2. Briefly, Chomps had 
heights 35, 36, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49 mm, Blibs had heights 62, 64, 6 6 , 70, 74, 75, 76, 
77 mm, and the test items had heights 81, 85, 121, and 124 (see Table 2). The 
procedure was likewise identical to that of Experiment 2, but for the fact that 
participants were asked to make their classifications a week after they had studied the 
training items. Moreover, in Experiment 5, classification of the test items took place 
without having the training items available.
Results and discussion:
In this experiment, we observed 47 participants classifying the test items in a relative - 
like one, and five classifying the test items in an absolute-like way. Results from 
seven participants were removed, as their classifications could not be characterized as 
absolute-like or relative-like. In Experiment 5 there was a strong tendency (against 
chance) to form relative-like categorizations x 1 = (1) 20.3, p  < .0005. We next 
compared the results of Experiment 5 with the results of Experiment 2 to find that in 
the former the proportion of relative-like categorizations was much higher, as 
predicted: = (1) 26.3, p  < .0005. This is consistent with a hypothesis such that a
time delay causes decay in memory and therefore weakens the memory for the
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absolute-like (physical) properties of the training exemplars, which encourages a 
relative-like classification.
Table 2: Sizes in for the length of each item in each group.
nt 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Blib
group
Test
items
Chomp
group
Blib
group
Test
group
Chomp
group
Blib
group
Zlog
group
Glab
group
Test
group
Chomp
group
Blib
group
Zlog
group
Glab
group
62 81 35 62 81 30 38 47 58 48 27 38 47 58
64 85 36 64 85 29 39 48 61 62 28 39 48 61
CD 
_ 
CO 121 40 66 121 36 40 49 62 113 28 40 49 62
70 124 42 70 124 30 41 50 63 183 31 41 50 63
44 74 30 39 49 61
46 75 29 40 50 60
47 76 24 41 51 62
49 77 21 36 52 63
Table 3: Summary of the results or relative vs. absolute experiments.
Experiment Classification
frequency
Predominant
classification
Items
per
group
Number
of
training
groups
Time
delay
Significance (all / 2 tes ts  
w ith 1 df).
Exp1 vs. 
chance
48 R 14 A Relative 4 2 none <.0005
Exp 2 vs. 
chance
25 R 32 A Non significant 8 2 none .573
Exp 2 vs. 1 48 R 14 A vs. 
25 R 32 A
Absolute 4 vs. 
8
2 vs. 2 none <.0005
Exp 3 vs. 
chance
59 R 9 A Relative 4 4 none <.0005
Exp 3 vs. 1 59 R 9 A vs. 
48 R 14 A
Non significant 4 vs. 
4
4 vs. 2 none .163
Exp 4 vs. 
chance
36 R 14 A Relative 8 4 none .024
Exp 4 vs. 2 36 R 14 A vs. 
25 R 32 A
Relative 8 vs. 
8
4 vs. 2 none .003
Exp 4 vs. 3 59 R 9 A vs. 
36 R 14 A
Absolute 4 vs. 
8
4 vs. 4 none .045
Exp 5 vs. 
chance
47 R 5 A Relative 8 2 1 week .000
Exp 5 vs. 2 47 R 5 A vs. 
25 R 32 A
Relative 8 vs. 
8
2 vs. 2 1 week 
vs. none
.000
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5.9 General Discussion
In five experiments, we explored the conditions, which might promote a relative-like 
vs. absolute-like mode of classifying novel instances relative-like to incidental taught 
categories. Experiment 1 was the baseline manipulation, in which more relative-like-like 
categorizations were observed compared to absolute-like ones. The predominance of relative­
like categorizations could be due to a greater bias for relative-like categorization as such, but 
it might be also due to participants wanting to assign some test instances to all the available 
categories (that is, a task demand). Conclusions regarding absolute-like or relative-like 
categorization are possible by comparing the results of at least two experiments. In 
Experiment 2, we found a shift towards absolute-like categorization (compared to Experiment 
1) when the number of items per group was doubled (relative to Experiment 1) from four to 
eight. In Experiment 3 we added two new groups with four items per group and found that 
participants categorized new stimuli using relative-like categorization. In Experiment 4, we 
used the same four categories as in Experiment 3, but doubled the number of items per 
category from four to eight. As was the case with Experiment 2, when comparing the results 
of Experiments 4 and 3 there was a shift for absolute-like classification. In Experiment 5, we 
used the same stimuli as in Experiment 2, but instead asked participants to classify the test 
items one week after the training items were presented. This manipulation led to a shift 
towards relative-like categorization, when comparing with Experiment 2. The results of the 
five experiments are summarized in Table 3.
The results can be summarized in the following way. First, smaller categories 
promote a relative-like mode of categorization (Experiments 1 and 3). Plausibly, when there 
are few exemplars per category, the cognitive system cannot confidently infer a category
I representation in terms of concrete information, so that a relative-like representation is
t
| adopted (by ‘concrete information’ we mean information which directly corresponds to 
physical attributes of the stimuli). Second, when the number of items per category was
!
increased, we observed a shift towards absolute-like categorization. Presumably, and 
consistently with the previous assertion, more exemplars per category imply that there is
| more information on the basis of which the cognitive system can represent a category in a
! concrete (absolute) way. Third, increasing the number of category groups enhances a relative-
j
| like mode of categorization. In this case, we suggest that the cognitive system finds it moref
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difficult to concurrently keep track of the distributional properties of several categories (and 
so represents them in a relative-like way). Accordingly, when there is a requirement to learn 
more categories, it adopts a simpler, relative-like way of representing category information. 
Finally, when we introduced a time delay relative-like classification was encouraged. It 
appears that a delay would lead to a less detailed mode of representing the information from 
the training phase, so that the cognitive system would abandon an absolute-like mode of 
representation, and instead prefer a representation in terms of (less specific) relative features, 
such as ‘small vs. large’.
There is a consistent theme underlying all our findings. In the case of simple 
schematic stimuli for which there are no prior, general knowledge expectations, we assume 
that the default preference is for the cognitive system to derive a representation for the stimuli 
| on the basis of their physical properties. When it comes to categories composed of such 
stimuli, the cognitive system appears to operate like a standard statistical engine as suggested 
in our Bayesian example: the more the information regarding the distributional properties for 
the exemplars of each category, the more likely it is that the category will be represented in 
way which directly relates to the physical properties of the stimuli (cf. Ashby & Maddox, 
1993; Chater, 1999; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006,
Lee & Vanpaemel 2008). Distributional category information could be undermined in a 
variety of ways: by having fewer items per category, more categories (which would lead to 
more confusion of which item belongs to which group), and a time delay. Our experiments 
provide support for the importance of all these factors in relative-like vs. absolute-like 
categorization.
The real-life situation we are trying to model with our experiments, concerns all cases 
when some stimuli would be represented in a (more) relative, as opposed to absolute, way. 
One such situation concerns absolute identification tasks, in which it appears that judgment is 
relative, rather than absolute. In categorization, there are cases of objects whose 
representation appears to involve at least some abstract features. For example, the sun is 
Targe’, a cheetah is ‘fast’, and a Christmas dinner is ‘plentiful’. In such and similar cases, it 
is uncommon to provide a more specific (absolute) impression of the corresponding 
characteristics. These are exactly the kind of situations we are trying to model with our 
experiments, that is, situations when absolute characterizations appear inappropriate or 
inconvenient in some sense and so people resort to more relative representations.
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This research provides evidence that the cognitive system can spontaneously represent 
the same items in an absolute-like or relative-like way, depending on the characteristics of the 
categorization problem. At face value, such a conclusion is consistent with the assumptions in 
Stewart et al.’s (2005) RJM for the absolute-like identification task. In that model, responses 
on a current stimulus are assumed to be a function of the previous stimulus, rather than an 
| exclusive function of the physical properties of the current stimulus. In other words,
| responding is relative-like rather than absolute-like. Moreover, the underlying motivation for
i
assuming relative-like responding is similar to ours: difficulty in accurately representing the 
physical information for all the stimuli. However, it is not clear whether there is a role for 
absolute representations in Stewart et a l ’s RJM.
This work allows an examination of the implications of the RJM for categorization. 
Are there circumstances when a relative-like representation mode might be preferred to an 
absolute one (the latter is assumed to be the default)? The extensive research tradition on 
analogical reasoning has, of course, made extensive use of relational features to understand 
analogical reasoning. However, this work does not provide any prescription of whether 
absolute-like or relative-like representations are more likely to be adopted in a categorization 
task. With five experiments, we aimed to provide some boundary conditions on this issue. 
Our results show that the cognitive system appears to adopt a fairly principled and adaptive 
way of preferring relative-like vs. absolute-like representations.
Our findings impact most directly on categorization theory. In brief, there are two 
classes of models, models of supervised categorization (such as prototype or exemplar 
theory; Nosofsky, 1984, Homa & Vosburgh, 1976) and models of unsupervised 
categorization (e.g., the rational model of Anderson, 2001, or the simplicity model of Pothos 
& Chater, 2002). Supervised categorization models typically operate on a default 
| representation of the stimuli, but have the ability to transform this representation typically
I through attentional parameters (attentional parameters effectively select out a subspace of the
i
I default representational space). Unsupervised categorization models can sometimes predict
; the dimension(s) participants should spontaneously prefer when categorizing a set of stimuli
(Pothos & Close, 2008; Pothos & Bailey, in press).
Could our results be explained within such modelling frameworks? The principles, 
which guide dimensional selection in supervised categorization models, have to do with 
identifying the representation, which makes the required categorization easiest to learn (e.g.,
Shepard et al., 1961; Smith & Minda, 2000). One could conceivably propose that the 
representation of the stimuli in our experiments is made of both absolute and relative 
properties. Then, the categorization task in test makes one set of properties more useful than 
the other. There are two problems with this approach. First, in our experiments it appears that 
the emphasis on relative properties (e.g., in Experiment 1 vs. 2), has to do with the processing 
| of both the training items and the test items. By contrast, supervised categorization models set 
their parameters only during the processing of the training stimuli. Second, there is an infinite 
number of possible relative properties. How could, as modellers, we decide a priori which are 
the appropriate relative properties to use in an experimental situation? Similar considerations 
apply in the case of models of unsupervised categorization (noting, in any case, that 
dimensional selection for such models is less well developed when compared with supervised 
categorization models).
In sum, our results show situations in which classification of test stimuli appears to 
have a profound influence on the representation of categories acquired in previous (training) 
phases. Such flexibility in category representation is difficult to reconcile with current 
categorization models and represents an exciting avenue for their further development.
5.10 Summary
This study explored the shifting between relative-like and absolute-like representations in 
categorization. While there is considerable evidence that categorization processes can involve 
information about both the particular physical properties of studied instances and abstract 
properties, there has been little work on the factors which lead to one kind of representation 
! as opposed to the other. We tested 320 participants in 5 experiments, in which participants 
I had to classify new items into predefined artificial categories. In three experiments, we 
observed a (predominantly) relative-like mode of classification, and in 2  experiments we 
observed a shift towards an absolute-like mode of classification. These results suggest three 
factors, which promote a relative-like mode of classification; when there are fewer items per 
group, more training groups, and the presence of a time delay. Overall, we propose that less 
information about the distributional properties of a category and/or weaker memory traces for
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the category exemplars (induced, e.g., by smaller item numbers per category, or a time delay 
respectively) can encourage relative-like categorization.
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Chapter 6
Experimental results: unsupervised categorization; testing the
simplicity model
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the experimental results of our unsupervised categorization 
investigation (this excludes the work carried out in relative vs. absolute shifting, which is 
given in Chapter 5, and the work carried out in unsupervised vs. supervised categorization, 
which is given in Chapter 7). Briefly, our goals here were twofold. Firstly, we examined the 
validity of the simplicity model by Pothos and Chater (2002), but with a much larger 
participant sample than they used. This investigation was carried out because one of the 
major problems with the results in Pothos and Chater (2002) was that they found high 
classification variability in their data sets. This led to some difficulty in identifying 
meaningful results with the particular sample sizes that they employed (between 10 and 29 
participants). Secondly, we investigated whether introducing some general knowledge about 
the items would affect perception (i.e., whether they were a coherent group or not), and thus 
the categories made.
6. 2 Experimental investigation: validating the simplicity model and exploring 
background (general) information
Empirical explorations of unsupervised categorization are much more complicated 
than of supervised categorization. First, in supervised categorization the relevant principal 
dependent variable is obvious: it corresponds to classification probabilities for test instances. 
In other words, an experimenter will collect data about how particular novel instances are 
classified and he/she will then attempt to fit participant selections with models of supervised 
categorization. This is not the case in unsupervised categorization. As noted, some
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researchers have explored particular empirical issues (such as the tendency for 
unidimensional sorting). However, there has been uncertainty in the literature regarding a 
suitable dependent variable for fitting models of unsupervised categorization. Pothos and 
Chater (2002) suggested that one could present stimuli to participants, ask them to divide 
them into any number of groups in an unconstrained way, and then count either the number 
of distinct classifications produced or the frequency of the most popular classification (this is 
the procedure employed in the current study, as well; note that Medin and colleagues have 
employed a similar procedure in the study of cultural biases; e.g., see Atran & Medin, 2008, 
for a recent overview). The rationale here is that if a particular classification is 
psychologically more intuitive, then more participants should select it and, equally, there 
should be lower variability in participants’ classifications (i.e., fewer distinct solutions).
While conceptually such an approach seems intuitive, it quickly runs into the problem that 
the space of possible solutions is vast: for ten stimuli there are about 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  classifications 
(Medin & Ross, 1997). For 16 stimuli (the number of stimuli employed in the present study) 
there are 10.4 billion possible classifications. So, reasonably, one has to ask just how intuitive 
a particular classification has to be in order to be preferred by participants amongst so many 
alternatives. Indeed, Pothos and Chater (2002) had some difficulty identifying meaningful 
results with the particular sample sizes they employed (between 10 and 29).
In later work, Pothos and Chater (2005; see also Pothos & Close, 2008) employed the 
Rand index of classification similarity to get around the problem o f response variability in 
unsupervised categorization. The Rand index is a measure of similarity between two 
classifications (Rand, 1971; see Fowlkes & Mallows, 1983, for an extension). The idea would 
be to specify, e.g., two target classifications, A and B (which might correspond to the 
predictions of two different models), and then compute the similarity of the classifications 
produced by participants to A and B. Higher similarity would indicate a preference for one of 
the target classifications, even if the actual classification had never actually been produced. 
This approach certainly has some merits, however, a problem is that one can never be 
logically certain that the target classifications appropriately characterize human performance. 
In other words, suppose that, as an experimenter, I choose classifications A and B for use 
with a Rand index analysis. It is possible that there is a third classification, C, which I have 
overlooked, and which is more similar to participants’ classifications than either A or B. In 
such a case, the Rand index analysis may lead to slightly misleading conclusions. To 
conclude, while the Rand index analysis has many strengths (and may well be the most 
appropriate method under particular circumstances), it also has important limitations.
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Another way in which researchers have attempted to study unsupervised 
categorization is by restricting the number of categories into which participants can divide a 
set of stimuli. In other words, after being shown a set of stimuli, participants might be asked 
| to divide them into two categories, as opposed to an unlimited number of categories. Such an
! approach clearly leads to considerably fewer distinct classifications and, indeed, it has
I
produced very valuable results in relation to classification strategies (e.g., Ahn & Medin,
| 1992; Milton & Wills, 2004). However, it has also been argued that this experimental
I
procedure does not exactly correspond to the cognitive process of spontaneous grouping and, 
rather, may correspond more to problem solving (Murphy, 2004; Pothos & Close, 2008). In 
other words, participants are given some information (the stimuli) and a problem (fmd, e.g., a 
suitable division of the stimuli in two clusters). So, conceivably, they simply search for the 
simplest way to achieve a solution to the problem, without necessarily being guided by which 
classification is more intuitive or natural. For this reason unsupervised categorization with a 
fixed number of categories may be a suboptimal procedure when it comes to fitting models of 
unsupervised categorization.
It therefore appears that the most suitable procedure for studying the “intuitiveness” 
or “naturalness” of particular categories is an entirely unconstrained classification paradigm. 
In the present work, we overcome the problem of response variability by employing a 
population sample which could be considered large (169 participants) by comparison with the 
relevant previous studies (Compton & Logan, 1999; Pothos & Chater, 2002). As an aside, it 
is interesting to consider the corresponding requirements for studies of supervised 
categorization: In such studies as few as 10 participants can be employed per condition in 
order for a researcher to expect to derive meaningful results. This is because a supervised 
categorization task forces conformity into participants’ responses. As participants have to 
learn the same division of stimuli into categories, their responses to the test items likewise 
tend to be fairly uniform. By contrast, in unsupervised categorization there are no aspects of 
the procedure to prevent idiosyncratic strategies, so that the relevant dependent variables 
| (e.g., preference for a particular classification) would be more noisy.
I
; The study of unsupervised categorization is not uniformly more complicated than that
; of supervised categorization. In the latter case, one typically has to consider whether the
supervised learning procedure might alter the perceived similarity of the studied stimuli. For 
! example, Goldstone (1995) has shown that classifying stimuli in the same category can
| increase their similarity to each other and decrease their reported similarity for stimuli in
I
other categories. Schyns, Goldstone, and Thibaut (1997; Goldstone, 2000) even suggested
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that new features may be created as a result of categorizing stimuli in particular ways. If the 
similarity structure of the stimuli changes, then this may complicate the fits of supervised 
categorization models, noting though that there is some debate as to whether such effects 
correspond to changes in how the stimuli are perceived or to response biases when invoking 
the stimuli (Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001; Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). By contrast, it 
is unlikely that unsupervised categorization leads to changes in the similarity of the 
categorized stimuli (cf. Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008; Pothos & Chater, 2005).
The purpose of the above discussion was to motivate the need for more datasets in 
unsupervised categorization and explore possible methodologies, the most suitable of which 
appears a completely unsupervised categorization procedure (with a large population 
sample). As with previous investigators (e.g., Shepard et al., 1961), a useful dataset is one 
which involves several individual stimulus sets, such that each one of them reflects a 
different intuition about the underlying psychological process. Shepard et al. (1961) were 
guided in their selections by considering a range of different learning problems. Likewise, we 
aimed to select stimulus sets such that each one would correspond a different intuition about 
spontaneous categorization. With such an approach, it is clearly the case that the more the 
stimulus sets the greater the range of categorization intuitions which can be examined. 
However, there is a contrasting consideration, which is that, given that the experimental 
design had to be within participants, the more the stimulus sets the greater the possibility for 
possible experimental confounds (e.g., responses for one stimulus sets affecting those for 
another, fatigue, etc.). Given the amount of time it takes to carry out a spontaneous 
categorization task, we thought that nine stimulus sets reflected a good balance between these 
two considerations.
Finally, we can now revisit the question of which aspect of human cognition 
unconstrained unsupervised categorization in the laboratory can help us understand. The 
spontaneous formation of categories must be guided by a sense in which certain groupings 
are more intuitive than others or, in other words, the relative coherence of different 
groupings. Performance in such tasks must, therefore, be partly guided by the same 
psychological process which allows us to consider certain concepts are more intuitive (or 
coherent) than others. Ultimately, we wish to understand the aspects of environmental 
statistics which drive the development of human concepts. A related issue is that most 
unsupervised categorization tasks in the laboratory manipulate only similarity (in the sense 
that some of the presented stimuli are more similar to others). It seems clear that the sense we 
have that certain items must be more similar than others must be an important driving force in
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spontaneous grouping behavior (noting that psychological similarity may take many forms 
and/ or be context dependent; e.g., Goldstone, 1994). It also seems very plausible that the 
general knowledge we have about a set of stimuli might affect our perception of whether they 
form a coherent group or not (Murphy & Medin, 1984). What is the role of general 
knowledge in unsupervised categorization? One possibility is that it modifies the perception 
of similarity for some stimuli, for example, by enhancing the salience of certain dimensions 
and suppressing that of others (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna, 1994). However, it is possible that 
general knowledge may have a more complex influence on spontaneous categorization, 
which cannot be reduced to a manipulation of similarity (cf. Yang & Lewandowsky, 2004; 
Wisniewski & Medin. 1994). Current formal models of unsupervised (and supervised) 
categorization all depend on similarity, but proponents of such models sometimes discuss the 
type of extensions which could (in principle) allow incorporating general knowledge effects. 
Note, though, that it is still unclear whether it may even be logically possible to provide 
formal description of general knowledge effects (cf. Fodor, 1983; Pickering & Chater, 1995; 
but see Harris, Murphy, & Rehder, 2008, or Heit, 1997, for promising attempts). In sum, the 
most valid conclusion is probably that unconstrained unsupervised categorization tasks which 
manipulate just similarity provide an approximation to the cognitive process of evaluating 
category coherence. The previous conclusion is arguably the main difference between 
modeling human unsupervised categorization and statistical clustering, since, typically, the 
objective of the latter is to determine whether there are clusters or not, as opposed to 
comparing the intuitiveness of different classifications on the same or different stimulus sets 
(e.g., cf. Hubert & Arabie, 1985; Fraboni & Cooper, 1989; Milligan & Cooper, 1986). 
However, a successful model of unsupervised categorization ought to discriminate between 
the relative intuitiveness of different classifications.
Before we layout our experimental procedure, to summarize; we are to investigate the 
validity of the simplicity model with a much larger sample size, to allow for more thorough 
identification of the classification patterns than found in Pothos and Chater (2002). The main 
dependent variable in the study is the frequency of the preferred classification for each 
stimulus. For each stimulus, the simplicity model can provide a value for how intuitive the 
preferred (or optimal in some other sense) classification ought to be. Therefore, the main test 
for the simplicity model is the correlation between the frequency of preferred classifications 
and the intuitiveness predictions. Secondly, we are to investigate the possible effect that 
introducing some general knowledge about the presented stimuli, will have on the 
intuitiveness of the classifications. So, a similar analysis can be conducted for the number of
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times the preferred classification was produced for different stimulus sets, as a function of 
instructions. Below, we give a brief account of the simplicity model (see Chapter 2 for a 
much more in-depth account).
The simplicity model
In Chapter 2 we give a thorough description of the simplicity model, here we give a brief 
summary of the key mechanisms. The simplicity model o f unsupervised categorized arose as 
a generalization of Rosch and Mervis’s (1975) model for basic level categorization. Rosch 
and Mervis suggested that in a hierarchy of concepts there is a preferred level, so that, for 
example, when participants are presented with a novel object they would identify it with its 
basic level categorization, rather than a subordinate or superordinate one. Rosch and Mervis 
suggested that the basic level of categorization should be the one for which within category 
similarity is maximized and between category similarity minimized. The simplicity model’s 
starting point is this intuition of Rosch and Mervis and the assumption that whatever 
determines preference in basic level categorization also determined preference in spontaneous 
categorization (cf. Gosselin & Schyns, 2001). In a sense, the simplicity model can be seen as 
a way to measure within/ between category similarity, and balance each term against its other 
in the formation of categories. More formally, the model prefers classifications that provide 
the greatest algorithmic simplification of the similarity structure of a set of items. It has been 
specified by using the principles of the minimum description length framework for 
formalizing the simplicity principle (Rissanen, 1987). Its original formulation is parameter- 
free, it is non-metric (its input is relative similarities; cf. Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005), 
and it does not require information about the number of categories sought either directly or 
indirectly. This last feature particularly distinguishes the simplicity model from other models 
of unsupervised categorization and clustering.
In the simplicity model, similarity information without categories for four stimuli 
A,B,C,D is specified as similarity(A,B)<similarity(C,D) etc. Each of these inequalities 
requires one bit of information to be determined (since there are only two possibilities, the 
similarity on the left hand side is greater or less than the similarity on the right hand side).
Assuming symmetry and minimality, for n objects there are p = pairs so that there are
p(^2 ^  pairs of pairs. For example, the similarity structure of 10 stimuli corresponds to 990 
bits of information; this is the codelength for the similarity information for a set of objects,
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without categories. Note that the model can easily be applied without the assumptions of 
symmetry and minimality. However, for the simple, schematic stimuli typically employed in 
unsupervised categorization tasks symmetry and minimality in similarity judgments ought to 
! be assumed (Hines, Pothos, & Chater, 2007; Tversky, 1977).
I Categories can reduce similarity codelength by using the definition that all similarities
for objects within categories are greater (or equal) than all similarities for objects between 
categories. When there are numerous, correct such constraints, then there is more codelength
i
reduction. However, in some cases categories may specify erroneous constraints. To correct 
such errors, we have to select the e erroneous constraints out of the total number of
constraints u which can be achieved with a code of length log2(u  +  1) +  log2
There is also a code for specifying the particular classification employed. The length of this 
code is given by log2{P art(r,n )), where r is the number of elements, n is the number of
clusters, and P a rt(r ,n ) =  H = o(—l ) v 7 ^7 ^ 7 7  Therefore, a classification can lead to a
\7T  V J . V ,
reduction (simplification) of the codelength for the similarity for a set of objects because of 
the constraints, but this advantage is moderated by the costs associated with correcting the 
erroneous constraints and specifying the classification. The final codelength for a set of 
objects with categories would be [codelength without categories] -  [constraints -  cost for 
errors - cost for specifying classification]. This final code length corresponds to the prediction 
of the simplicity model: the lower its value, the more the simplification due to a 
classification, and the more intuitive the classification is predicted to be. Note that predictions 
from the simplicity model are typically expressed in terms of the ratio [codelength with 
categories] / [codelength without categories].
The simplicity model can produce a prediction for the optimal classification for a set 
of stimuli from scratch and a prediction for how intuitive particular classifications should be 
relative to each other. It assumes that all the available stimuli are presented at once.
i
i
6.3 Experiment 1; validating the simplicity model, and exploring background 
‘ information
i
\ Participants and design
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Participants were 169 students at Swansea University, who took part for a small 
payment. Each participant classified nine stimulus sets, one after the other. A between- 
participants condition related to whether the stimuli were described in a neutral way or as 
real-world objects (87 participants received the realistic instructions and 82 the neutral ones).
| Stimuli
| We created nine stimulus sets of 16 stimuli each. The stimulus sets were created so as to 
capture a range of intuitions about unsupervised categorization. Accordingly, we had three 
stimulus sets in which there were two well-separated clusters. The first such stimulus set 
involved two equally-sized clusters (‘two clusters’), the second stimulus set involved two 
clusters which were not equally sized (‘unequal clusters’), and the third stimulus set two 
spread out clusters, that is, clusters which were not very cohesive (‘spread out clusters’). We 
then had three stimulus sets for which the most intuitive classification was deemed to be 
more complicated (but not necessarily less intuitive; such a notion of ‘being complicated’ 
here has entirely heuristic value and just corresponds to our prior intuitions). The first such 
stimulus set had three well-separated clusters (‘three clusters’), the second stimulus set two 
clusters but with some intermediate ambiguous points (‘ambiguous points), and the third 
stimulus set two clusters which were close to each other and which also greatly varies in size 
(‘poor two clusters’). The final three stimulus sets were designed to that the best possible 
classification would be expected to be even more complicated. Accordingly, the first such 
stimulus set had five well-separated clusters (‘five clusters’), the second reflected random 
variation (‘random’), and the third was meant to correspond to cluster embedded in a cloud of 
noise (‘embedded’). As noted, a greater number of stimulus sets would allow more 
informative model comparisons, but would complicate the data collection procedure (since 
the design was within participants, the higher the number of stimulus sets each participant
I
I was asked to classify, the greater the chance for response interference, problems due to[
| fatigue etc.) All nine stimulus sets are shown in a schematic representation in Figure 5.
! The stimuli were made from two continuous dimensions. We preferred this approach,
i
as opposed to employing stimuli composed of discrete features, because, in the latter case, it 
is often difficult to specify complex category structures (because each feature can have a 
limited number of discrete levels), unless one employs several features. But, when several 
features are employed, then there is the issue of whether participants can create holistic 
representations of the stimuli (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004). The two stimulus dimensions
| (Figure 5) were mapped to the length of a ‘body’ (horizontal dimension) and the length of the
‘legs’ after the joint (vertical dimension) of schematic spider-like stimuli (Figure 6 ). By 
choosing such stimuli, both dimensions of physical variation were lengths, and so a Weber 
fraction in mapping the Figure 5 values to physical values could be safely assumed (8 %;
! Morgan, 2005). For both dimensions, the actual lengths were between 40mm and 80mm.
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Figure 5. A schematic representation of the nine stimulus sets employed in this research.
Each point in each stimulus set is indexed by a number from 0 to 15. In parentheses we show 
the number of times the most frequent classification was produced for different stimulus sets. 
A higher number indicates that the most frequency classification was more intuitive.
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Figure 6 . Some examples of the stimuli used.
A number of considerations motivated this choice of stimuli. First, as noted, we 
wanted stimuli for which we could assume Weber fractions for the relevant dimensions of 
physical variation. Most of the models of unsupervised categorization function by assuming a 
psychological representation of the stimuli, so that it is clearly important for the validity of 
model predictions to ensure that the assumed coordinate representation is as close to the 
underlying psychological representation as possible. (Note that even for models which can 
operate directly on similarity ratings, such as the simplicity model, it is typically better to 
employ a coordinate representation, since similarity ratings tend to be very noisy.) Second, 
the two dimensions of the stimuli ought to both broadly cohere together (so that it does not 
become an analytic process to perceive the stimuli holistically; Milton & Wills, 2004), and be 
perceived separately. The latter constraint arises because some models of unsupervised 
categorization allow spontaneous attentional selectivity. Accordingly, we wanted participants 
to be able, in principle at least, to allocate differential attentional salience to the two 
dimensions. This was verified independently by two other people that the stimuli could be 
perceived without effort in terms of both their dimensions concurrently and, also, that each 
dimension could also be attended to independently, if so desired. Finally, the stimuli had a 
neutral interpretation as schematic drawings (their semblance to real-life spiders was
intentionally low) and also an interpretation as biological objects (with a little imagination, as 
spiders). This allowed an instructional manipulation (described in the Procedure).
We provided a test of whether the similarity structure of the spider-like stimuli 
I conformed to a coordinate representation based on the length of the central bodies and the 
length of the legs (given the Weber fraction assumed above). We created a stimulus set of 12 
! stimuli which spanned all regions of the available (assumed) psychological space, as shown 
i in Figure 7a. We then asked 30 participants (all Swansea University students, who did not 
take part in the categorization experiment) to provide similarity ratings for these stimuli. 
Specifically, each participant was shown all possible stimulus pairs in this set of 12 stimuli, 
excluding identities: there were 12x12 -  12 (identities) =132 trials. Stimulus presentation 
and response recording were computer based. The structure of each trial was to present a 
fixation point for 250ms, followed by the two stimuli in a pair one after the other for 1000ms 
each, followed by a 1-9 Likert ratings space. Similarity results from all participants were then 
averaged and subjected to a multidimensional scaling (MDS; two dimensions) procedure, 
leading to Figure 7b; the stress associated with the MDS solution was 0.115, indicating that 
the spatial arrangement derived from the MDS algorithm is a good representation of the 
similarity information.
It can be seen that the coordinate representation (Figure 7a) and the one based on 
similarity ratings (Figure 7b) are very similar. We next employed the Orthosim procedure 
(Barrett et al., 1998) which allows the computation of various similarity indices between two 
sets of coordinates for the same set of items. We selected a similarity index which adopts a 
‘procrustes’ approach (Barrett et al., 1998), according to which the coordinate configurations 
to be compared are first normalized and rotated/ reflected to remove any of the arbitrariness 
in MDS solutions. The Orthosim documentation recommends the ‘double-scaled Euclidean 
distance’ coefficient, for which 0 corresponds to complete dissimilarity, 1 to identity. This 
coefficient was 0.911, indicating close correspondence between the assumed coordinates and 
I the similarity-rating s based representation. Overall, the results of this analysis support our 
! representation assumptions.
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Figures 7a, 7b. In the (a) panel we show the assumed coordinate representation of a sample of 
all stimuli. In the (b) panel we show the derived MDS representation for the same stimuli, 
from similarity ratings provided by participants. Numbers indicate stimulus ids.
Procedure
Participants received the items in each stimulus set in a pile. The two dimensions of the 
stimuli were described to participants and it was emphasized that they were equally 
important. In one instructional manipulation, the stimuli were described as ‘objects’ and the 
two dimensions as ‘rectangle length in the center and thin parallel lines length on the sides’.
In another instructional manipulation, a scenario was presented to participants saying how 
new spiders are discovered all the time around the world. Participants were then told about a 
recent expedition to the Amazon, during which several new spiders were identified. All these
new spiders had broadly similar structure, but differed in terms of the length of their bodies 
and legs.
In both instructional conditions, participants were told to consider the stimuli in each 
set independently, that is, as if the current stimulus set was the only one they had received 
(this was done to avoid participants thinking that, e.g., if they used X  groups in one stimulus 
set, they should also use X  groups in another). They were asked to spread the items in front of 
them and classify the items in a way that seemed natural and intuitive, using as many groups 
as they wanted, but not more than necessary. It was stated that more similar objects should 
end up in the same group. Participants were told to indicate their groupings by arranging the 
objects in each group in separate piles.
Results
Because of the way classifications were recorded there were inevitably some transcription 
errors. For a stimulus set for which there were no transcription errors there were 169 
classifications from participants to analyze; for the rest of the stimulus sets there were one to 
two classifications missing, except for the ‘embedded’ stimulus set for which there were 15 
classifications missing. We decided not to carry out some scaling of the dependent variables 
(which are presented below) because the missing classifications are more likely to be ones 
which were more random and so not contribute to the frequency of the preferred 
classifications. Indeed, the ‘embedded’ stimulus set was the one for which we observed the 
greatest number of alternative preferred classifications (the highest frequency with which any 
classification was produced for this stimulus set was only two).
With 16 stimuli there are approximately 10.4 billion possible classifications. The 
vastness of this search space informs the complexity of the classification problem, a problem 
which cognitively appears trivial. Indeed, across the nine stimulus sets there were over 1100 
unique classifications (many of which appear to reflect random individual variation in 
classification strategy; cf. Pothos & Chater, 2002).
We are interested in deriving from this data an empirical measure of classification 
intuitiveness. That is, under what circumstances can we say that a particular classification is 
psychologically more intuitive than another? The most obvious choice for a dependent 
variable is to measure the frequency of the preferred classification in each stimulus set. If in 
stimulus set A, the preferred classification is produced by 10/169 participants and in stimulus 
set B the preferred classification by 50/169 participants, then we can trivially conclude that
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the preferred classification in B is more obvious/ intuitive to naive observers. A related 
dependent variable is agreement between participants for how a particular stimulus set should 
be classified. In other words, if in stimulus set A participants produce 40 distinct 
classifications and in stimulus set B participants produce 10 distinct classifications, then 
clearly in the latter case participants agree more on how the A stimuli should be classified, 
and so the corresponding classification structure must be more intuitive. A question is 
| whether the two dependent variables o f ‘frequency of preferred’ and ‘distinct classifications’ 
are independent or not. In principle they might be, for example, if there are more than one 
obvious ways to classify a set of stimuli. However, this was not the case in our stimuli: the 
correlation between ‘frequency of preferred’ and ‘distinct classifications’ was .97, p<.0005. 
Henceforth, we shall only consider the frequency of the preferred classification as the 
dependent variable.
Another question is how informative the variable of frequency of the preferred 
classification for different stimulus sets is. For example, suppose that the frequency of the 
preferred classification in stimulus set A is 40/169. This would be very informative if there 
were no other high frequency classifications for stimulus set A and, clearly, less informative 
if there were other classifications which were produced with a frequency of, e.g., 39, 38, 37 
etc. In the latter case, one would be forced to conclude that there is nothing particularly 
special about the highest frequency classification, in light of the fact that there would also be 
several other very high frequency contenders. An interesting empirical finding of this 
research is that this latter scenario was not true. In other words, for the stimulus sets for 
which participants showed a preference for any classification, this classification was 
overwhelmingly preferred—there were no alternative classifications which competed with 
the most frequent one. That a particular classification can dominate so much in the we 11- 
structured stimulus sets (that is, stimulus sets for which there was an obvious classification) 
was a surprising finding, given the otherwise very high performance variability. Table 4 
shows the most frequent classification for each of the nine stimulus sets.
Finally, we briefly consider the issue of the instructional manipulation. The simplest 
| examination of the effect of this manipulation would be to consider the distinct classificationsi
produced by participants receiving the neutral and the realistic instructions. We can then ask 
[ whether there is any difference in the pattern of responding for the two sets of instructions. 
Table 5 shows this was not the case. Correlating the number of distinct classifications for the 
nine stimulus sets with realistic and neutral instructions we obtained r=.91,/?=.001. In other 
words, there was the same degree of classification variability for a particular stimulus set,
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regardless of instructions. A similar analysis can be conducted for the number of times the 
preferred classification was produced for different stimulus sets, as a function of instructions 
(Table 6 ; r=.94, p<.0005). Perhaps this is not a surprising finding. Both sets of instructions 
emphasized groupings according to similarity, described the two dimensions of physical 
variation, and provided similar instructions to participants regarding the ideal number of 
groups. The instructional manipulation will not be considered further.
Stim ulus s e t M o st  f r e q u e n t  classification
Two c lu s te rs  
U nequal c lu s te rs  
S p read  o u t  c lusters
{0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7} { 8  9 10 1112 13 14 15} 
{0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9} {10 1112 13 14 15} 
{0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7} { 8  9 10 1112 13 14 15}
T hree  c lu s te rs  
A m biguous  po in ts
Poor tw o  c lus te rs
{0 1 2 3 4} {5 6  7 8  9} {10 1112 13 14 15}
{0 1 2 4 7} {3 5 6 } { 8  9 10 12} {1113 14 15}
{0 1 4 7} {2 3 5 6 } { 8  9 10 12} {1113 14 15}
{0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8  9 10 11} {12 13 14 15}
Five c lu s te rs
R andom
E m b ed d ed
{0 1 2} {3 4 5} { 6  7 8 } {9 10 11} {12 13 14 15}
{0 4} {2 3} {1 5 6  7 8  9} {10 1114} {12 13 15}
{0 1} {2} {3 4} {5} { 6  7} {8 } {9} {10 1112 13 14 15}
{0 1} {2} {3} {4} {5} { 6  7} {8 } {9} {10 1112 13 14 15}
{0 1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6 } {7} {9} {8 } {12 1110 14 15 13}
{0 1 2 3 10 1112 15} {4 5 6  7 8  9 13 14}
{0} {1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6 } {7} {8 } {9} {10 1112} {13} {14 15}
Table 4. The most frequent classifications for each of the nine stimulus sets. The category 
membership of each stimulus is indicated by a number id; these ids are the same as the ones 
in Figure 5. In cases in which more than one classification appears, this means that there were 
more than one classifications with the highest frequency of occurrence observed for that 
stimulus set.
112
Stimulus se t Realistic instructions Neutral instructions
Two c lus te rs  60 63
U nequal c lu s te rs  59 54
S pread  o u t  c lu s te rs  77 74
T hree  c lu s te rs  50 54
Am biguous po in ts  84  76
Poor tw o  c lus ters  74  66
Five c lus ters  49  34
R andom  80 78
E m b ed d ed  77 72
Table 5. The table shows the number of distinct classifications produced for different 
stimulus sets, as a function of the two sets of instructions participants could receive.
Stimulus se t Realistic instructions Neutral instructions
Two c lusters  19 12
U nequal c lu s te rs  17 16
S pread  o u t  c lu s te rs  5 3
T hree  c lus te rs  32 23
Am biguous p o in ts  1 2
Poor tw o  c lu s te rs  11 6
Five clusters  27 31
Random  2 1
E m bedded  1 1
Table 6 . The frequency of the preferred classification for different stimulus sets, as a function 
of the two types of instructions participants could receive.
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Table 7. Summary of the empirical results of the study in unsupervised categorization.
Stim ulus s e t  F requency  o f  m o s t  p r e fe r r e d 1 F requency  o f  next m o s t
p r e fe r r e d 1 Distinct classifications p ro d u c ed
Tw o clusters 31 5
123
U nequal c lusters 33 7
113
S p read  o u t  c lus ters 8 3
151
T h ree  clusters 55 4
104
A m biguous po in ts 3 3
160
P oor tw o  clusters 17 3
140
Five c lusters 58 8
83
R andom 3 2
158
E m b ed d ed 2 2
149
N otes :  'P re fe r red ' co r re sp o n d s  to  th e  classification p re fe r red  by p ar tic ipan ts  fo r  t h e  
co r re sp o n d in g  s t im u lus  se t .
Modeling
We will say that there is (a lot of) category structure in a stimulus set if there is a 
classification for the stimuli which is particularly intuitive. In other words, category structure 
is an impression of whether is some good classification for the stimuli. Considering the
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results in Table 7 and the intuitive impression of the stimuli in Figure 5 readily leads to some 
puzzling questions. For example, the stimulus sets ‘two clusters’ and ‘unequal clusters’ both 
conform to a simple two-group classification and, indeed, participants were reasonably good 
at identifying this classification. However, the seemingly not dissimilar two-group 
| classification for the stimulus set ‘spread out clusters’ turned out to be much less intuitive. 
Moreover, the more complex three-group and five-group classifications for the ‘three 
clusters’ and ‘five clusters’ stimulus sets respectively were the star performers. They were 
preferred by participants with a frequency which exceeded that for the preferred 
classifications in all the other stimulus sets. Equally, for the ‘ambiguous points’ stimulus set 
we expected that participants would identify some category structure; after all, this is a 
stimulus set with a reasonably obvious two-group category structure, but with some 
ambiguous points in between. However, in this case participants were hardly able to 
consistently able to identify any classification as salient. These findings illustrate that the 
challenge to formal models of unsupervised categorization will be profound.
The structure of model application to this data can take two forms. First, the 
simplicity model receives as input the coordinates of the nine stimulus sets. The model then 
produces a number which would reflect the intuitiveness of the preferred classification for the 
stimulus set. The objective of the model would be to produce category intuitiveness 
predictions which match as closely as possibly the empirically determined variable of 
category intuitiveness (i.e., the frequency of the preferred classification for each stimulus set). 
In other words, there are effectively nine data points with which we try to test each model.
Second, the model receives as input the coordinates and the preferred classification(s) 
for each stimulus set. It then computes a value of intuitiveness for a stimulus set and a 
particular classification. This second approach is relevant for models which can produce an 
intuitiveness value for particular classifications, but they are unable to predict what should be 
the preferred classification for a stimulus set from scratch. Note that the modeling challenge 
! we are presently interested in is to correctly predict differences in the intuitiveness of the
; preferred classification across the nine stimulus set. (The related problem of predicting the
preferred classification for a stimulus set from scratch is, arguably, less interesting anyway; 
cf. Pothos & Bailey, 2009). A related issue is that for some stimulus sets there were more 
than one classifications which were produced with the highest frequency. All such cases 
I corresponded to stimulus sets with very poor category structure. Accordingly, reasonably,
! there is no sense in which we can assign a special status to any of these preferred
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classification and so we computed intuitiveness values for all of them and considered the 
model prediction (for the stimulus set) to correspond to the highest such value.
Simplicity model
The simplicity model was first developed to account for the spontaneous categorization 
results of Pothos and Chater (2002). These stimulus sets were composed of only 10 stimuli 
each and also the range of category structures employed was limited. Accordingly, in order to 
apply the simplicity model to the present stimulus certain extensions were required. It is still 
assumed that the primary determinant of classification goodness is codelength, so that the 
lower the codelength the more intuitive the particular classification will be to participants. 
However, it also had to be recognized that slight perturbations in the coordinates of the 
stimuli can lead to different predicted classifications. The effect of such perturbations, or 
noise, will depend on the similarity structure of the stimuli: for some stimulus sets noise does 
not affect the predicted classification, while for others even modest perturbations can lead to 
several different classifications. Accordingly, it appears that different classifications are more 
stable against noise.
Why would stability against noise be a significant consideration when modeling 
empirical results? Because different participants will basically perceive the available stimuli 
in slightly different ways. Even though the MDS analyses show that the assumed coordinate 
representations of the stimulus sets broadly match the psychological representations, 
inevitably there will be individual differences variation in stimulus perception. Therefore, 
regardless of how low the codelength of a particular classification is, we expect more 
variability in participants’ responses in situations where perturbing the stimulus coordinates 
alters the predicted preferred classification.
The above considerations were implemented in the following way. We constructed a 
regression model to predict the frequency of the preferred classification for each stimulus set, 
on the basis of two predictors. The first predictor is the codelength of the best possible 
classification for a stimulus set, not the preferred classification. The reason why we applied 
the model in this way is that the simplicity model has to predict that the preferred 
classification ought to be the optimal one. This first predictor effectively corresponds to how 
the simplicity model has been originally applied (e.g., Pothos & Chater, 2002). The second 
predictor is a measure of the stability against noise of the category structure in a stimulus set.
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To compute the second predictor, for a stimulus set, we perturbed the two coordinates of each 
stimulus independently, by adding a noise term of up to 1 0 % of the range of the 
corresponding dimension (the value 1 0 % was chosen because of its consistency with the
! Weber fraction employed in designing the stimuli). Noise could be positive or negative (i.e.,
I
; the coordinate would change by at most +1 0 % x range or - 1 0 % x range) and the new
coordinates were scaled back so that the range of the new coordinates along each dimension
| would be the same as before (i.e., no overall stretching or shrinking o f psychological space). 
This procedure was repeated 1000 times for each stimulus set and we simply counted the 
number of distinct classifications as a measure of stability against noise. For example, if the 
number of distinct classifications was just one, then the predicted optimal classification 
would be the same whether the original coordinates were employed or any of the 1 0 0 0  
alternative perturbed coordinates. Accordingly, in such a case we would say that the optimal 
classification should be extremely stable against noise.
The two predictors were combined in a linear regression model. The predictions from 
the simplicity model for a stimulus sets were taken to correspond to the predicted 
classification frequency values from the regression model—clearly, higher values correspond 
to more intuitive classifications. Note that the regression model was significant 
(F(2,6)=l 0.46, p=.011). Finally, we can ask whether the classification predicted as optimal 
from the simplicity model is the same as the classification preferred by participants. This was 
the case for all stimulus sets for which there was high classification structure (i.e., ‘two 
clusters’, ‘unequal clusters’, ‘spread out clusters’, ‘three clusters’, ‘poor two clusters’, and 
‘five clusters’). In the case of the stimulus sets ‘random’ and ‘embedded’ there were small 
differences between the optimal classification predicted by the simplicity model and the 
empirically preferred one (the codelength associated with the former was only very slightly 
lower than the codelength associated with the latter). However, for the stimulus set 
‘ambiguous points’ there was a large difference between the simplicity prediction and
|
! empirical result. In that case, the preferred classification was produced with a frequency of
I three, so that one would have less confidence that this is indeed the classification most
I obvious to participants, as opposed to one which emerged as most popular simply by chance.
6.4 Summary
118
For this investigation, we were interested in examining the validity of the simplicity 
model, and whether introducing general knowledge would affect the spontaneous 
classifications made. An unsupervised categorization task was employed to examine 
observer agreement concerning the categorization of nine different stimulus sets. The 
stimulus sets were designed to capture different intuitions about classification structure. The 
main empirical index of category structure was the number of times the most frequent 
classifications was produced, for different stimulus sets. With 169 participants, and a within 
participants design, with some stimulus sets the most frequent classification was produced 
over 50 times and with others not more than two or three times. For some stimulus sets, there 
was good correspondence between model predictions and participant performance, but our 
results also revealed weaknesses in the simplicity model. Also, introducing general 
knowledge did not affect the way in which the classifications were made.
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Chapter 7
Experimental results: unsupervised categorization vs. 
supervised categorization
7.1 Introduction
i
This Chapter provides the experimental results of our supervised vs. unsupervised 
investigation (this excludes the work carried out in relative vs. absolute shifting, which is 
given in Chapter 5 and the unsupervised categorization results of Chapter 6 ). Briefly, our 
goals here were to investigate whether there was a relationship between supervised and 
unsupervised categorization. So, after exploring the validity o f the model with the larger set 
| in Chapter 6 , 1 then used the same stimuli, but adopted a supervised categorization procedure
(a learning task). This was to test whether the intuitiveness of the categories would affect how 
j easy it is to learn and remember the supervised categories.
7.2 Supervised and unsupervised categorization
!i
| Chapter 2 gives a thorough account of the simplicity model in unsupervisedj
! categorization, and explains some of the concepts below such as category coherence in more 
! depth. Chapter 3 gives an account of supervised categorization. The literature in 
categorisation has, to a large extent, been organised around the distinction between 
supervised and unsupervised categorisation. For example, most categorisation models are 
specifically proposed as either models of supervised categorisation (e.g., Ashby et al., 1998; 
Minda & Smith, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988), or of unsupervised categorisation (e.g., Anderson,
! 1991; Pothos & Chater, 2002). As a consequence, supervised and unsupervised categorisation
I
1
t
I
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processes, previously, have been studied in separate research traditions, and only few studies 
have attempted to explore possible convergence between the two forms of categorisation.
In unsupervised categorization, one of the most fascinating aspects of human 
cognition is how we develop the concepts and categories with which we understand the 
world. Research into unsupervised categorization concerns the processes which enable us to 
spontaneously recognize/ create groupings in a set of stimuli and offers the promise to help us 
appreciate the causal principles underlying the richness and diversity of human conceptual 
knowledge. In the laboratory, in unsupervised categorization experiments there are no pre­
determined categories. Participants are presented with a set of stimuli and are asked to divide 
them into categories which appear natural and/ or intuitive (the number of categories can be 
fixed or unconstrained). In real life, unsupervised categorization would relate to the process 
which allows us to spontaneously consider a set of patterns as belonging together (cf. 
perceptual grouping) or to category coherence, that is the ‘glue’ which binds together the 
members of a category. The notion of category coherence has intrigued psychologists, since 
its initial proposal by Murphy and Medin (1985). Why do we consider a category like ‘chairs’ 
as intuitive (coherent) but a category composed o f ‘babies, the moon, and rules’ nonsensical? 
A simple answer might be similarity. Even though exclusive reliance on similarity has been 
criticized (Barsalou, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 1985), there is no doubt that this is an 
incredibly powerful principle in understanding human categorization.
Research in unsupervised categorization concerns a range of topics. The focus of the 
present work is the spontaneous preference for certain classifications, as opposed to others, 
and whether such a preference can be applied to supervised categorization. Ultimately, it is 
hoped that understanding what drives this preference will help understand the issue of 
category coherence. Other research issues studied in unsupervised categorization relate to the 
spontaneous attentional dimensional selection (e.g., Milton & Wills, 2004; Pothos & Close, 
2008) and the role of general knowledge in category coherence (e.g., Yang & Lewandowsky, 
2004; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). Note, finally, that most categorization research has so far 
concerned supervised categorization, which involves the teaching of predetermined 
categories. For example, in the laboratory, an experimenter might decide that certain stimuli 
are in category ‘A’ and other stimuli in category ‘B’. In the real world, a toddler might be 
told by her mum that this round, yellow object, with the funny smell is a ‘lemon’. In 
supervised categorization the key research question concerns how novel instances are 
classified in relation to existing categories. The default assumption would be that supervised 
and unsupervised categorization correspond to separate cognitive processes.
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Modeling work in supervised categorization has progressed at an impressive rate. For 
example, the computational properties of supervised categorization models have been 
I thoroughly scrutinized. For example, in relation to the debate between exemplar and
; prototype theory, there have been several studies examining the computational behavior of
j the models and sometimes even the role of specific individual parameters (e.g., Ashby &
| Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Lee & Vanpaemel, 2008; Olsson, Wennerholm, & Lyxzen, 2004;
| Minda & Smith, 2000; Navarro, 2007; Nosofsky, 1990, 2000; Smith, 2007; Vanpaemel &
Storms, 2008). With no doubt, this work has been extremely useful. Individual researchers
I
may have their preferences regarding, e.g., exemplar vs. prototype theory, but the crucial 
point is that there is a wealth of computational analyses to make an informed decision. We 
suggest that one reason for the sophistication of formal work in supervised categorization has 
been the existence o f ‘standard’ datasets, capable of discriminating between model 
predictions. For example, Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) famous 5-4 category structure and 
Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins’s (1961) finding that certain classifications are easier to learn 
than others, have been examined in dozens o f studies (e.g., Johansen & Kruschke, 2005; 
Nosofsky, 2000; Smith & Minda, 2000; but see Homa, Proulx, & Blair, 2008). One might 
argue that so much emphasis on a particular dataset may be distracting and ultimately reduce 
the ecological validity of the resulting models/ model revisions. However, at the same time, 
there is unquestionable value in the existence of modeling ‘standards’ against which new 
proposals can be evaluated.
There is an abundance of empirical data if one is interested either in unsupervised 
learning (e.g., Billman & Knutson, 1996; Knowlton & Squire, 1994; Reber, 1967) or 
spontaneous categorization with some constraints (such as the number of categories to be 
produced; e.g., Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999). For example, several researchers have 
reported the spontaneous selection of a single dimension for categorization, when participants 
| are asked to divide objects in two groups (e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987;
! Milton & Wills, 2004; Regehr & Brooks, 1995; but see, Murphy, 2004, Pothos & Close,
2008). However, there are very few datasets with an entirely unconstrained unsupervised 
categorization procedure, which could serve as modeling standards in the development of 
unsupervised models of categorization (in the way, for example, that the Shepard et al., 1961, 
or the Medin and Schaffer, 1978, results have guided supervised categorization models).
| Compton and Logan (1999), Pothos and Chater (2002) did employ an entirely unsupervised
j categorization procedure, however, in both these cases there were problems: Compton and
Logan employed a procedure which could only loosely be considered a spontaneous grouping
of stimuli into categories (they presented participants with dot diagrams and asked them to 
draw curves around the dots which should be grouped together) and Pothos and Chater 
employed a very limited number of participants; as we shall see, a key empirical problem 
| with unsupervised categorization experiments is that there is considerable variability in 
| participants’ responses.
So, as given above, there is much evidence on both unsupervised and supervised
i
categorization, but little effort has been made to explore the relationship between these two 
different forms of categorization.
7.3 Experimental results supervised vs. unsupervised categorization
The extensive computational work in supervised categorization has led to a clear 
understanding of the differences and similarities of different models. In fact, the majority of 
studies in supervised categorization have been driven by a desire to test specific differences 
between supervised categorization models. This has not been the case in unsupervised 
categorization.
Note that some limited computational comparisons have been carried out for the 
rational model, the simplicity model, and an unsupervised version of the GCM (Pothos & 
Bailey, 2009; Pothos, 2007). These analyses did not show a particular model as superior. For 
example, Pothos (2007) presented a systematic examination of the models against a series of 
artificial stimulus sets. The stimulus sets were specified to conform to obvious intuitions
| about category coherence (e.g., if there are two clusters, the shorter the distance between the
i
I clusters, the less coherent the resulting classification). Under such circumstances, the
j
predictions about category intuitiveness from the simplicity model and the rational model 
were nearly identical. Pothos and Bailey (2009) used data from previous studies. But, in their 
comparison, the only truly unsupervised data came from Compton and Logan (1999), who 
employed a rather artificial categorization task (stimuli were dots in a diagram and 
participants were asked to indicate their classifications by circling around the dots) and 
Pothos and Chater (2002), who employed probably too few participants for robust 
unsupervised categorization results.
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Regardless of these limitations, there is an important conclusion we can make from 
these two studies: models of unsupervised categorization tend to agree on what is the best 
way to classify a single set of stimuli (not least because, as noted, the category structures 
employed in studies of unsupervised categorization tend to be fairly intuitive). Where they 
differ is regarding their predictions for the relative intuitiveness, or naturalness, of different 
classifications. For example, two classifications for the same set of stimuli set can vary in 
category intuitiveness but, equally, two classifications for different stimulus sets can vary in 
i  intuitiveness. In Chapter 2 we demonstrated two examples of category intuitiveness, given in
I Figure 2 (this is given again below to illustrate this point again, and more specifically to the
experimental work). In Figure 2, classification A is more intuitive than alternative 
classification B for the same stimulus set. It is with respect to such predictions that Pothos 
and Bailey (2009) identified differences between models of unsupervised categorization. 
Therefore, the important conclusion is that models of unsupervised categorization are best 
evaluated with respect to how intuitive they predict different classifications will appear to 
naive observers, across a number of different classifications for the same stimuli and different 
stimuli. The question that motivates the experimental work in the present chapter, is whether 
such notions o f 4 intuitiveness’ can be applied to supervised categorization.
Research in categorization has been organized on the basis of a distinction between 
supervised and unsupervised categorization. The former concerns learning pre-specified 
categories. In a laboratory setting, an experimenter may have decided that certain stimuli are 
in one category, while other stimuli in a different one. The objective of a participant is to 
learn which stimuli go to which category, usually through a process of corrective feedback 
(that is, a participant sees a stimulus, guesses its category membership, and receives feedback 
as to whether his/her guess was correct or not). In real life, arguably many linguistic 
categories are taught through a process of supervised categorization. For example, a child can 
learn that certain objects are oranges and other objects are lemons, by guessing the category 
membership of a relevant novel exemplar and subsequently receiving corrective feedback 
I from an adult (cf. Demetras, Post, & Snow, 1986; Gleitman, Newport, & Gleitman, 1984). A 
I key aspect of supervised categorization is that there are no (apparent) limits on the
complexity of the classifications which can be taught (e.g., Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999; 
McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995).
Unsupervised categorization concerns the spontaneous impression we often have that 
a group of stimuli belong to the same category. Such an intuition is most obvious in 
perceptual grouping, whereby sometimes we have an immediate impression that there are
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| clusters (e.g., see Figure 8 ; cf. Compton & Logan, 1999). With respect to real concepts,
j
| Murphy and Medin (1985) advocated the idea of category coherence: that is, for most realI
I concepts, there is a ‘glue’ that binds the members of a concept together. As with the 
; perceptual grouping example of Figure 8 , certain real life concepts are more coherent than 
| others. For example, there is very little ambiguity regarding membership into the category of 
‘chairs’. However, many naive observers will disagree as to what should be considered (a 
I member of the concept) ‘literature’. In experimental studies of unsupervised categorization, 
an experimenter is typically constrained to consider naturalistic classifications, that is, 
classifications which will be plausibly spontaneously produced by participants (e.g., Pothos 
& Chater, 2002; Pothos & Close, 2008).
Figure 8 . Assume that the diagrams correspond to some putative psychological space and that 
each dot corresponds to an instance in our experience. There an immediate impression that 
there are two clusters on the left panel, but this is not so for the right panel.
We are interested in the extent to which the distinction between supervised and 
i  unsupervised categorization is meaningful. This is an issue of central importance in the study 
of categorization, since, for example, it affects researchers’ perception of whether there
i
should be separate models for supervised and unsupervised categorization or not. In 
! motivating the present experiments, we will consider relevant neuroscience, computational,
} and experimental work.
[
We can first consider whether what is known about the neuroscience of categorization 
can provide some clues as to whether supervised and unsupervised categorization should be
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considered separate cognitive processes. With respect to supervised categorization, 
researchers have been interested in whether one can use neuroscience methods to understand 
what is different about rules-based category learning and category learning based on 
knowledge of individual exemplars (cf. Pothos, 2005). For example, Koenig et al. (2005; see 
also Smith, Patalano, & Jonides, 1998) found that classifying novel instances on the basis of a 
rule activated the anterior cingulate cortex, parietal areas, and left inferior frontal areas, while 
classification on the basis of similarity to previously encountered exemplars involved anterior 
prefrontal areas, the posterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral temporal-parietal areas.
Participants in the rule condition of Koenig et al. were explicitly told of which rule to 
use (cf. Allen & Brooks, 1991). One could ask of whether there are situations when naive 
observers required to learn a classification might spontaneously do so in terms of a rule.
I Ashby and colleagues have been advocating an influential paradigm, termed CO VIS 
(Competition between Verbal and Implicit Systems; Ashby et al., 1998; Zeithamova & 
Maddox, 2006), according to which category learning can proceed either through the 
development of an explicit, verbal rule (cf. Smith et al., 1998) or an exemplar similarity 
strategy (in the CO VIS framework this is termed ‘information integration’). The rule strategy 
is supported primarily by the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the head of 
the caudate nucleus. For example, the prefrontal cortex has been widely implicated in 
planning, differentiating amongst conflicting goals, and identifying expectations based on 
actions (Banich, in press). By contrast, the information integration strategy involves the 
inferotemporal cortex and the tail of the caudate nucleus. This is a procedural learning 
system, which presumably involves the nigrostriatal dopamine pathway.
The two systems of CO VIS appear to provide a reasonable framework of the range of 
classifications systems which might be involved in supervised category learning. We can ask 
whether there is any evidence that the brain areas involved in unsupervised categorization 
might be distinct or overlap with the areas postulated in CO VIS for supervised categorization. 
A telling study by Op de Beeck et al. (2008) revealed that perceptual organization in the 
lateral occipital cortex was based on similarity (of course, in earlier visual areas, organization 
of information is retinotopic). Can we associate the spontaneous emergence of intuition that a 
set of stimuli should be categorized in a certain way, with this similarity-based organization 
in the later visual areas? It’s unclear that we can do this, but, equally, it’s unclear as to which 
other areas might support the spontaneous emergence of classification intuitions. Overall, the 
neuroscience results may tentatively indicate that separate systems support supervised and
126
unsupervised categorization, but this conclusion is greatly undermined by the lack of 
neuroscience research regarding unsupervised categorization.
We can next examine the principles underlying computational models of supervised 
and unsupervised categorization. Influential supervised categorization models, such as
I
; exemplar theory and prototype theory (Minda & Smith, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988; see also, Van
1
| Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008), typically assume that categorization of novel exemplars is 
driven by their similarity to either the members or the prototype of the available categories. 
Similarity is typically computed as a function of distance in a putative psychological space. 
However, such models allow for the possibility that the process of category learning may 
transform the original psychological space, through the attentional weighting of different 
dimensions or overall stretching or compression of the space. Such transformations would 
take place in a way to support the process of category learning (e.g., the attentional salience 
of a dimension would increase if it is highly diagnostic for a required classification).
Models of unsupervised categorization also often employ a principle of similarity. For 
example, Pothos and Chater’s (2002) simplicity model is based on the idea of Rosch and 
Mervis (1975) that more obvious classifications should be ones for which within category 
similarity is maximum and between category similarity is minimum. Other models of 
unsupervised categorization, such as the rational model, predict categories which maximize 
the posterior probability of the particular feature combination of their members, given 
category membership (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2006; cf. Corter & 
Gluck, 1992). However, Pothos (2007) compared the rational model and the simplicity model 
and found that the predictions of these models converged across a wide range of stimulus 
sets. Moreover, Pothos and Close (2008) postulated a mechanism of spontaneous attentional 
weighting of dimensions in unsupervised categorization. According to Pothos and Close, a 
dimension may be spontaneously entirely ignored if it does not contribute to the intuitiveness 
j of a classification for a set of stimuli (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004). Note, however, that the
\ graded attentional weighting that seems to be possible in supervised categorization has not
j been observed in unsupervised categorization.
So, at this broad level of analysis, supervised and unsupervised categorization models 
appear to be based on similar principles. Love, Medin, and Gureckis (2004) were the first to 
try to provide a single computational framework for both supervised and unsupervised 
categorization, with their SUSTAIN model. However, crucially, there are separate 
components of SUSTAIN responsible for each type of categorization. Regarding 
unsupervised categorization, categories emerge for groups of items which are similar to each
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! other. Supervised categorization is supported by a learning mechanism similar to that!
j  embodied in current versions of the exemplar theory (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988). In principle,
| SUSTAIN can allow the interaction between supervised and unsupervised categorization (a
parameter controls the relative influence of each mechanism). Therefore, according to Love 
et al. (2004) there are separate computational mechanisms for supervised and unsupervised 
categorization.
Pothos and Bailey (2009) provided a contrasting perspective. They examined whether 
an influential version of exemplar theory, the Generalized Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky, 
j 1988), could be modified to describe results in unsupervised categorization. They called their
! model unsupervised GCM and compared its predictions against those of two (proper)
!
| unsupervised categorization models, the simplicity model and the rational model. Overall, the
comparisons of Pothos and Bailey did not reveal a model to be superior relative to the two 
others—the performance of the unsupervised GCM was approximately equivalent to that of 
the simplicity model and the rational model. Pothos and Bailey’s comparisons, therefore, 
show that a model of supervised categorization can, with relatively little modification, be 
applied in the context of unsupervised categorization.
Logically, a model of supervised categorization can always be applied in 
unsupervised categorization, and vice versa. For example, a supervised categorization model 
can be used to produce an ‘intuitiveness’ prediction for a particular classification, by 
considering each instance one-by-one as a novel instance and classifying it to its respective 
category; this operation will result to an error term (which may be zero). Repeating this 
procedure for all stimuli, the sum of error terms can be used as a measure of classification 
intuitiveness, in the sense that when the error term is low we can say that the classification is 
more consistent with the model’s assumptions (this is the procedure by which Pothos & 
Bailey, 2009, applied the GCM to unsupervised categorization data). Conversely, a model of
| unsupervised categorization can, in principle, be applied to predict the classification of new|
' instances by examining how the intuitiveness of a classification is changed by assigning a
j
| novel instance to different categories.
Of course, as noted, there are possible differences between supervised and 
t unsupervised categorization, such as the issue of attentional weighting o f stimulus
dimensions noted above. Moreover, the requirements of learning a particular supervised 
| categorization may lead participants to develop complex category representations, for
example, based on rules or combinations of elementary rules (Ashby et al., 1998; Kurtz, 
2007). In sum, considering the computational principles relevant in supervised and
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unsupervised categorization provides mixed intuitions regarding a possible equivalence 
between supervised and unsupervised categorization.
Love (2002) carefully examined this issue. One of his hypotheses was that in 
supervised learning there should be no difference between linearly separable and non-linearly 
separable category structures (this result is supported by the data of Medin &
| Schwanenflugel, 1981), while in unsupervised learning linearly separable category structures 
| appear more plausible. His results supported this hypothesis, so that Love concluded that 
supervised and unsupervised categorization are better understood as separate cognitive 
processes. However, there are some problems with this conclusion.
First, the conclusions of Medin and Schwanenflugel have been challenged, with later 
research indicating that in supervised categorization as well, linearly separable category 
structures are easier to learn than nonlinearly separable ones (Blair & Homa, 2001). Second, 
Love created an unsupervised categorization task using the Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins 
(1961) dataset, which is a well known dataset in supervised categorization. However, 
importantly, he augmented the stimuli with an extra dimension of variation, which was meant 
to correspond to the intended classification. This manipulation effectively alters the similarity 
structure of the stimuli quite drastically: in all cases, it creates a very easy (and linearly 
separable) categorization of the stimuli into the required categories. In other words, if 
participants were to focus only on this additional (labels) dimension of variation, there would 
be no need for them to consider any o f the other information about the Shepard et al. stimuli. 
Indeed, the intended structure of the Shepard et al. stimuli (as linearly separable categories, 
nonlinearly separable categories etc.) would be lost. Finally, the tasks Love employed 
corresponded only loosely to the more standard procedures in unsupervised categorization 
research. For example, participants were asked to either memorize or rate the pleasantness of 
the stimuli. Then, in test, pairs of stimuli were presented such that they were identical except 
| that in one stimulus the ‘classification’ dimension had one value and in the other the 
! classification dimension had the other possible value; the task was an old-new recognition 
I task. He found that recognition accuracy was different with the memorization or pleasantness 
learning tasks, compared to a standard supervised categorization task. Interesting as this 
manipulation is, it clearly corresponds more to an incidental learning cognitive process rather 
than an unsupervised categorization one. The properties that emerge as more salient as a 
result of a memorization or irrelevant learning task (based on pleasantness) is an issue quite 
different from that of whether a classification is more intuitive than another.
I
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To sum up, Love’s (2 0 0 2 ) is not a definitive test of the (lack of) equivalence between 
supervised and unsupervised categorization. The research reported in this paper broadly 
follows the design of Love’s study. However, we have tried to incorporate a range of 
extensions which should lead to a better test of the equivalence between supervised and 
unsupervised categorization. Colreavy and Lewandowsky (2008) provided another 
comparison between supervised and unsupervised categorization, in the context of the
r
development of learning strategies with increased exposure to a set of stimuli. In their 
unsupervised condition, participants could decide how to classify each stimulus into either of 
two available categories. In the supervised condition, participants were asked to learn twp- 
cluster classifications for the same stimuli. Colreavy and Lewandowsky found many 
similarities between the supervised and unsupervised categorization conditions, including, for 
example, with respect to learning rates.
The research reported in this paper broadly follows the design of Love’s study. 
However, we have tried to incorporate a range of extensions which should lead to a better test 
of the equivalence between supervised and unsupervised categorization. The first extension is 
that the basis of the current investigation is the dataset of unsupervised categorization results, 
presented in Chapter 6 . To our knowledge, this is currently the most extensive study of 
unsupervised categorization and, therefore, it provides a rich dataset against which to 
examine possible relations with supervised categorization. A particular advantage of this 
dataset is that it includes stimulus sets for which the empirically preferred classification does 
not always have two clusters—for some stimulus sets the preferred classification has as many 
as five clusters. Second, we employed exactly the same stimulus sets for unsupervised and 
supervised categorization. Thus, the comparison of human performance between the two 
types of categorization is better controlled (recall that Love, 2002, had to change the 
representation of the Shepard et al., 1961, stimuli, for his test of unsupervised categorization).
I The unsupervised categorization results are reported in detail in Chapter 6 ; in this work, we
| simply employ the main conclusions from this study, and compare them with the
' corresponding results from two matched supervised categorization tasks (which constitute the 
novel empirical work reported in this paper).
Third, there is the issue of which variables to use to characterize supervised and 
unsupervised categorization. The former is a straightforward issue. In this context, supervised 
categorization performance can be adequately characterized by the difficulty associated with 
learning different classifications. In this work we also employed an additional dependent 
variable to characterize supervised categorization, corresponding to the memory of a
i
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particular classification. The latter is a more complex issue, not least because of the enormous 
variability which is typically associated with unsupervised categorization experiments 
(Pothos & Chater, 2002). In Chapter 6 , 1 suggested two possible dependent variables, the 
frequency of the preferred classification for a stimulus set and the number of distinct 
classifications produced by participants for a stimulus set. The logic behind both variables is
f
the same: if for a stimulus set there is a very intuitive classification, then one would expect 
this classification to be produced very frequently and, equally, that there should be less 
disagreement in how the stimuli are classified. In fact, in Chapter 6 1 reported that these two 
variables correlated extremely highly with each other. In this work we follow these 
investigators and also suggest that human performance in unsupervised categorization can be 
characterized by the frequency of the preferred classification in different stimulus sets.
To sum up, the purpose of this research is to provide the most straightforward 
possible test of the possible equivalence between supervised and unsupervised categorization. 
Our starting point is a large dataset on unsupervised categorization, which is reported 
elsewhere (Chapter 6 ). In this research we describe two experiments with matched supervised 
categorization tasks. Our overall approach follows that of Love (2002), although we have 
tried to improve on his specific procedure in several respects. There are two experiments that 
follow. Experiment 1, compares the relationship between the results of the unsupervised task 
with a standard supervised learning task. Experiment 2, compares the relationship between 
the difficulty o f learning the categories (i.e. the results of Experiment 1) with the memory for 
category labels.
7.4 Experiment 1 unsupervised vs. supervised learning; learning condition
I
i
f
! Participants
{
!
Participants were 180 Swansea University undergraduates, who had not taken part in any 
related experiments. They participated in the study for course credit or a small payment. 
Experimental design was between participants, so that each participant was tested with only 
one stimulus set (exactly 2 0  participants were tested with each stimulus set).
Materials
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The materials employed in this study are identical to those of Chapter 6  but for the fact that in 
this study stimuli were presented individually on a computer screen, while in Chapter 6  
unsupervised categorization study each stimulus was printed individually on a sheet of paper. 
We took care to ensure that the physical size of the stimuli as shown on the computer screen 
and as printed on the sheets of paper were the same.
We briefly summarize the stimulus details (for more information please see Chapter 
6 ). Stimuli were created so as to broadly resemble spiders; the two relevant dimensions of 
variation were the length of the ‘legs’ (after the joints) and the length of the central body. We 
adopted lengths as the relevant dimensions of variations, since this makes it relatively 
straightforward to assume a Weber fraction (in both cases 8 %; Morgan, 2005). For both 
dimensions, the actual lengths were between 40mm and 80mm. An example of the stimuli is 
shown in Figure 6  of Chapter 6 . The stimuli were intentionally created to resemble some real- 
life creature, as a manipulation to increase the coherence of the two dimensions. It was 
important that the two stimulus dimensions could be perceived together without analytic 
effort (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004; Pothos & Close, 2008).
The key design aspect of this research concerns the range of stimulus sets employed. 
In Chapter 6 , 1 employed nine different stimulus sets, each having 16 stimuli, which were 
meant to capture a range of intuitions regarding unsupervised categorization. For example, in 
one stimulus set there was a fairly salient two-cluster classification, in another a two-cluster 
classification whose salience was undermined by some ambiguous points, in a third a five- 
cluster classification etc. The considerations guiding the selection of stimulus sets are 
considered extensively in Chapter 6 . In this work we aim to simply employ the results 
regarding category intuitiveness from this research (summarized in Chapter 6 ) and motivate 
the creation of matched supervised categorization tasks. The nine stimulus sets can be 
referred to as ‘two clusters’, ‘unequal clusters’, ‘spread out clusters’, ‘three clusters’, 
‘ambiguous points’, ‘poor two clusters’, ‘five clusters’, ‘random’, and ‘embedded’. These 
names are meant to correspond to the key aspect (in terms of prior, experimenter intuitions) 
of category structure in each stimulus set. All stimulus sets are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. A schematic representation of the nine stimulus sets employed in this research. 
Each point in each stimulus set is indexed by a number from 0 to 15. The curves show the 
classifications taught to participants in each case.
Procedure
We adopted a standard supervised categorization procedure. The experiment was organized 
in units, such that each unit consisted of one presentation of all the stimuli with their correct 
category labels, and two presentations of the stimuli without the labels—in the latter case, the 
participant had to guess the correct label and corrective feedback was provided after each 
response (as is standard in experiments of supervised categorization). When participants were 
not required to make a response each stimulus was presented for 1 0 0 0 ms, when participants 
were required to respond, a stimulus would be shown until a response was made. The 
learning criterion was to go through all the stimuli in a learning unit without making any 
errors (the experimenter was able to determine when this happened, because a sound 
indicated an incorrect response). When a participant managed to do this, the experiment 
stopped. Otherwise, the participant would be presented again with the stimuli in a unit. A 
different randomized order of stimulus presentation was employed each time.
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The classifications taught to participants for each stimulus set are shown in Figure 9. 
Note that the number of categories varies from two to five. These are the classifications 
predicted as most intuitive by the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002). The simplicity 
model has been shown to predict the classification preferred by participants in all cases in 
which there is a salient category structure. Moreover, for stimulus sets for which there is no 
salient category structure, there tends to be very high variability in participant classifications. 
In such cases, it appears that a certain classification may be preferred not because of any 
intrinsic structural properties but, rather, by chance. This observation provides justification to 
use the classifications predicted by the simplicity model in the supervised categorization task, 
rather than the ones preferred by participants.
It is clearly an empirical issue whether this assumption can be justified in general. 
Regardless, it does seem to be appropriate in the present case: For the stimulus sets shown in 
Figure 9, the simplicity model correctly predicted the preferred classifications in the cases of 
the ‘two clusters’, ‘unequal clusters’, ‘spread out clusters’, ‘three clusters’, ‘poor two 
clusters’, and ‘five clusters’. In the case of the stimulus sets ‘random’ and ‘embedded’ there 
were small differences between the optimal classification predicted by the simplicity model 
and the empirically preferred one. For the stimulus set ‘ambiguous points’ there was a large 
difference between the simplicity prediction and empirical result. Importantly, in the three 
cases in which there was a discrepancy between the prediction of the simplicity model and 
the classification preferred by participants, the frequencies with which the preferred 
classifications were produced were just 3, 2, and 3, respectively for the ‘random’,
‘embedded’, and ‘ambiguous points’ stimulus sets (note that there were 169 participants in 
the study of unsupervised categorization in Chapter 6 ; therefore, a frequency for the preferred 
classification of 2 means that, out of 169 participants, only 2 produced this classification). To 
reiterate, our assumption is that when a classification is produced with a frequency as low as 
2 or 3, then we are not warranted to conclude that there is something special or particularly 
intuitive about this classification (so that we are better off employing the predictions of a 
reasonably well-motivated model of unsupervised categorization, such as the simplicity 
model).
Results
We recorded two dependent variables, the number of learning units required to achieve 
criterion and the total number of errors before criterion had been achieved (note that each 
learning unit consisted of a presentation of all the stimuli with their labels and two
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presentations of the stimuli without the labels—in the second case participants had to guess 
the correct classification of each stimulus). There was a highly significant correlation 
between the two variables (r=.64, p<.0005). Accordingly, we will restrict the analyses to only 
one of the variables, the number of learning units required to reach criterion.
Table 8  shows how the number of units differed for the nine stimulus sets we 
employed. Also, it summarizes the key dependent variable from the unsupervised 
categorization results of Chapter 6  (this is the frequency o f the preferred classification). Note, 
first, that there are differences between the ease of learning of different datasets: 
F(8,171)=35.22,;?<.0005. This result confirms the expectation from Table 8 , that it was much 
easier to learn the required classification for certain stimulus sets, compared to others.
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I Stimulus se t  Frequency o f m ost p refe rred1 M ean num ber of units2 Range3
i
j ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
ii
!
Two c lu s te rs  31 4 .10  2 — 10
U nequal c lu s te rs  33 4 .15  2 — 11
S pread  o u t c lu s te rs  8 7 .40  2 — 17
T hree c lu s te rs  55 9 .30  3 —21
A m biguous tw o  c lu s te rs  3 14.45 3 —27
P oor tw o  c lu s te rs  17 9.65 3 —24
Five c lu ste rs  58  13.45 4 —28
R andom  3 25.40 1 2 - 3 3
E m bedded  2 22 9 —35
Table 8 . A summary of the unsupervised categorization results of results from Chapter 6  and the supervise 
Experiment 1.
Notes: The frequency with which the preferred classification was produced. The mean number of learning 
criterion. The lowest and highest number of learning units required to reach criterion. The standard deviat: 
learning units required to reach criterion.
The critical research question concerns a possible relation between the unsupervised 
and supervised categorization results. From an unsupervised categorization perspective, the 
higher the frequency o f the preferred classification, the more psychologically intuitive this 
classification should be. From a supervised categorization perspective, the lower the numberj
| o f units required to reach the learning criterion, the easier (and hence more intuitive) the 
I taught classification should be (cf. Pothos & Bailey, 2009). The objective in the analyses
| below is to examine whether these two measures of category intuitiveness, from an
unsupervised and supervised categorization task, are related or not.
A simple test of a putative association between the measures of category intuitiveness
|
from the unsupervised categorization results of Chapter 6  and the supervised categorization 
results from the present experiment is a correlation, for each stimulus set, between the 
frequency of the preferred classification and the number of learning units required to reach 
criterion. This correlation was low and not significant, although in the right direction (r=-.47, 
p=.20). However, this test does not take into account the fact that there is a differential role 
for the number of category labels in the supervised and unsupervised categorization 
procedure. Specifically, an increased number of category labels is likely to affect executive 
function and working memory resources, both of which would disrupt a process of supervised 
learning (Maddox et al., 2004). Indeed, there was a correlation between number of units 
required to achieve criterion and number of category labels (r=.72,p=.03). By contrast, there 
is no evidence that a spontaneous classification involving more clusters will be more (or less) 
demanding than one with fewer clusters. We therefore first regressed the number of learning 
units on category labels and recorded the unstandardized residuals—these residuals provide 
us with an estimate of the variance in the number of learning units which cannot be accounted 
for by differences in the number of labels. The regression was significant, as expected, 
showing (as before) that the number of labels participants had to keep track of affected 
! learning difficulty (F(l ,7)=7.37, p=.03). Subsequently, we correlated the residuals with the 
frequency of the preferred classification. The correlation was now highly significant and in 
the right direction: r=-.811, /?=.008.
Discussion
The literature in categorization has, to a large extent, been organized around the distinction 
j  between supervised and unsupervised categorization. For example, most categorization 
! models are specifically proposed as either models of supervised categorization (e.g., Ashby et
i
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al., 1998; Minda & Smith, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988) or models of unsupervised categorization 
(e.g., Anderson, 1991; Pothos & Chater, 2002). There is no doubt that the distinction between 
supervised and unsupervised categorization is a highly intuitive one. However, the present 
empirical results have failed to provide support it.
In brief, Experiment 1 was a standard supervised categorization learning paradigm.
We asked different participants to learn a particular classification for nine different stimulus 
sets. A natural dependent variable in this context is the difficulty with which different 
classifications are learned (cf. Shepard et al., 1961). Certain classifications were easier to 
learn than others. Are these the same classifications which are spontaneously produced more 
frequently by participants? We utilized the unsupervised categorization results of Chapter 6  
for the same stimulus sets. Factoring out the variance due to the number of category labels,
| we found that classifications which were easier to learn were indeed the ones more likely to 
be produced spontaneously. Our results therefore show that the aspects of category structure 
which make a classification easy to learn are the same as the ones which make a classification 
‘stand out’ in a spontaneous categorization setting (cf. Colreavy & Lewandowsky, 2008).
In Experiment 1 we considered one possible hypothesis of how we can decide 
whether a categorization taught to participants is intuitive or not: if a categorization is easier 
to learn, then it should be more intuitive. There is an alternative perspective: we can ask 
whether a particular association between category labels and stimuli is more resistant to 
forgetting. If a classification for a set of stimuli is better remembered several days after it has 
been taught, then we should conclude that this classification is more intuitive. Accordingly, 
we can examine whether category intuitiveness in terms of remembering a taught 
classification is associated with category intuitiveness in terms of preference in a spontaneous 
categorization task. Experiment 2 addresses this issue.
7.5 Experiment 2 unsupervised vs. supervised learning; memory condition
Participants
Participants were 195 Swansea University undergraduates, who had not taken part in 
Experiment 1 or any other related experiments. They participated in the study for course
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credit or a small payment. Experimental design was between participants. Participants were 
divided between the nine stimulus sets as shown in Table 9.
Materials and Procedure
The materials were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 consisted of 
two parts. First, there was a part in which participants had to learn the given classification. 
This part proceeded in a way analogous to that o f Experiment 1, although some modifications 
were introduced. The learning part was organized in units consisting of a presentation of each 
stimulus with the correct label, followed by five presentations of all the stimuli without the 
labels—in these presentations, as before, participants had to guess the correct answer and 
received corrective feedback. Moreover, in the trials when participants did see the correct 
label, the stimulus and label appeared on the screen until the participant pressed the key with 
the corresponding label. In this way, we hoped to reinforce the stimulus— label associations. 
The learning criterion was, in a way analogous to what we had before, responding to all the 
stimuli once without making any errors. Unlike Experiment 1, a learning unit could be cut 
short when participants achieved the learning criterion. After the learning criterion had been 
achieved, participants saw all the stimuli three more times, in a way that each stimulus with 
its correct label appeared on the screen, and participants had to press the key with the 
corresponding label before proceeding to the next stimulus. This ‘fixed exposure’ 
manipulation was added to ensure that participants would experience the same number of 
label— stimulus associations, after they had learned the correct classification.
Participants were invited to come again to the laboratory seven days later (a deviance 
of one day was tolerated). To encourage participants to do so, they would not receive any 
compensation until they came for the second time. Nearly all participants did attend both 
experimental sessions. The second experimental session was identical to the learning unit 
described above (five presentations of all stimuli), but without the presentation of the correct 
stimulus—category label associations at the beginning. In other words, this was a standard 
recall test for the correct label for each stimulus.
Results
We first consider the dependent variables which are analogous to those in Experiment 1, the 
number of blocks required to achieve the learning criterion and the errors made before
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criterion could be achieved (note that a learning block in Experiment 2 corresponds to one 
presentation of the 16 stimuli, so that it differs from the learning unit defined in Experiment 
1). Table 9 shows these results. As before, there was a highly significant correlation between 
number of blocks and errors (r=.92, /?<.0005). It is also interesting to check that the 
supervised learning results in Experiment 2 were equivalent to those in Experiment 1, which 
turned out to be the case (r=.87,/>= 002). This result is reassuring, since there were only 
superficial differences between the training procedure in Experiment 1 and that of 
Experiment 2.
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Stimulus se t Participants Mean num ber  of blocks1 Range2 Standard deviat
Tw o c lu s te rs  25 1 .36 1— 3
U nequal c lu s te rs  27 2 .04  1 —8
S pread  o u t  c lu s te rs  32 2 .22  1— 11
T h ree  c lu s te rs  13 9 .23  2 — 37
A m biguous tw o  c lu s te rs  21 3 .57  1 — 18
P oor tw o  c lu s te rs  18 6 .39  1 — 17
Five c lu s te rs  19 10 .42  3 — 31
R andom  20 18 .15  3 - 4 7
E m bedded  20 24 .95  6 —60
Table 9. The supervised categorization results obtained in Experiment 2.
0 .6 4
1 .58
1.93
9 .33
3 .98
4 .25
7 .42
10.99
15.05
Notes: The mean number of learning blocks required to reach the learning criterion. The lowest and highe: 
reach criterion. The standard deviation associated. The number of errors in reproducing the category label-
In Experiment 2 there was a unique dependent variable, the number of memory errors 
in recalling the category label—stimulus associations a week after training (Table 9). The 
memory variable correlated highly with the number of blocks required to reach criterion 
(r=.97,p<.0005). This result illustrates that classifications which were easiest to learn were 
indeed the easiest to remember a week later as well. Moreover, the frequency of preferred 
classifications correlated highly with the memory variable, once the variance due to category 
labels had been eliminated as in Experiment 1 (r=-.73,p=.026).
|
i
|
| Discussion
|
The memory for a particular classification is a dependent variable which has not featured 
prominently in categorization research. However, it is an important empirical variable, since 
it informs our insight of what kinds of classifications might be more resistant to forgetting. 
Presumably, as categorization researchers, we would like to conclude that classifications 
which are remembered better are ones which are cognitively ‘special’, in some sense. A 
classification which is easy to learn is not necessarily the same as a classification which is 
resistant to forgetting. For example, categories which are closer to each other may be more 
prone to interference from forgetting, even if they are straightforward to learn in the first 
place. Equally, learning a categorization sometimes appears to involve particular 
transformations of the psychological space for the corresponding stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky, 
1988). There has been no research as to how long-lived such transformations are. For 
example, a particular classification may be easy to learn after a fairly radical transformation 
of psychological space (e.g., involving the projection of all stimuli along a single dimension). 
However, if this transformation is short-lived, then one would expect that memory for the 
i  corresponding classification to likewise decay quickly.
Despite the above considerations, the present results showed that the memory for a
i
| particular taught classification correlated highly with the ease of learning the classification in
| the first place and, moreover, with the likelihood that the classification would be
i  spontaneously produced in an unsupervised setting. This provides compelling demonstration
j  that a convergence in the theoretical accounts for supervised and unsupervised categorization
may be desirable, at least in some cases.
General discussion
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We have examined two measures of supervised categorization, with nine different stimulus 
sets, and related the results to spontaneous preference for the taught classifications in an 
unsupervised categorization task. Each of the different categorization tasks can be seen as 
providing a different measure of category intuitiveness. For example, a standard supervised 
categorization task (Experiment 1) can discriminate between classifications which are easy to 
learn and ones which are more difficult to learn. Clearly, we can suggest that the former are 
more intuitive compared to the latter (cf. Kurtz, 2007; Shepard et al., 1961). The supervised 
categorization task augmented with a recall task (Experiment 2) allowed us to identify the 
classifications which are more resistant to memory decay and forgetting. Classifications 
which are better remembered must be more obvious and intuitive. Finally, the unsupervised 
categorization procedure that I employed in Chapter 6 provides a measure of spontaneous 
preference for a categorization. More intuitive categorizations would be the ones that are 
spontaneously produced more frequently.
All the three measures of category intuitiveness related closely to each other, 
consistently with the findings of Colreavy and Lewandowsky (2008). This conclusion 
suggests that whatever it is that makes a classification more obvious in an unsupervised task, 
also makes the classification is easier to learn in a supervised task. If such a conclusion 
proves to be general, it would have important implications for the development of models of 
categorization. Currently, nearly all categorization models are specifically proposed either as 
models of supervised categorization (e.g., Minda & Smith, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988) or models 
of unsupervised categorization (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Pothos & Chater, 2002). Some 
researchers have sought to modify models of supervised categorization so that they can 
function as models of unsupervised categorization (e.g., Pothos & Bailey, 2002; cf. Kurtz, 
2007). Also, there have been attempts to integrate a supervised model and an unsupervised 
one within the same formalism (e.g., Love et al., 2004). However, few models have been 
proposed from the outset as purporting to account for both supervised and unsupervised 
categorization with exactly the same computational principles.
How general are the conclusions in this paper? A key point is that the taught 
classifications were all ones which were very likely to be produced spontaneously. 
Supervised learning can allow a naive observer to learn classifications which would never be 
produced spontaneously (e.g., McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995; Maddox et al., 2004). For such 
very complex classifications, it seems meaningless to talk about a putative equivalence 
between supervised and unsupervised categorization.
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A related issue is this: models of supervised categorization typically employ 
mechanisms which appear to go beyond those relevant in unsupervised categorization. For 
example, in supervised categorization researchers have advocated a process of fine tuning of 
the attentional salience of each stimulus dimension, non-linear compression/ stretching of the 
entire psychological space, response parameters which affect whether a categorization 
decision is more probabilistic or deterministic, and separate learning systems to distinguish 
between classifications which can be learned with a simple rule vs. ones which require a 
more passive, information integration procedure (Ashby et al., 1998; Minda & Smith, 2001 
Nosofsky, 1988; Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008). It seems extremely unlikely that all these 
mechanisms have analogues in unsupervised categorization. Indeed, supervised and 
unsupervised categorization appear to share only a handful of computational principles. 
Similarity is one such principle, since most models of both supervised and unsupervised 
categorization embody some function of similarity. Attentional weighting of stimulus 
dimensions may be another common principle, noting, however, that only ‘crude’ attentional 
selection has been observed in unsupervised categorization (that is, a stimulus dimension may 
be spontaneously ignored if it does not appear to add to the overall intuitiveness of a 
classification; Pothos & Close, 2008). Conversely, in unsupervised categorization it has been 
suggested that general knowledge plays an important part (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985); in 
supervised categorization, general knowledge effects appear to be restricted to enhancing the 
attentional salience of certain stimulus features (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna, 1994). Note, 
however, that the effect of general knowledge in categorization has been incredibly difficult 
to formalize and so, in the absence of formal models, it is difficult to appreciate exactly how 
much of an effect it has on categorization (cf. Pickering & Chater, 1995; but see Harris, 
Murphy, & Rehder, 2008; Heit, 1997).
The upshot of the above discussion is that a putative equivalence between supervised 
and unsupervised categorization must only hold for classifications which ‘naturalistic’ in the 
first place (i.e., classifications which are likely to be produced naturally). A possible 
hypothesis forthcoming from this research is that the features of supervised categorization 
models which do not appear relevant in unsupervised categorization are relevant only when 
learning more complex classifications, that is, ones which are very unlikely to be produced 
naturally. Whether the learning of complex classifications is supported by the same cognitive 
process as that of simple classifications is very much an open issue. It is possible that 
learning of complex classifications should be better understood in the context of learning 
models in general, rather than as a cognitive process of concept formation. An alternative
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possibility is that categorization models should rightly incorporate the ability to learn both 
simple and complex concepts, so that only their features corresponding to the former ability 
can be extended to support unsupervised categorization processes as well. Such possibilities 
suggest exciting new avenues for further research.
In sum, we showed that when it comes to naturalistic classifications, supervised and 
unsupervised categorization processes converge. This finding raises several interesting 
possibilities regarding the way supervised and unsupervised models can be developed, in a 
way that a corresponding convergence of the relevant computational principles can be 
achieved.
7.6 Summary
Supervised and unsupervised categorization have been studied in separate research 
traditions. Only a handful of studies have attempted to explore a possible convergence 
between the two. This Chapter provided a research investigation which built on these studies, 
by comparing the unsupervised categorization results from Chapter 6 with the results from 
two procedures of supervised categorization. In two experiments, we tested 375 participants 
with nine different stimulus sets, and examined the relation between ease of learning of a 
classification, memory for a classification, and spontaneous preference for a classification. 
After taking into account the possible confounding role of the number of category labels in 
supervised learning, we found the three variables to be closely associated with each other. 
Our results provide encouragement for researchers seeking unified theoretical explanations 
for supervised and unsupervised categorization.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary of findings
This thesis set out to explore three separate phenomena in categorization. Firstly, it 
tested the validity of the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002). Secondly, it investigated 
the relationship between unsupervised and supervised categorization. Thirdly, it explored the 
circumstances which would cause a relative and absolute shift in representation. The 
experimental traditions explored in this thesis related broadly to categorizing with learning, 
(supervised), without learning (unsupervised), and when learning is impaired through 
interference (interference in our case was implemented by increasing group size and group 
numbers in the relative experimental work).
8.2 Summary of the relative vs. absolute experimental work.
In Chapter 5 ,1 explored the conditions which cause traditional ‘absolute 
representation’ of supervised categorization to be abandoned. This work was based upon the 
work into absolute judgment experiments and, specifically, the theory implemented by 
Stewart et al. (2005), regarding the use of the RJM, to explain some of the sequential effects. 
In these effects, judgments about the serial position of the ‘current’ item in a sequence is 
thought to be determined by the neighboring items, in terms of relational properties, such as 
‘bigger than and ‘smaller than’. I applied this theory, in a general way, to my current 
investigation into relative and absolute representations, as little related work has been done in 
the area of categorization and in the area concerning relative, absolute representational shifts.
I generally found that reducing exemplar numbers, increasing the categories available 
and by introducing a time delay between presentation and response, was sufficient to induce 
changes in the representation. More specifically, I found that the representation of ‘absolute’ 
decision making shifted towards a more ‘relative’ form, where relational properties such as
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‘bigger than’, ‘smaller than’ became important. I related this finding to work in the area of 
analogical mapping and the relative judgment model.
8.3 Summary o f the work carried out in unsupervised categorization.
In Chapter 6, evidence was sought to test the accuracy of the simplicity model to 
predict unsupervised categorization results. This was an extension to the work carried out by 
Pothos and Chater (2002) in using more complex stimulus sets and using a much larger 
participant sample. The basic form of the model predicts that unsupervised categorization 
can be predicted with the ‘simplicity principle’, and that this principle can be formalized 
more specifically in categorization through the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002). 
The simplicity principle, suggests that, generally, given some data, the simplest hypothesis 
that leads to the best description (or explanation) of this data, is most likely to be the correct 
one. This has been formalized in the simplicity model of unsupervised categorization, which 
suggest that the categories are chosen on the basis that lead to greatest reduction in 
codelength Broadly, this means that the categories that lead to the shorted codelength are 
those which remove (take advantage of) redundant information.
The results did demonstrate that some aspects of the simplicity model were able to 
predict accurately the unsupervised categorization results, however, for some conditions it 
did not do as well. These results have motivated additional research (not covered in my 
thesis), and modeling work to accommodate these new findings.
8.4 Summary of the work carried out in supervised categorization
In Chapter 7 ,1 examined the relationship between the unsupervised categorization 
results and the potential intuitiveness o f supervised categorization. This is an area in 
categorization that has received little attention. Supervised categorization differs from 
unsupervised categorization, because it is categorization where the group structure and labels 
are indicated by the experimenter. For example, the experimenter gives corrective feedback 
to the participant, which indicates that item 1 belongs to a group called ‘Chomps’ and item 
two belongs to a group called ‘Blibs’. This differs significantly from the work carried out in 
unsupervised categorization, which is based on free sort tasks, where the participants are not 
given any feedback, and can sort the items into categories on any basis they choose. As
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| indicated by the simplicity model, unsupervised categorization decisions are made on the 
| basis of information reduction, which loosely corresponds to the simplicity principle. The 
motivation for associating results in supervised categorization, was to identity whether the
i
I ‘intuitive’ categories (low codelength) were also those which could be learned and 
; remembered more easily. This work thus was intended to find some common theme between 
supervised and unsupervised learning, through the simplicity principle.
The findings from this work were promising, as I found a general relationship
| between intuitiveness of categories predicted by the simplicity model of unsupervised
|
categorization, and the ease with which participants could learn the supervised categories and 
also remember these categories a week later. This work provides promising evidence that the 
simplicity principle can be applied outside of unsupervised categorization, in the area of 
supervised categorization.
8.5 Some broader theoretical thoughts.
On the whole, these quite separate categorization research traditions have been related 
through the common theme of information reduction. Occam’s razor (see Chapter 2), seems 
to be prevalent through this categorization work, and has not been explicitly explored across 
so many domains of categorization work. Occam’s razor is a general theoretical attempt to 
formalize the notion that simple explanations are generally preferred. In unsupervised 
categorization this has formally been implemented in the form of simplicity principle, which 
was the basis for the simplicity model. However, to date, no such attempts have explored 
how this general theory of information reduction can be applied more generally throughout 
categorizations work. The work carried out on the relationship between unsupervised and 
supervised categorization in Chapter 7 formally investigated the application of such a theory 
to supervised categorization, with promising results. It is more difficult to relate the 
| simplicity principle with the work on relative vs. absolute categorization formally (i.e.,
i
| through a specific mathematical framework). However, in principle, this more formal
approach could be applied, where in some situations relational properties could be considered 
‘simpler’ by the cognitive system. A simple example of this is where the category ‘Chomps’ 
is smaller than the category ‘Blibs’, this requires just one bit of information to compute 
whereas in absolute mode of representation, each absolute representation would have to be 
considered according to exemplar theory, and thus would require more computation.
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8.6 Future work and directions; potential applications o f the measured used in 
this thesis work
8.6.1 Theoretical
This work provides a great deal of evidence which can lead to more investigations at 
both the theoretical and applied levels. For example, at the theoretical level, more work 
could be done to bridge the gap between the simplicity principle and relational representation. 
One plausible question is to what extent can we apply the simplicity principle, formally, 
outside of unsupervised categorization. Of course, the work here looked at the relation 
between supervised and unsupervised categorization, and, also, we have some speculative 
results that indicate that representation can change to ‘simpler forms’ (i.e., relative 
representations) when the information content is overly complex, but it is yet unclear if these 
ideas can be formalised more specifically.
Another area of direct theoretical work, could be to first refine the simplicity model, 
to fit the data more accurately, and then examine the ability of the model to account for 
changes in stimulus presentation and number of dimensions. For example, can the simplicity 
model predict the unsupervised categorization, accurately, using stimuli that is comprised of 
three of four dimensions? Also, would attention weights (as used in the GCM) need to be 
introduced to account for such more complex stimuli. At this stage, this is unclear.
There is yet another area that could be explored, which deals with modelling 
background information. For example, the simplicity model could, potentially be extended to 
deal with general knowledge effects through the simplicity principle. However, a formal 
account of such an approach would be clearly very difficult (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Heit, 
1997; Heit & Bot, 1999; McDermott, 1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1991, 1998; Pickering & 
Chater, 1995). The closest attempt to date at solving this problem directly is from Heit 
(1999), who used an exemplar account for addressing the knowledge selection problem. 
Heit’s Baywatch model involves a supervised process where the experimenter provides the 
background information to the program, which allows its expert systems to select sub 
descriptions for the categories given. In one example, the category ‘buildings’, could be 
subdivided into ‘unique buildings’ by the expert system, such as identifying ‘churches’ as 
different to ‘schools’. This involves a process where new information is integrated with old
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and observed category members have a greater effect when they are consistent with 
background information (see Heit, 1994). So, the simplicity model, could in principle be 
applied in a similar way.
i
|
j 8.6.2 Applied
i
i
i
In one potential application, the simplicity model could be applied directly to the area 
of autism, where there is much debate over the mechanisms behind over-selectivity. For 
instance, several suggestions attempt to explain why individuals with ASD have problems in 
discrimination learning with complex cues. These include attention deficits (Dube et al.,
1999; Lovaas et al., 1971), encoding problems (Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Reed & 
Gibson, 2005), and post-processing or retrieval problems (e.g., Leader et al, 2009). 
Unsupervised categorization could be employed in this area to determine whether over­
selectivity is caused by deficits in attention as there is already evidence from supervised 
categorization experiments showing learning deficits (Klinger & Dawson 1995; 2001; Bott et 
al., 2006).
Similarly, as the autistic population have shown to have limited ‘absolute 
representation’, demonstrated by their reduced supervised categorization performance, this 
could lead to more ‘relative mode’ representations when using the relative vs. absolute 
experimental paradigm. So, there is a lot more room for extending this work to other 
populations, especially in relation to cognitive deficits, such as an autistic population.
Likewise, this could also be applied to the area of traumatic brain injury, where over-
!
| selectivity has been shown by Way land and Taplin (1985), and potentially many other
| clinical areas. This would therefore have important implications in terms of interventions that
I could be used. This could lead to further research into how to ameliorate dysfunctional over-
; selectivity in category learning. Therefore, there is a clear impact on potential ‘users’ of this
research in a directly practical and applied way. I plan to use the experimental data to 
investigate further what interventions are most appropriate for the specific attention- or 
learning-based deficits, as it might be the case that certain individuals with ASD would need 
specially catered interventions, based on their specific attention or learning deficit needs.
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8.7 Closing comments
The present investigation has explored themes in the categorization area. This includes work 
in unsupervised, supervised categorization, as well as relational shifting (within supervised 
categorization). I have demonstrated that the simplicity principle is useful as a general means 
of describing and predicting categorization. However, it is clear that much additional work 
needs to be carried out, with additional dimensions, and modelling work in the area of 
background knowledge. There is also potentially a lot of applied work that can be considered 
in the areas of autism, and clinical populations.
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